

Indira Gandhi National Open University



**THE ROLE OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY IN
ETHIOPIAN STATE FORMATION**

By

ABEL ANDARGE AGEGNEHU

Enrollment No.: ID1405566

Supervised By:

BEFEKADU DHABA (PhD Candidate)

Master of Arts (Political Science)

INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY

May, 2018

**THE ROLE OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY IN ETHIOPIAN
STATES FORMATION**

By

ABEL ANDARGE AGEGNEHU

Enrollment No: ID1405566

Supervised By:

BEFEKADU DHABA (PhD Candidate)

**This Dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Masters in Political Science of the
Indira Gandhi National Open University**

May, 2018

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the Dissertation entitled “**THE ROLE OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY IN ETHIOPIAN STATE FORMATION**” is my original work and has not been submitted for any other academic award in any institution of learning, has not been presented to any purpose earlier than being submitted to Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU); and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Name of Candidate : Abel Andarge Agegnehu

Enrollment No : ID1405566

Signature :

Date : May, 2018

CERTIFICATE BY THE ACADEMIC SUPERVISOR

CERTIFICATE

Certified that the Dissertation Entitled “THE ROLE OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY IN ETHIOPIAN STATES FORMATION ” Submitted by ABEL ANDARGE AGEGNEHU is his own work and has been done under my supervision. It is recommended that the dissertation be placed before the examiner for the evaluation.

Signature of the Academic Supervisor

.....

Name : Befekadu Dhaba (PhD Candidate)

Address: Rift Valley University, Chafe Campus,

Addis Ababa

P.O.Box : 18048 e-mail: dbefeaau@yahoo.com

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Study Center: St. Mary, University, Addis Ababa

Regional Center : 34

May 2018

Acknowledgement

Thank God for his unlimited blessings in my life. I would like to express my love and respect to my mother Miss Amakelech Tilahun and my wife Mahlet Muruts for their presence beside me and facilitate peaceful as well as pleasant environment for me so that I could be psychologically energetic in doing my duties.

I am very grateful to INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY (IGNOU) for it allowed me to enroll to its sophisticated, scholarly and most advanced Masters programme, particularly, in the Political Science stream, which has always been my favorite. It has shaped me to understand the contemporary political discourse around the globe, particularly, the fragile political dynamics in Ethiopia. This has motivated me to continue writing at large to reveal how poorly managed politics could affect a given people and the country. I really appreciate the quality and originality of IGNOU's course materials.

My special and heartfelt gratitude goes to my advisor and mentor Befekadu Dhaba (PhD Candidate) who relentlessly supported, advised and encouraged me in the entire processes and finalization of this timely Dissertation. He deserves huge respect and appreciation for his positive attitude and high commitment to be able to finalize this Dissertation.

I foreword my gratitude to all academicians, political party members as well as civil society workers who cooperated with me in sharing their precious time to the interviews I had with them to collect data for this dissertation.

Finally I thank all individuals who supported me whenever I need their cooperation and assistance. Thank you all.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgement.....	i
Table of Contents.....	ii
Acronyms.....	v
Abstract.....	vi
Meanings of Key Terms.....	vii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY	1
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM	3
1.3. Research questions	5
1.4. OBJECTIVES of the Study.....	5
1.4.1. General objective.....	5
1.4.2. Specific objectives.....	5
1.5. Significance of the Study.....	5
1.6. Scope and Limitations of the Study	6
1.6.1. Scope	6
1.6.2. Limitation	6
1.7. Organization of the Study	6

CHAPTER TWO

2.1. Theoretical framework and Review of Literature	7
2.1.1. Ethno-culture	7
2.1.2. Theory of Racial Typology.....	7
2.1.3. Race, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism.....	12

2.2. Conceptualization-Theories of state formation	13
--	----

CHAPTER THREE

Methods and Methodology of the Research.....	21
3.1. Research Methodology.....	21
3.2. Methods.....	21
3.2.1. Tools for Data Collection	21
3.2.2. Semi Structured Interview	22

CHAPTER FOUR

Research Interpretations and analysis	24
4.1. The Construction of National Identity in Modern Times: Theoretical Perspective	25
4.1.1. Definition of Identity	25
4.1.2. Identity Formation Mechanisms.....	27
4.1.3. Nation-Building Strategies	31
4.1.4. The Etymological Analysis of the Nation	35
4.1.5. National Identity	37
4.2. Ethiopia in Comparative Perspective	42
4.3. Ethnic Diversity in Ethiopia.....	44
4.4. The Evolution and Structure of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia	47
4.4.1. From Multi-ethnic Empire to Ethnic Federation	47
4.4.2. Language Pluralism	51
4.4.3. Regional Autonomy.....	52
4.4.4. Ideology of Ethiopian Federalism: Ethnic Self- determination.....	54
4.4.5. Stalinist theory of nationality and reconstruction of the Ethiopian state.....	57
4.4.6. EPRDF's Revolutionary Democracy and Federalism	62
4.5. Advantages and disadvantages of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia.....	62

4.5.1. Advantages of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia	63
4.5.2. Disadvantages of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia.....	64

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion and Recommendations	68
5.1. Conclusion.....	68
5.1.1. Empirical flaws behind Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia	68
5.1.2. Conceptual flaws behind Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia.....	72
5.2. Recommendations	77
Media sources.....	81
References.....	i
Appendix 1 : Interview questions	viii
Appendix 2 : Interview questions to observe Anticipation Ethnic Rights and Ethnic Relations..	ix
Appendix 3 : Interview questions to assess comments and suggestions on Resource Allocation ...	x
Appendix 4 : Interview questions to assess Representation.....	xi
Appendix 5: Interview questions to assess Anticipation	xii

Acronyms

AESM:	All Ethiopian Socialist Movement / MelaItyopia Socialist Niqinaqe (MEISON)
ALF:	Afar Liberation Front
ANDM:	Amhara National Democratic Movement
ASSR:	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
FDRE:	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
ENM:	Eritrean Nationalist Movements
EOC:	Ethiopian Orthodox Church
EPRDF:	Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP:	Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party
ESM:	Ethiopian Students’ Movement
IOLF:	Islamic Oromo Liberation Front
OLF:	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF:	Ogaden Nation Liberation Front
SNNPR:	Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region
SSR:	Soviet Socialist Republic
TPLF:	Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front
USA:	United States of America
UN:	United Nations
USSR:	United Soviet Socialist Republic
WSLF:	Western Somali Liberation Front

Abstract

In 1991 Ethiopia established an ethnic federal system that gave full recognition to ethnic autonomy, while maintaining the unity of the state. Its new constitution created a federal system largely consisting of ethnic-based territorial units. The constitution aspires to achieve ethnic autonomy and equality while maintaining the state. The federal system is significant in that its constitution provides for secession of any ethnic unit. It encourages political parties to organize along ethnic lines, and champions an ethnicized federal state with a secession option. As an exception to the general pattern in Africa, it is a worthy case study. The paper has four interrelated objectives. First, it situates the Ethiopian case in comparative perspective. Second, it provides an overview of ethnic diversity in Ethiopia. Third, it analyzes the evolution and structure of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. Fourth, it attempts to provide a preliminary appraisal of its success and failure thus far and to speculate on its future prospects. It is a qualitative research conducted by literature reviews, semi-structured interviews, discussion with a number of academicians, political party members and other concerned individuals.

Meanings of Key Terms

- **Ethno-culture:** The combination of both Ethnicity and Culture.
- **State Formation:** The creation of a state as a political entity.
- **Internationalism:** Official socio political Relationship (s) and Inter governmental relationships between two countries or among more than two countries.
- **Globalism:** Worldwide interaction among people from different parts of the world by due to trade, politics, cyber, migration and so on.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Some people consider their state nationality (citizenship) as their essential identity more than their ethno-cultural background; while others consider their ethno-culture as if it is their fundamental identity more than the state nationality or citizenship. It is usually observed that sentiment of nationalism, racism, and tribalism among different individuals as well as different social groups throughout the world. Globalism on the other hand is seen by a number of people as a phenomenon which is against the everlasting sustainability of the uniqueness of the ethno-cultural identity since it causes people from different communities interact with each other and exchange their values.

In contrast, there are so many persons everywhere who promote the perspective of humanism. It is an obviously an observable reality that there is interdependency among human individuals and societies at large.

While admitting the inevitability of interdependency in human life, the argument of this thesis is basically in favor of the importance of interdependency, internationalism, and globalism on which the writer's personal conviction is based.

The essay attempts to discuss the role of ethno-cultural identity in the process of state formations and expansions as well as the Ethiopian contemporary trends of political administrations in accordance with ethno-cultural issues. In relation to this, it tries to see the main factors affecting ethno-cultural identity to be significantly influential or not to be so.

Furthermore, analysis of various discourses related to this topic and the thesis writer's critical reflection on them is one of the focus areas of this paper. Ethno-cultural identity is one of the major critical parts of the overall frameworks of the individual as well as collective identity.

Feelings of comfort and "rightness" for many philosophers are likely to come out of living within the environment which is to be shaped based on their own critical thinking rather than that of living within the existing system which is dominated by ethno-cultural values.

Ethno cultural identities are manifested in very intentional ways. This manifestation is triggered most often by two conflicting social and cultural influences.

First, deep conscious immersion into cultural traditions and values through the highly influential religious, family, neighborhood, and educational exposures and then developing a positive sense of ethnic identity and confidence on it (Linda Martin, 1997).

Second, people with minority status can have different ethnic make-ups. Those who are victims of negative stereotype, discrimination, political oppression, economic domination, and administrative marginalization may cause sense of differentiating themselves from the main stream society which is not as such affected by those problems. In this case, individuals often develop sense of ethnic identity as a result of being victim's of a negative treatment and media messages received from others because of their race and ethnicity (IBID).

Others, especially black Africans and red Indians, manifest ethnic and racial identity in mostly unconscious ways through their behaviors, values, beliefs, and assumptions. For them an ethno cultural identity is usually invisible and unconscious because societal norms have been constructed around their racial, ethnic, and cultural frameworks, values, and priorities and then referred to as "standard American culture" rather than as "an ethno cultural identity." This unconscious ethnic identity manifests itself in daily behaviors, attitudes, and ways of doing state formation and expansions (IBID).

Unlike many western cultures, there is a little conscious instilling of specific ethnic identity through white communities, nor is differential ethnic treatment often identified in the media of as white cultures did. This paper will try to discuss about the ethno cultural Identity benefits from the development of a conscious ethnic identity and benefits as well when multicultural frameworks are used in state formations and expansion (Bickford, Susan, 1997).

Contemporary societies in contrast, are likely to experience and be resistant to ways of state formations doing that are outside the globalization and trans ethno cultural identity norms in which they have been raised. Thus today's world communities are likely to have multi ethno cultural identity and self-reflective skills; they are likely to insist on individual tasks and rewards to discount knowledge bases that seem "alternative". On the other hand, post modernism, cultural relativism, hermeneutics, and multiculturalism are used to show them how an attempt is made to refute arguments which are in favor of domination from one side and reestablish the notion of diversity in ethno cultural identity.

But, the discussion of the arguments of these two sides alone would not be sufficient for it leaves us in the middle of nowhere. So coming up with some different alternative to the problems at hand is mandatory to the philosophy of ethno cultural identity which is a new orientation in political theory, try to overcome the limitations of both of these two sides while developing its own unique position of state formations and expansions.

So rather than limiting oneself to one's dominant horizon alone, ethno cultural identity philosophy depicts how pleasingly reformed how the state should be.

The sentiment of ethno cultural identity in several cases could have been a cause to formulate the contemporary independent societies. This paper somehow attempts to assess the issue of those communities who have been struggling for liberation as a consequence of being victims of marginalization, discrimination, and liberation.

However, some part of the arguments on this essay has a limitation as it doesn't broadly show to what extent the extra factors could positively affect the importance of ethno cultural identity on state formations and expansions, and how much logically agreeable it is on clearly showing the liberation of disadvantaged parts of the society.

1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The question of identity is one of the major topics that have been raised among different groups of people throughout the world. The sentiments of racism, tribalism, and nationalism are also the major burning issues in the contemporary world. Sometimes, political elites also manipulate the mentality of the society by constituting and exaggerating ethno-cultural issues. This situation sometimes causes conflicts, civil wars, and international wars at large.

For example, it is possible to observe the case of North Korea versus South Korea, china versus Taiwan, India versus Pakistan, Eritrea versus Ethiopia, afar versus Isa - who live both in Djibouti and Ethiopia, Nuer versus Dinka - who live in south Sudan, etc. This people are known to have antagonism among each other and there is the sentiment of either racism or nationalism behind their opposition.

Ethnic conflict does not necessarily have to be violent. In a multiethnic society where freedom of speech is protected, ethnic conflict can be everyday feature of plural democracies. For example, ethnic conflict might be a non-violent struggle for resources divided among ethnic groups.

However, the subject of the confrontation must be either directly or symbolically linked with an ethnic group. In healthy multiethnic democracies, these conflicts are usually institutionalized and channeled through parliaments, Assemblies, and bureaucracies or through non-violent demonstrations and strikes.

While Democratic countries cannot always prevent ethnic conflicts flaring up into violence, institutionalized ethnic conflict does ensure that ethnic groups can articulate their demands in a peaceful manner, which reduces the likelihood of violence. On the other hand, in authoritarian systems, ethnic minorities are often unable to express their grievances.

Grievances are instead allowed to fester which might lead to long phases of ethnic silence followed by a violent outburst. Therefore, ethnic peace is an absence of violence, not an absence of conflict. Another consequence is that violent ethnic rebellions often result in political rights for previously marginalized groups.

The source of ethnic conflict is more likely psychological than intrinsically factual. Mental frameworks of the people have a major impact on the causes of ethnic conflicts; Social stigma, social stereotype and prejudice, discrimination and marginalization.

In order to make our world more peaceful and stable, we human beings should develop a sense of brotherhood among ourselves in a societal level, national level, continental level, and in a global level. So as to develop a sense of brotherhood, everyone has to find out the rationale behind it because sense of brotherhood cannot be developed by a mere wish.

When we come to the case of Ethiopia, ethnic based complaints and movements have been taking place since long ago up to now. The contemporary Ethiopian political situation indicates that there are frequent occurrence of uprisings and conflicts between groups of people from different ethno cultural background in Ethiopia.

For instance, in recent time, groups of people could quarrel in the name of identity who are from Ethio-somali versus those who are from Oromia. There is no any guarantee for similar conflicts among other ethnic groups not to happen because the majority of the layman people especially in relation to state formation have not properly understood the issue of ethno cultural identity.

This research aims to contribute its own findings and recommendations to the efforts being undertaken by policy makers and all other concerned bodies in this regard.

1.3. Research questions

1. Are internationalism and globalization inevitable natural processes or unnecessary incidents?
2. Does ethno cultural identity have a significant role in the process of any state formation and expansion?
3. Does ethno cultural identity have a significant role in the formation and expansion processes of African States?
4. Does ethno cultural identity have a significant role in the formation and expansion processes of Ethiopia as a State?
5. What should Ethiopia do to accommodate internationalism and globalization?

1.4. OBJECTIVES of the Study

1.4.1. General objective

The present study has tried to investigate the relationship between ethno-culture and state formation.

1.4.2. Specific objectives

- To assess the relationship between ethno-culture and state formation in Ethiopia
- To find a rational answer for the question as to what should Ethiopian policy makers do regarding ethno-cultural issues in accordance with globalism?

1.5. Significance of the Study

Studying about the relationship between ethno-culture and state formation is believed to have the following significances:

- It could be an insight for researchers who are concerned in political theory of how ethno-culture relates with state formation in the context of globalism and internationalism,
- It could give clue to policy makers and other concerned bodies about ethno-cultural issues in the context of globalism and internationalism, and
- It could be used by researchers who are concerned into Ethiopian political system about the issue of identity and the relationship between ethno-culture and state formation.

The researcher chose this study because there were not other people before who conducted the same research on such an issue which specifically assess the relationship between ethno-culture and state formation of Ethiopia in the context of globalization.

1.6. Scope and Limitations of the Study

1.6.1. Scope

Even though Ethno-culture and state formation are worldwide issues, the scope of this literature is restricted to Ethiopian context; and in terms of conceptual framework, it attempts to deal with ethno-cultural identity in its aspect which exclusively relates only to globalism.

1.6.2. Limitation

Even though there are a number of universities in Ethiopia. Due to financial and time constrains, the researcher's operation is limited in the universities which are located only in Addis Ababa city. The other limitation is that, it is very difficult to find out people who have the courage to express their genuine political believes due to some security issues. Besides, while communicating with the main participants of the study, it is difficult to find out persons who are free from personal bias even among academicians.

1.7. Organization of the Study

The study project has five chapters and they have been organized as follows;

CHAPTER ONE:- Chapter one has presented the "Introduction". The introduction contains two parts; the background as well as the conceptualization and theoretical framework. The background and the conceptualization provide with the main theme which deals with various theories and perspectives about the relationship between state formation and Ethno-culture in Ethiopian Political system. In addition, the chapter presents about the issue of identity and globalization in Ethiopian context. CHAPTER TWO:- Literature review about Ethnicity, Culture, identity and Globalization. CHAPTER THREE:- Presents about Research Methodology. CHAPTER FOUR:- Presents Research Interpretations and analysis. The chapter is further divided in to a number of sub-sections and the main theme of the dissertation is presented with in the chapter. CHAPTER FIVE:- Presents Conclusion and Recommendation.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1. Theoretical framework and Review of Literature

2.1.1. Ethno-culture

Philosopher observations show that ethnic, cultural, and ethno-identities come into being and are awakened by awareness of and interaction with other ethnic and cultural groups. As Alain de Benoist wrote: "the group and the individual both need to be confronted by 'significant others'. Therefore it is nonsense to believe that identity would be better preserved without this confrontation; actually it is the opposite: confrontation makes identity possible. Other subjects make a subject become a subject." (Ericsson and David, 2011). Thus interaction with other types of human beings is an essential part of human existence, since they draw their very awareness of being who they are by interaction.

Concerning the relations between different cultures, under normal circumstances each cultural entity is in contact with other cultural entities. It is true that cultures exist separately from each other, but it is an error to regard them as forming different universes, for in reality cultures engage in contact and dialogue with each other, which contributes to their development and improvement. For this reason, many authors such as Pierrekrebs have rightly argued, from an identitarian perspective that the originality and richness of the human heritages of this world are nourished by their differences and their deviations (Connolly and William, 2002).

In cultural dialogue, each exchange results in the appropriation and re-appropriation by one culture of the cultural creations or ideas of another culture in a new way based on its own unique particular spirit. It is also important to recognize that Europeans have also exchanged cultural creations with non-European people in a large scale cultural dialogue from which both sides benefited. This has established "World-European contemporary philosophy", although until late modern times Europeans have always maintained their uniqueness and particularity (Appiah and Anthony, 1992).

2.1.2. Theory of Racial Typology

Historically, the concept of race has changed across cultures and eras, eventually becoming less connected with ancestral and familial ties, and more concerned with superficial physical

characteristics. In the past, theorists have posited categories of race based on various geographic regions, ethnicities, skin colors, and more. Their labels for racial groups have connoted regions (Mongolia and the Caucasus Mountains, for instance) or denoted skin tones (black, white, yellow, and red, for example). However, this typology of race developed during early racial science has fallen into disuse, and the social construction of race or racialization is a far more common way of understanding racial categories.

According to this school of thought, race is not biologically identifiable. Rather, certain groups become racialized through a social process that marks them for unequal treatment based on perceived physiological differences. When considering skin color, for example, the social construction of race perspective recognizes that the relative darkness or fairness of skin is an evolutionary adaptation to the available sunlight in different regions of the world.

Contemporary conceptions of race, therefore, which tend to be based on socioeconomic assumptions, illuminate how far removed modern race understanding is from biological qualities. In modern society, some people who consider themselves “white” actually have more melanin (a pigment that determines skin color) in their skin than other people who identify as “black.” Consider the case of the actress Rashida Jones. She is the daughter of a black man (Quincy Jones) but she does not play a black woman in her television or film roles. In some countries, such as Brazil, class is more important than skin color in determining racial categorization. People with high levels of melanin in their skin may consider themselves “white” if they enjoy a middle-class lifestyle. On the other hand, someone with low levels of melanin in their skin might be assigned the identity of “black” if they have little education or money (Marks, Jonathan, 2003).

The social construction of race is also reflected in the way that names for racial categories change with changing times. It’s worth noting that race, in this sense, is also a system of labelling that provides a source of identity—specific labels fall in and out of favour during different social eras. For example, the category “negroid,” popular in the 19th century, evolved into the term “negro” by the 1960s, and then this term fell from use and was replaced with “black Canadian.” The term was intended to celebrate the multiple identities that a black person might hold, but the word choice is an ambiguous one: it lumps together a large variety of ethnic groups under an umbrella term. Unlike the case in the United States where the term “African American”

is common, most black Canadians immigrated from the Caribbean and retain ethnic roots from that area. Culturally they remain distinct from immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa or the descendants of the slaves brought to mainland North America. Some prefer to use the term “Afro-Caribbean Canadians” for that reason.

Ethnicity is a term that describes shared culture—the practices, values, and beliefs of a group. This might include shared language, religion, and traditions, among other commonalities. Like race, the term “ethnicity” is difficult to describe and its meaning has changed over time. And like race, individuals may be identified or self-identify with ethnicities in complex, even contradictory, ways. For example, ethnic groups such as Irish, Italian American, Russian, Jewish, and Serbian might all be groups whose members are predominantly included in the racial category “white.” Conversely, the ethnic group British includes citizens from a multiplicity of racial backgrounds: black, white, Asian, and more, plus a variety of race combinations.

These examples illustrate the complexity and overlap of these identifying terms. Ethnicity, like race, continues to be an identification method that individuals and institutions use today—whether through the census, affirmative action initiatives, non-discrimination laws, or simply in personal day-to-day relations.

Sociologist Louis Wirth (1945) defined a minority group as “any group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination.” The term minority connotes discrimination, and in its sociological use, the term subordinate can be used interchangeably with the term minority, while the term dominant is often substituted for the group that’s in the majority.

These definitions correlate to the concept that the dominant group is that which holds the most power in a given society, while subordinate groups are those who lack power compared to the dominant group.

Note that being a numerical minority is not a characteristic of being a minority group; sometimes larger groups can be considered minority groups due to their lack of power. It is the lack of power that is the predominant characteristic of a minority, or subordinate group. For example, consider apartheid in South Africa, in which a numerical majority (the black inhabitants of the country) were exploited and oppressed by the white minority.

According to Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris (1958), a minority group is distinguished by five characteristics: (1) unequal treatment and less power over their lives, (2) distinguishing physical or cultural traits like skin colour or language, (3) involuntary membership in the group, (4) awareness of subordination, and (5) high rate of in-group marriage.

Issues of race and ethnicity can be observed through three major sociological perspectives: functionalism, conflict theory, and symbolic interactionism. As you read through these theories, ask yourself which one makes the most sense, and why. Is more than one theory needed to explain racism, prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination?

In the view of functionalism, racial and ethnic inequalities must have served an important function in order to exist as long as they have. This concept, of course, is problematic. How can racism and discrimination contribute positively to society? Sociologists who adhere to the functionalist view argue that racism and discrimination do contribute positively, but only to the dominant group. Historically, it has indeed served dominant groups well to discriminate against subordinate groups. Slavery, of course, was beneficial to slaveholders (Lee, 1997).

Holding racist views can benefit those who want to deny rights and privileges to people they view as inferior to them, but over time, racism harms society. Outcomes of race-based disenfranchisement—such as poverty levels, crime rates, and discrepancies in employment and education opportunities—illustrate the long-term (and clearly negative) results of slavery and racism in world society.

Apart from the issues of race, ethnicity, and social inequality, the close ties of ethnic and racial membership can be seen to serve some positive functions even if they lead to the formation of ethnic and racial enclaves or ghettos. The close ties promote group cohesion, which can have economic benefits especially for immigrants who can use community contacts to pursue employment. They can also have political benefits in the form of political mobilization for recognition, services, or resources by different communities.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission for aboriginal residential school survivors or the policy of multiculturalism are examples. Finally, the close ties of racial or ethnic groups also provide cultural familiarity and emotional support for individuals who might otherwise feel alienated by or discriminated against by the dominant society (Smedley and Morgan, 2007).

For symbolic interactionists, race and ethnicity provide strong symbols as sources of identity. In fact, some interactionists propose that the symbols of race, not race itself, are what lead to racism. Famed interactionist Herbert Blumer (1900-1987) suggested that racial prejudice is formed through interactions between members of the dominant group: without these interactions, individuals in the dominant group would not hold racist views.

These interactions contribute to an abstract picture of the subordinate group that allows the dominant group to support its view of the subordinate group, thus maintaining the status quo. An example of this might be an individual whose beliefs about a particular group are based on images conveyed in popular media. These beliefs are unquestioned because the individual has never personally met a member of that group.

A culture of prejudice refers to the idea that prejudice is embedded in our culture. We grow up surrounded by images of stereotypes and casual expressions of racism and prejudice. Consider the casually racist imagery on grocery store shelves or the stereotypes that fill popular movies and advertisements. It is easy to see how someone living in Canada, who may know no Mexican Americans personally, might gain a stereotyped impression from such sources as Speedy Gonzalez or Taco Time fast-food restaurants, or Hollywood. Because we are all exposed to these images and thoughts, it is impossible to know to what extent they have influenced our thought processes (Winfield, 2007).

It is important to stress here that recognizing the reality and role of race in culture and ethnic identity does not imply culture and society can be reduced to race. It is true that the egalitarian assertion that "race is a social construct" is simply false, but it does not follow from this that "society is a racial construct". In fact, both of these positions are equally false: the former denies the reality and function of race which we have previously discussed, while the latter is the expression of a biological reductionism. Identitarian and new right philosophy rejects all forms of reductionism as fallacious, and therefore recognizes the complexity of factors influencing the nature and culture of a society. Race is only one factor that influences culture and society on state formations (which may themselves convey a reciprocal influence on race), but it is important to note that numerous cultural and social changes occur independently of race, because of multiple factors, and that identity cannot be reduced to simply racial identity, even if the later has some importance (Mills, Charles, 1998).

2.1.3. Race, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism

Similar debates in philosophy of race highlight the contingent and historical nature of “race” as a category of identity. Despite a complex history of biological essentialism in the presentation of racial typologies, the notion of a genetic basis to racial difference has been largely discredited; the criteria different societies (at different times) use to organize and hierarchize “racial formations” are political and contingent (Omi and Winant, 1986). While skin colors, appearance of racial features, or hair type are in some trivial sense genetically determined, the groupings of different persons into races do not pick out any patterned biological difference (Alcoff 1997, 2006).

The most notorious example of an attempt to racial difference as biological is the “one drop rule”, under which an individual was characterized as black if they had “one drop” or more of “black blood”. Adrian piper points out that not only does this belief persist in to contemporary readings of racial identity, it also implies that given the prolonged history of racial mixing in the US both coerced and voluntary. Very significant number of nominally “white people” in the US today should be re-classified as “black” (piper 1996).

In those countries that have had official racial classification, individuals’ struggles to be re-classified) almost always as a member of a more privileged racial group) are often invoked to highlight the contingency of race, especially at the borders of its categories. And a number of histories of racial groups that have apparently changed their racial identification Jews, Italians, or the Irish, for example also illustrate social constructionist thesis (Ignatiev, 1995).

The claim that race is “socially constructed”, however, does not in itself mark out a specific identity politics. Indeed, the very contingency of race and its lack of correlation with categories that have more meaning in everyday life (such as ethnicity or culture) may circumscribe its political usefulness: just as feminists have found the limits of appeals to “women’s identity” so Asian Americans may find with ethnicities and cultures as diverse as Chinese, Indian, or Vietnamese that their racial designation itself provides little common ground for global state formations which has community. That a US citizen of both Norwegian and Ashkenazi Jewish heritage will check that they are “white” on a census form says relatively little (although

nonetheless something) about their identity, or indeed of their very different relationship to anti-Semitism.

Tropes of separatism and the search for forms of authentic self-expression are related to race via ethno-cultural understandings of identity: for example, the U.S. Afro centric movement appeals to the cultural significance of African heritage for Black Americans (Asante 2000). Racial categories are perhaps most politically significant in their racial features, drawing on a complex history of racial stereotypes to do so. Racism is arguably analogous to other forms of oppression in being both overt and institutionalized, manifested both as deliberate acts by individuals and as unplanned systemic outcomes. The specific direction of US discussion of the categories of race has been around color-blind versus color-conscious public policy (Appiah and Gutmann 1996). Colorblindness that is, the view that race should be ignored in public policy and everyday exchange has hegemony admissions procedures is unfair and racist. Advocated of color-consciousness, on the other hand. Argue that racism will not disappear without proactive efforts, which require the invocation of race.

2.2. Conceptualization-Theories of state formation

The question about the origin of the state has been discussed for centuries. In the historical and philosophical arena, this question is a debated issue among scholars. With no concrete evidence to support any of the proposed theories, it remains as speculation. All of the most accepted theories do agree that the state must have certain basic elements: territory, population, government and sovereignty. Four Most Widely Held Theories That Attempt to Explain the Origin of the State are force theory, evolutionary theory, divine right theory, and social contract theory.

Force Theory proposes that the origin of state is developed through the use of force. One person or a small group of people claim control over the population in a specific area by force. Once the rule is well established the state is established. This theory is generally a result of war. One example: Adolf Hitler and his control over Germany that led to the attempted control of Europe, as well as the mass genocide of the Jewish population (Owns and King, 1999).

Evolutionary Theory states that the state evolved over time, starting with the primitive family. One person in the family was determined to be the leader of the family. On a primitive level, a

basic government was formed. Over decades, the family became a clan and a clan became a tribe. The state was identified when the tribe settled in a designated area and claimed it as their own (Owens and King, 1999).

The divine right theory holds that God created the state. God gave certain individuals of royal birth the divine right to rule. Since God divinely ordained its rulers and they were accountable to God, the population obeyed the ruler as they were required to obey God. This theory existed in many countries such as England and Europe throughout the Middle Ages (Owens and King, 1999).

In the social contract theory, a specific population within a given designated area gave up as much power to a government as needed to promote the well-being of all. Specifically, the community population and the leader have a contract. The state has power and authority over the territory. The community receives certain services such as a safe, crime-free area in which to live and keep their rights protected. This theory was developed in the 17th and 18th centuries by philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau. The U.S. political system is based on the social contract theory (Owens and King, 1999).

The Ethiopian case is more likely a combination of both force theory and the divine right theory in the ancient time and has been transformed into social contract after 1991. Writers of Ethiopian history have different perspectives in terms of their perception about the socio-political background of the country. Generally there are four different perspectives and approaches by which Ethiopian socio-political history has been presented. (1) Africanist perspective, (2) Ethiopianist perspective, (3) Ethio-nationalist perspective, and (4) Post-modern view of Ethiopian socio-political experiences.

The pan-Africanist perspective simply looks at Ethiopian history as part and parcel of African history. Ethiopia is just a part of Africa and the whole elements of Ethiopian socio-political experience are to be viewed as some part of the historical background of Africa. According to the perspective the age of Ethiopia is to be traced back as far as the age of Africa. Fossilized findings are widely used by pan-Africanist in order to describe Ethiopian age in history (Lex Lubin, 2010).

Ethiopianist perspective on the other hand, viewed Ethiopia as a unique state established by a divine will in different way from the rest countries of Africa. Ethiopianists measure the age of

Ethiopia since from about 3,500 years ago and even sometimes they claim about the time to be measured since 5,000 years ago. They argue that Ethiopia is culturally unique state "blessed" with the religious culture of Orthodox Christianity. The people of Ethiopia are heroes who have been sacrificing their lives for the respect of the country's sovereignty, territory, as well as identity. In this case, the northern Ethiopian culture is considered as an agent for the whole culture of the country. The Solomonic dynasty lovers can be mentioned as an example for this perspective. During the cold war era, the former Ethiopian president colonel Mengistu Hailemariam and his political party also by and large used to tend to be Ethiopianists even though they rejected the idea of divine power as they were Marxist and Leninist (Kelley L., Rose 2014).

The third one is the Ethio-nationalist perspective. Ethio-Nationalism is a type of nationalism which defines the nations in terms of a shared ethnicity. This perspective is further divided in to two different viewpoints such that "Colonial thesis" and "national operation thesis" (Gene Callahan, 2016).

The colonial thesis activists argue that the ethnic groups of the political elites in the ruling class have been colonizing the all ethnicities and peoples who could not get the chance to hold on the political power. That means, there are more than 85 ethnic groups within the Ethiopian political system and out of all these 85 ethnic groups, only one or two ethnic groups could get the chance to hold on to the political power and colonize all the rest political groups. One of the widely known political party which can be mentioned as the activist of the colonial thesis is the Oromo liberation front (OLF). OLF is an organization established in 1973 by Oromo nationalists to promote self-determination for the Oromo people against "Abyssinian colonial rule" (Gudina, Merera. 2006).

Another example of the colonial thesis is the Ogaden national liberation front (ONLF). ONLF is a separatist rebel group fighting for the right to self-determination for Somali ethnic groups who live in the Ethio-Somali region of Ethiopia. ONLF is established in 1984 claiming for the autonomy of this region and has claimed responsibility for several attacks since the beginning of 1994 aimed at Ethiopian forces in the area, which the government considers a region under the new federal system. The Sidama Liberation Front (SLF) is also another example for the colonial thesis advocates (Ibid).

In contrast, the national operation thesis argues that there has never been any colonialism in the Ethiopian historical background. Any ethnic group has never been colonized by another ethnic group. However, all ethnic groups did not enjoy equal opportunity in the political economy of Ethiopia since long ago. So, according to the national operation thesis perspective. The former Ethiopian political leaders favored one ethno culture over the other ethno cultures and one religion over the other religions. Even all the peoples from the other ethno-culture to which the former Abyssinian political leaders belong did not employ proper justice; rather, only some members of that ethnicity who were in the network of the ruling class which means the political elites enjoyed luxurious life. In short, this perspective rejects the idea of colonialism in Ethiopia but admits the presence of inequality among ethnicities within the politics of Ethiopia (Ibid).

Postmodern view of the Ethiopian political experience argues that there are always unexpressed undermined stories under the obviously told exaggerated stories in Ethiopian history. Ethiopian history is full of discourses. Historians are usually so biased that they don't genuinely search out and expose the true stories; instead, they focus on the issues which support their personal concern. So, they study and write based on their own ideological interest. This is one of the discourses which make one not to rely on the historical teachings about Ethiopian politics.

Another discourse is that, culture and territory are artificially constructed manifestations of identity within a society. A community may claim "this territory (land) is mine" and another community may also claim the same issue to the same territory (land). But, what is the factual evidence which enables them to convince that land area really belongs to either of the communities? There is no any objective judgment to allocate resource and cultural identity to the people. Rather influential elites and their propagandists preach the people and convince them to have the belief of specific ethno-cultural identity and ownership of specific natural resources. The issue of identity and ownership is full of discourse.

So, no one can genuinely and rationally assert that Ethiopian ethno-cultural issues are to be addressed correctly. Every social construction is essentially unfair phenomenon because it is made up at the expense of human life in which so many innocent people have been lost for the sake of that. This is also another discourse. For this research purpose, the researcher's position is in the favor of the national operation thesis which is one of the two branches of the ethno-nationalist perspective.

While the source of the conflict may be political, social, economic or religious, the individuals in conflict must expressly fight for their ethnic group's position within society. This final criterion differentiates ethnic conflict from other forms of struggle.

Ethnic conflict does not necessarily have to be violent. In a multi-ethnic society where freedom of speech is protected, ethnic conflict can be an everyday feature of plural democracies. For example, ethnic conflict might be a non-violent struggle for resources divided among ethnic groups. However, the subject of the confrontation must be either directly or symbolically linked with an ethnic group.

In healthy multi-ethnic democracies, these conflicts are usually institutionalized and "channeled through parliaments, assemblies and bureaucracies or through non-violent demonstrations and strikes." While democratic countries cannot always prevent ethnic conflict flaring up into violence, institutionalized ethnic conflict does ensure that ethnic groups can articulate their demands in a peaceful manner, which reduces the likelihood of violence.

On the other hand, in authoritarian systems, ethnic minorities are often unable to express their grievances. Grievances are instead allowed to fester which might lead to long phases of ethnic silence followed by a violent outburst. Therefore, ethnic peace is an absence of violence, not an absence of conflict. Another consequence is that violent ethnic rebellions often result in political rights for previously marginalized groups.

Academic explanations of ethnic conflict generally fall into one of three schools of thought: primordialist, instrumentalist or constructivist. Recently, several political scientists have argued for either top-down or bottom-up explanations for ethnic conflict. Intellectual debate has also focused on whether ethnic conflict has become more prevalent since the end of the Cold War, and on devising ways of managing conflicts, through instruments such as consociationalism and federalisation. The causes of ethnic conflict are debated by political scientists and sociologists. Explanations generally fall into one of three schools of thought: primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist. More recent scholarship draws on all three schools. Proponents of primordialist accounts argue that "ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location". Primordialist accounts rely on strong ties of kinship among

members of ethnic groups. Donald L. Horowitz argues that this kinship "makes it possible for ethnic groups to think in terms of family resemblances" (Jack, 2003).

Clifford Geertz, a founding scholar of primordialism, asserts that each person has a natural connection to perceived kinsmen. In time and through repeated conflict, essential ties to one's ethnicity will coalesce and will interfere with ties to civil society. Ethnic groups will consequently always threaten the survival of civil governments but not the existence of nations formed by one ethnic group. Thus, when considered through a primordial lens, ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic society is inevitable.

A number of political scientists argue that the root causes of ethnic conflict do not involve ethnicity per se but rather institutional, political, and economic factors. These scholars argue that the concept of ethnic war is misleading because it leads to an essentialist conclusion that certain groups are doomed to fight each other when in fact the wars between them that occur are often the result of political decisions.

Moreover, primordial accounts do not account for the spatial and temporal variations in ethnic violence. If these "ancient hatreds" are always simmering under the surface and are at the forefront of people's consciousness, then ethnic groups should constantly be ensnared in violence. However, ethnic violence occurs in sporadic outbursts. For example, Varshney points out that although Yugoslavia broke up due to ethnic violence in the 1990s, it had enjoyed a long peace of decades before the USSR collapsed. Therefore, some scholars claim that it is unlikely that primordial ethnic differences alone caused the outbreak of violence in the 1990s.

Primordialists have reformulated the "ancient hatreds" hypothesis and have focused more on the role of human nature. Peterson argues that the existence of hatred and animosity does not have to be rooted in history for it to play a role in shaping human behavior and action: "If "ancient hatred" means a hatred consuming the daily thoughts of great masses of people, then the "ancient hatreds" argument deserves to be readily dismissed. However, if hatred is conceived as a historically formed "schema" that guides action in some situations, then the conception should be taken more seriously."

Constructivist accounts: constructivist set of accounts stress the importance of the socially constructed nature of ethnic groups, drawing on Benedict Anderson's concept of the imagined community. Proponents of this account point to Rwanda as an example because the Tutsi /Hutu

distinction was codified by the Belgian colonial power in the 1930s on the basis of cattle ownership, physical measurements and church records. Identity cards were issued on this basis, and these documents played a key role in the genocide of 1994.

Some argue that constructivist narratives of historical master cleavages are unable to account for local and regional variations in ethnic violence. For example, Varshney highlights that in the 1960s "racial violence in the USA was heavily concentrated in northern cities; southern cities though intensely politically engaged, did not have riots". A constructivist master narrative is often a country level variable whereas we often have to study incidences of ethnic violence at the regional and local level.

Scholars of ethnic conflict and civil wars have introduced theories that draw insights from all three traditional schools of thought. In *The Geography of Ethnic Violence*, for example, Monica Duffy Toft shows how ethnic group settlement patterns, socially constructed identities, charismatic leaders, issue indivisibility, and state concern with precedent setting can lead rational actors to escalate a dispute to violence, even when doing so is likely to leave contending groups much worse off. Such research addresses empirical puzzles that are difficult to explain using primordialist, instrumentalist, or constructivist approaches alone. As Varshney notes, "pure essentialists and pure instrumentalists do not exist anymore.

Instrumentalist accounts: Anthony Smith notes that the instrumentalist account "came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, in the debate about (white) ethnic persistence in what was supposed to have been an effective melting pot". This new theory sought explained persistence as the result of the actions of community leaders, "who used their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, because they found them more effective than social classes". In this account of ethnic identification, ethnicity and race are viewed as instrumental means to achieve particular ends. Whether ethnicity is a fixed perception or not is not crucial in the instrumentalist accounts. Moreover, the scholars of this school generally do not oppose the view that ethnic difference plays a part in many conflicts. They simply claim that ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain conflicts.

Mass mobilization of ethnic groups can only be successful if there are latent ethnic differences to be exploited, otherwise politicians would not even attempt to make political appeals based on

ethnicity and would focus instead on economic or ideological appeals. Hence, it is difficult to completely discount the role of inherent ethnic differences. Additionally, ethnic entrepreneurs, or elites, could be tempted to mobilize ethnic groups in order to gain their political support in democratizing states. Instrumentalist's theorists especially emphasize this interpretation in ethnic states in which one ethnic group is promoted at the expense of other ethnicities. Furthermore, ethnic mass mobilization is likely to be plagued by collective action problems, especially if ethnic protests are likely to lead to violence. Instrumentalist scholars have tried to respond to these shortcomings. For example, Hardin argues that ethnic mobilization faces problems of coordination and not collective action. He points out that a charismatic leader acts as a focal point around which members of an ethnic group coalesce. The existence of such an actor helps to clarify beliefs about the behavior of others within an ethnic group.

Hence, in this case of instrumentalist theory, resource is very important. Political elites or the ruling class play a vital role in the creation of ethnic conflict because they prioritize their own accumulation of wealth. When they prioritize their own economic security, that condition may cause lack of good governance or maladministration (Marks, Jonathan 2003). So, whenever there are economic crisis, there can also be lack of basic needs among the people and then people will start to rush to resource. The ruling class or political elites then try to divert this economic problem into ethnic dilemma in order to avoid the guilt from itself.

A number of political scientists argue that the root causes of ethnic conflicts do not involve ethnicity in its pure sense, but rather institutional, political, and economic factors. These scholars argue that the concept of ethnic war is misleading because it leads to an essentialist conclusion that certain groups are doomed to fight each other when in fact the wars between them that occur are often the result of political decisions. There have always been economic claims behind every ethnic argument and conflict in Ethiopia so far. Therefore, as a theoretical framework, the instrumentalist perspective is more compatible with the Ethiopian experience. As a result of that, the researcher has tentatively planned to conduct the study within the conceptual framework of the instrumentalist theory. However, the upcoming main research has equal rooms of accommodation for any of all possible results to be found at the end of the investigation to be carried out.

CHAPTER THREE

Methods and Methodology of the Research

3.1. Research Methodology

The research type is a qualitative research. It is a kind of case study which specifically focuses on the case of Ethiopian state formation and its relationship with the case of Ethno-cultural identity in Ethiopian communities.

In terms of data collection, both primary and secondary sources are to be used. Naturalistic observation and Interviews were used as primary sources and critical review of relevant literatures is to be used as secondary sources.

Critical instance case study, has been used to observe the research site for the purpose of calling into question in order to either challenge or assert the existing generalized thought about the cause and effect relationship between Ethno-cultural identity and state formation. Its positive as well as negative impacts on Ethiopian state formation, and then assessed the implication of the answer to be found in the context of the contemporary globalization era.

- Independent variable is Ethno-cultural identity and dependent variable is state formation.
- Investigating variables are participant groups of academicians from different academic centers of higher education as well as prominent members of different political parties. Their ideas are to be assessed by responding to interview questions.

3.2. Methods

3.2.1. Tools for Data Collection

The researcher has used the following techniques to collect data:

- Analyzing texts and documents, interview and
- Recording and transcribing
- Discussions, etc.

The main focus has been targeted on the structures questioner and key informant interview through check list, logically coherent questions in response to the research objective drafted and the researcher has posed questions based on the checklists to find as much information as possible through probing technique until the relevant information is acquired.

The other tools; and document review have been targeted on obtaining more information about the Ethno-cultural issues in Ethiopia.

3.2.2. Semi Structured Interview

Key information interviewers have been divided into three categories in terms of their occupational status.

- Academicians from different disciplines
- Different Political Party members
- Workers from different civil society institutions.

The researcher has conducted interviews with 10 senior academicians who work at different higher educational institutions. Those academicians were senior lecturers who have been teaching social Science disciplines such as History, Geography, political Science, Philosophy, Anthropology, Sociology, International relations, Global Studies, African Studies and Civics. In addition to those Social Science lecturers, the researcher has conducted interview with ten political professionals (political party members) who work in different political parties in Ethiopia. Thirdly, ten other individuals who work In different civil society institutions have been questioned in that regard.

Key Informant Interviewers

In additions to those social science lecturers, the researcher has conducted interview with ten political professionals (political party members) who work in different political parties in Ethiopia.

Sampling Methods

- **Sampling In Qualitative Research**

Sampling is required in both qualitative and quantitative studies, simply because the researcher could not observe or record everything that occurs. We often speak of probability and non-probability samples in social science research probability sampling is considered as the most

rigorous approach to sampling since every element in the study of population is chosen at random and have a known probability of selection (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:78).

Therefore the qualitative methods employed have been focused on group discussion and key informant interview through checklist, logically coherent questions in response to the research objective drafted; and the researcher has posed questions based on the checklist to find as much information as possible through probing technique until the relevant information was acquired.

The other tools are relevant literatures and documents which are reviewed in order to learn more about the relationship between Ethno-cultural identity and state formations in Ethiopia.

Methods of Data Analysis

The researcher has attempted to produce patterns and concepts from the data by analyzing interview, discussions and documents into different thematic arrays and structured coding have been used instead of open coding. Qualitative research helps to ensure that all the key consistencies of relevance to the subject matter are covered and some diversity is included. Even though the research type is mainly a qualitative research, since it should be as objective as possible, the researcher has attempted to include a scientific data analysis technique.

Therefore, the SPSS has been used to examine descriptive statistics and the correlation between the variables which are selected. Accordingly, the data which has been gathered through the interview and questionnaire have been analyzed using the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) version 16. To obtain the demographic information of the participants, the researcher has employed descriptive statistics, such as frequency and percentages have been engaged to check the major types, common causes and management techniques in the process of group decision making. Finally, after categorizing similar response of the open-ended questions, the researcher has analyzed them in terms of the research questions.

American Psychological Association conventions (APA) has been used for reporting significant results, i.e., $P < 0.05$ as statistically significant (*) and $p < 0.01$ as statistically more significant (**). In the data analysis, Bivariate analysis has been used for testing the degree of associations among the two variables which are denoted as (X,Y). This is to determine the empirical relationship between them.

CHAPTER FOUR

Research Interpretations and analysis

In 1991, following the collapse of military rule, Ethiopia established a federal system creating largely ethnic-based territorial units, its framers claiming they have found a formula to achieve ethnic and regional autonomy, while maintaining the state as a political unit. The initial process of federalization lasted four years, and was formalized in a new constitution in 1995. The Ethiopian ethnic federal system is significant in that it provides for secession of any ethnic unit. The secession clause is one of the most controversial issues in public discourse in Ethiopia and its diaspora communities today.

Opponents of ethnic federalism fear that it invites ethnic conflict and risks state disintegration. The Ethiopian state, they worry, may face the same fate as the USSR and Yugoslavia. Others, of an ethno nationalist persuasion, doubt the government's real commitment to self-determination; they support the ethnic federal constitution per se, but claim that it has not been put into practice. To many critics, the federal state is a de facto one-party state in which ethnic organizations are mere satellites of one ethnic organization, the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), the leading unit in the ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).

Finally, those who consider Ethiopia to be a colonial empire see the federal exercise as yet another colonial trick, and advocate "decolonization." Supporters of ethnic federalism point out that it has maintained the unity of the Ethiopian peoples and the territorial integrity of the state, while providing full recognition to the principle of ethnic equality. It is important to examine objectively whether ethnic federalism is a viable way of resolving conflict between ethno nationalism and state nationalism. Now that the ethnic federal experiment is more than a decade old, it is possible to make a tentative evaluation of its performance.

This chapter consists of six sections: 1) The Construction of National Identity in Modern Times; 2) a presentation of Ethiopian ethnic federalism in comparative perspective; 3) an overview of ethnic diversity in Ethiopia prior; 4) an analysis of the evolution and structure of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia; 5) The positive and negative impacts of ethnic federalism and speculation on its future prospects in Ethiopia; 6) Internationalism and globalization, and its implications on the Ethiopian state formation. The sources of data for this paper include public documents,

fieldwork, and interviews. The public documents include the Charter of the Transitional Government and the present constitution, relevant proclamations, government statistical data, government and private print media, state radio and television. I spent months during this year observing political developments in the country as they pertain to ethnic federalism. I personally interviewed 30 Ethiopians, including public officials, academics, and different political party members in Addis Ababa.

4.1. The Construction of National Identity in Modern Times: Theoretical Perspective

Recent political arena suffers under hesitation and contradictory trends between globalization and multiculturalism and between localization and ethnic identities, and seeks mono-culturalism in respect of countries and people with similar culture coming together in cultural, social, economic co-operations and strategic alliances with those of different cultures and various civilizations that tend to be left outside of these co-operations because of their ‘differences’. In this context, identity question is at the agenda for the people who have a fear to lose their own identities. Identity is a social phenomenon, which starts with the identity formation process by means of interaction with the ‘other’ or against the ‘other’. The individual tends to internalize and practice the behaviors, values and norms of the society where he or she has lived in, in order to provide his or her psychological and physical security. In this way, to get an identity one must either identify oneself with someone and/or be perceived as identical to someone else. The continuous and permanent internalization processes of social setting are resulted in the construction of an individual identity within a social dimension.

4.1.1. Definition of Identity

Identity is a description or, in other words, the definition of the existence and belongingness. The identity consists of two pillars: identifier and identified. (Eralp 1997:19) In our concern, the individual is subjected identified as a ‘self’ and the society is main identifier as an ‘other’. It is an altered, otherness and an ambiguous notion which gets its meaning from what it is not, from the ‘other’ as Derrida argued: “ All identities can possibly exist with their ‘difference’ (with an “a”) There is no culture or cultural identity which does not have its ‘other’ of the ‘self’ ” (Derrida 1992: 129). Because the identity means to the ‘other’, it is defined, determined and nominated by the ‘other’. Nevertheless, Derrida distinguishes the word “difference” and “difference” as ‘the

identity as sameness' from 'the identity as equivalence' respectively, which is indicated in his text "Difference in Speech and Phenomena" written for the counter-argumentation to Heidegger's essay "Identity and Difference". On the one hand, difference indicates 'difference' as distinction, inequality, or discernibility; on the other, it expresses the interposition of 'delay', the interval of a spacing and temporalizing that puts off until 'later' what is presently denied, the possible that is presently impossible" (Ibid.:130).

It is a very vulnerable point to bear in mind that if the 'other' solely defines the identity, the distinctive features and otherness dimension of the identified is emphasized and the common points are disregarded. This kind of over-emphasizing leads to hostility, contradiction and discrepancy as well as denying, humiliating and negating the 'other'. However, the construction of any certain identity is an inclusive process with the internalization of the same values of identifier, but it is also an exclusive process with the elimination of other identities. The main problem here is hidden at the response to the question of "how to realize this exclusion?" In this context, there is several identity narratives presented to the preference of the people in political worries gaining very critical significance. Although it is a fact that identity implies both uniqueness and sameness, according to Martin, one identity cannot be defined in isolation: the only way to circumscribe an identity is by contrasting it against other identities (Martin 1995: 6).

On the other hand, the 'other' may bare both pejorative implications such as "marginality", "lack", and "backwardness" and positive connotations such as "privileged" and "the preferred one" (Kuran-Burçoğlu 2002: 1). However the comprehension of oneself as an 'other', with the others, is always an interpretation. At the same time, the identity narrative borrows from history as well as from fiction and treats the person as a character in a plot (op. cit.: 7). In fact, the person as a character is not separable from its life experience. As Taylor argues identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of the others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or compatible picture of themselves (Taylor 1995: 25).

The phenomena of authenticity, which was defined by Taylor as "the right of people to be acknowledged publicly as what they really are" (Ibid: 149) and the process of identification has a multi-dimensional, dynamic and permanent character. At first, neither individualistic life nor the

social / societal stratification can be reduced into the constrained dimension. Thus, the identity is supposed to be multi-dimensional. The multicultural and multi- societal character of the identity requires the necessity of a plurality of people, groups, social confrontations, mutual challenges and profound interactions and, finally, a strong possession is needed for the gained identities and these identities may be redefined in accordance with the conjuncture. However, this socialization process may lead to the creation of the newly constructed identities. The continuity of the process will lead to a permanent character in the identity values as well.

Perspective, continuity and dynamism reflect the pluralistic character of the identity, and individuals usually possess more than one identity units and exemplify a variety of identities. As Kymlicka claims, plurality is based on three pillars: One of them is history; human beings have lived as plural and multicultural social units have thus created multicultural identity units throughout the history. Second one is social structure; society has profound, inter-weaved and complicated identities. Third one is identity constructive capacity of the human beings; the identity is profoundly constructed by the thoughtful, planning and conscious people in plural character (Kymlicka, 1998:193-194). The acquisition of the plural identities, such as -popularly known- family, tribe, ethnic group, community, country, *patrie*(‘national terrain’ in Smith’s writings), nation, gender, class and civilization, are constructed within the process of socialization. By the way, different sorts of identities fall into three categories. First one of these categories is the universal identity that is some traits that distinguish the people from the non-people and be shared by all people without any discrimination. Second one is the group identity that is shared identity by some people. Third one is the individual identity that is distinctive and *sui generis* traits of a sole individual (Ibid.:202).

4.1.2. Identity Formation Mechanisms

Identity is constructed in accordance with the special condition of the time process and dependent on time and space. The concept of identity is introduced both, the notion of continuity and that of change without making them contradictory; on the contrary, continuity, in so far as it concerns the ‘self’ in its relation with the ‘other’, is meaningless without transformation.

This transformation is referred to within two factors. First; the authenticities are not natural and given by birth, but constructed within the social and historical framework. Second; the history sense of identity means not only the positioning of identity units within the historical process, but

also changing the comprehensive and holistic character of any given common identity unit within the historical perspective. In any certain period of history, a kind of identity might be comparatively more influential over the people.

For instance, while the religious identity was more influential and determinant in pre-modern Europe, with the modernization process the national identity gained very critical significance and evenly universal character spreading over almost all countries. Moreover in today's perspective, the deprivation of national identity for any community is perceived as "unidentified" in many respects. The historical character of identity makes it changeable and temporal, while its sociality enhances its continuity (Martin, 1995: 8-11).

What are the affects or influences of the identity which has a social, historical, dynamic, changeable, multi-dimensional, permanent and dependent character? The content of variable and plural identities varies depending on both densities and diversities and their influences over the individuals, and the degrees of necessities and initiative within the conditionality of time and space.

For instance, according to Smith, "the universal character of the gender identity lessens its initiative of orienting the common action" (Smith, 1990: 5). In this point, it can be claimed that if the unit of identity broadens, its strength of creating pressure over the individual, the coherent process of constructing the identity and the dynamic for common action weakens. As a prolongation of this logic, while the "family" and "community" groups have higher capacity to direct the common action than the "nation", the "civilization" and "empire" are weaker than the "nation" in this respect. Lastly, "the criteria of the strength for the identity preponderance are necessity, urgency, external threat and relative capability as well as its internalization by the given society (Eralp, 1997:26).

The formation and the definition of a social identity is based on "objective" and "subjective" elements (Smith, 1990: 27). Objective elements are depicted as the properties shared by all members of the social identity unit such as symbols, myths, language, religion, ethnicity, geography, the mode of life, common history, values, traditions, etc. Social identity is shaped by the internalization of these elements by the members of the implied unit, and at the second stage, the preponderant character of the social identity is determined by emphasizing and singling out the priority of one of them (Ibid.:28).

For instance, as Smith asserts in his book *The Origins of Nations*, on the one hand, the country and mutual rights and duties are the main priorities in territorial model on the other hand in the ethnic model of nation building; they are the ethnic origin and language. Subjective elements of social identity are defined as the relative indication of to what extent the internalization process of the objective ones is carried out (Smith, 1989: 349). A strong and prudent perception of the subjective consciousness is very important for the common features in constructing the national identity.

The social and cultural identities can be grouped in two categories, as “granted” and “gained” identities (Yurdusev, 1997: 27). Family, ethnic group, society, community, nation and civilization are ‘granted’ identities and are created within the socialization process. They are exclusive because of their inborn character. However, the identities chosen by the free will of the individual are ‘gained’ identities.

Nevertheless, the dynamism, continuity and plurality of the identity prevents any certain gained identity to have the power of creating monopoly and absolute authority over the individuals such as the case of conversion, since the voluntary factor and humanitarian interference can be mentioned even in granted identities in some extent. For instance, the national identity as a ‘granted’ identity is not a natural and spontaneous identifier that emerged in any certain period of the history. Contrarily, the intervention of the modern state shapes the construction of the national identity as Massimo d’Azeglio claims: “We established Italy and now it is time to create the Italians” (Hobsbawm, 1991:44).

Belonging to a country has a great influence in adopting, reinforcing or weakening of other identities, such as the social identity. That is, country identity determines the social identity, the same way, and national, religious, ethnic and class – based have a great impact in shaping other identities. The perception of different identities is based on the reciprocity and mutual understanding as well as interaction positioning. A social identity unit generally separates and differentiates the other. Here there is a reciprocal interaction working to find out negative and positive differences of each identity (op. cit.: 29). If the identities are rival and threat each other, the negative emphasis is pointed out. In order to elaborate this fact, the study of the interaction within the history is required.

In psychological respect, the definition of identity depends upon the notions of I, ego, self or personality, identity that are used like synonymous terms in social sciences, such as psychology, sociology and cultural anthropology. Erickson defines it both as “the permanent self-identification within the inside of the person and the reciprocal relationship of a principal character which always share with the others” (Erickson, 1967: 17). For Wheelis it is “the feeling of the unity and wholeness which is based on the harmonization of the behavior / actions and the value judgments of the people” (Wheelis, 1958: 27).

For Fromm it is “the feeling which is required to be an individual and obtained by having the identification with the other groups and persons” (Fromm, 1955: 134). For Lichtenstein, there are two kinds of identities. These are “psycho – social identity” and “socio – cultural identity”. “Psycho – social identity” has the following three dimensions: objectivity and subjectivity, individuality and sociability, and sameness, otherness and alterity (Ibid.: 134). According to Smith, individual ‘self’ is originated from four categories. First, “gender” which is the most obvious and constant category that is universal and the origin of the other differences and dependencies. Nevertheless, the gender distinction is relatively weak in creating the collective identification and not enough dynamic because everybody has a distinct gender. Second category is the “terrain or *patrie* or country” category: Local and regional identity is widespread in pre-modern times.

Nevertheless, it is weak because the geographical definition is very difficult and the regions can be broken into local units or they can be varied depending on time and space. Third category is the “socio-economical social class”. The class is the unique collective identity and the unique transformer of the history in Marxist theory. In fact, the class-based identity cannot constitute a separate category since its organization and awareness of it is a very complicated issue; the criteria and conjuncture is too different to combine, and it is deprived of cultural deepness and sentimental attractiveness. Furthermore it is easily seized by the religious and ethnic identities as wider collectivities. Fourth category is the “ethno – religious” identity (Smith, 1996: 16). Religious identity is originated from the social and communicational scopes and based on the alignment between the culture and cultural elements, such as customs, traditions, symbols, myths and values codified within the social rituals. Religious communities are very involved in the ethnic identities.

In this context, ethno-religious identity is the transformation of any society from religious community into the completely ethnic one. These two identities should be separated analytically despite of the fact that both are capable enough to constitute a community, both have originated from similar criteria of cultural classification and mostly coincides and strengthen each other. Nevertheless the religious diversity leads to delay the emergence of an ethnic unity (Smith, 1991: 67).

Collective social identities can be conceptualized as religion, gender, ethnicity, race, and sexuality. The list is somewhat heterogeneous; such collective identities matter to their bearers and to others in very different ways. Religion, for example, unlike all the others, entails attachments to creeds or commitment to practices. Gender and sexuality, unlike the rest, are both grounded in the sexual body; both are differently experienced at different places and times (Taylor, 1994: 150).

Taylor explains the connection between individual identity and collective identity as follows: Each person's individual identity has two major dimensions. There is a collective dimension pertaining to the interaction of their collective identities, and there is a personal dimension, consisting of other socially and morally important features, that are intelligence, charm, wit, cupidity, etc. that are not themselves the basis of forms of collective identity (ibid.: 152).

4.1.3. Nation-Building Strategies

Nation and nationalism are two concepts bearing the controversial ideas about the preceding of their tangibility and conceptualization (Ersanlı-Özdoğan, 1985:175). Fortunately some data helps us to comprehend the matter. First data is the reality that today's ongoing political unit is nation-state (Bottomore, 1987: 59). At the same time, "nationalism is a doctrine accepting the necessity of organizing the people within the realm of nation-states" (Kedourie, 1970: 29). Second data is pertaining with the synchronization of the nationalism with the industrialization as well as with the modernization (Gellner, 1983: 55). Thus, the nature of the nation-state is related with the answer given to the question of the beginning period of the nationalization process and its persistence.

The starting point of this process is Western Europe. The process fell into two categories. One of them is the unit of nation emerging with the spontaneous products of newly emerged formations and discrepancies brought about by the industrialization and capitalism. Second one is the unit of

nation which is formed as a defensive element against the menacing factors coming from the West with the contribution of the imposition of ideas of French Revolution and, thus, which oriented to the unity surrounding with the pre-modern motto of “one language, one culture and one history”. French Revolution, as a distinctive feature, brings a new understanding of legitimacy and this legitimacy threatens other absolutist monarchies of the Europe.

The Revolution imposes the idea that the sovereignty belongs to the nation and approves the “self-determination” and the “right of resistance” or changing the regime in case of the violation of the social contract acted between the state and citizen as vested interests (Kedourie, 1971: 4). Naturally, the key word in new understanding is “nation”. The nation emerges as an actual entity as the first time in history in France and England. Since 10th century, when the cities and regional organizations became leading factors before the churches and feudal relations depending on the flourishing of the trade, feudal frontiers rapidly fuses and natural national borders are established. The constitution of absolutist national monarchies displays their luminous patterns in France, Britain and Spain.

Taking precedence, England and France played a very prominent role at emergence of the absolutist state in 16th century as a result of rapid centralization process as well as the nationalization of the churches with the Reformation movement. Aforementioned absolutist establishment expresses the consensus and balance between the feudal nobility and newly established bourgeois (Anderson, 1974: 15). For this reason, absolutist state should be understood as a transitory form.

As a result of the working money economy (mercantilism), bourgeois comes to power. Nevertheless, this socio-economic power turns as a political stratum in 17th and 18th centuries with the transformation of the states to the constitutional monarchies. This is the brilliant victory of the “tiers etat” (Third Estate). In 17th century England achieves to create the nation and settle and establish her state over the basis of nationality by means of suppressing the ongoing disputes with the governing monarchs and unifying the people who are exposed to be categorized within the castic divisions (Rustow, 1968: 8). Thus, this definition means the comprehension of transferring the sovereignty to the nation, as socially, culturally, economically and politically integrated people.

The state in England, removing the feudal partition with the Norman occupation, ends the power of the church positioning as a non-centralized rival against the absolute sovereignty of state and provides its ultimate submission and acceptance of national obedience. England witnesses the rapid increasing of the capital accumulation, making widespread the manufacture production and settlement of a new understanding of proprietorship over the land within the first half of the 17th century. These developments originate from capital accumulation by the mercantilist expansion of England. This acceleration of social change forces to destroy the political structure of the previous social relations system as expected. The widening of the market turns the whole nation to the one economic unit and, eventually, the monopoly of competition is demolished (Ibid.: 12).

Consequently, the absolutist state mechanism establishing the stability between the feudal elements and bourgeois holding the economic dominance with its hand loses its historical function. In this case, the first half of the 17th century is the years of the struggle between two social institutions; on one hand, English patriotism, English Protestantism (Puritanism) as a national sect of the Christianity and economic power of the bourgeois; feudal aristocracy tied with the land possession and resisting against the monetary economy (mercantilism) and England Catholicism (Anglicanism) as official interpretation of the religion, on the other hand. This strife results in the victory of the liberal on the leadership of Oliver Cromwell. The period of 1640 - 1660 when these episodes realize implies the transition to the new political arena and free ground giving chance to flourish the capitalism as a necessity and essential factor for competitive national economy (Hill, 1983: 35-88).

These developments came true at the end of the 18th century in France. Apart from England, French political thought developed the philosophic and ideological basis of transition from absolutism to constitutionalism and republic. As Tocqueville, who is a very prominent political sociologist known by his book *Democracy in America*, claims that French Revolution is not a social but political revolution, he means by social revolution the changing in the production, possession and distribution systems (Mardin, 1971: 197). Subsequently, French thinkers achieved to get rid of the ancient dynamics of the established social structure with the motto of “*égalité, fraternité, liberté*” (equality, brotherhood and liberty). Because the main target of these principles is to overthrow the monarchs of the Europe, French thinkers envisage the emancipation of the people who bound to be subjected of monarchs by the idea that “the sovereignty belongs to the nation”.

Under these circumstances, the French nationalism, having the “internal” nature tackles to the matter of settling their own nation-states to the last ladder of the modernization, by having the “external” nature it becomes the producer of the ideology that will separate their national hostiles from the inside. Thus, the most important historical steps to universalize the nationalism are the Napoleonic wars and French Revolution which extends the influence of these ideas towards along with the Germany, Italy, Spain and Russia.

Nationalism is a kind of ideology mainly oriented towards these aims (Ergil 1983: 73);

- *To create a national economy*
- *To constitute autonomous national legislative and executive organs and to collect all separatist relations such as regional loyalties and community ties under the control and integration of this organ*
- *To create a national culture (the system of common values and expectations) and define an identification depending on the newly created culture.*

The distinctive features of the French and English are their possession of spontaneously established national economies and internal market integrities parallel to the rise of capitalism and the shaping of the world economy without needing to direct to the first principle. The weakening of the feudal sovereignty and increasing centralist influence of the absolutist state provides the integrity and unification of the country within the frontiers of the national economy.

In this process, the national identity is formed and enhanced the volunteer obedience for the national power represented by the absolutist state. The reached relative welfare in 17th century and the mercantile development to supply this welfare and necessities of the increasing population and the bourgeois turning to the preponderant economic element by empowering with these developments removes the need of absolutist state which functions as a stability/consensus component between previous social relation system and newly established order. In this framework, the real social power replaces its own political strength with the support of wide popular strata and their original ideology.

Thus, the second aim of nationalism, autonomous national body, is constituted as inclusive of “new middle class” and exclusive of all regional power components. The most perfect form of the nation-state, which covers the content of the power, possess the pluralistic structure. For this

reason, as Hayes argues, the understanding of “nation” is rather different from the approach of the nationalistic or cultural nation (Hayes 1937: 231). It is based on the assumption that the citizens who share the equal rights and duties have the consciousness of being the part of the same “civilization”. Therefore, some elements such as language, sect, religious order and ethnic origin are reduced to secondary rank.

4.1.4. The Etymological Analysis of the Nation

As it is mentioned above, there is a consensus that the fundamental characteristics of nation are modernity. For this reason, it is inevitable to elaborate the etymological evolution of the term “nation” in order to understand this concept with its all dimensions. In this framework, Habermas argues that the history of term ‘nation’ mirrors in a peculiar way the emergence of the nation state (Habermas, 1995: 255).

For the Romans *natio* is the Goddess of Birth and Origin. *Natio* refers, like *gens* and *populus* and unlike *civitas*, to peoples and tribes who were not yet organized in political associations; indeed, the Romans often used it to refer to ‘savage’, ‘barbaric’ or ‘pagan’ peoples. In this classical usage, therefore, nations are communities of people of the same descent, who are integrated geographically, in the form of settlements or neighborhoods, and culturally by their common language, customs, and traditions, but who are not yet politically integrated in the form of state organization.

This meaning persists throughout the middle Ages and indeed in the modern times. Even Kant still maintains that ‘that group which recognizes itself as being gathered together in a society due to common descent shall be called a nation.’ Yet, since the middle of the 18th century, the differences in meaning between ‘nation’ and ‘staatsvolk’, that is, ‘nation’ and ‘politically organized ‘people’, have gradually been disappearing. With the French Revolution, the nation even became the source of state sovereignty, for example, in the thought of Sieyès (Kedourie 1971: 6). Each nation is now supposed to be granted the right to political self-determination. Indeed, in the 19th century, the conservative representatives of the German Historical School equated the principle of nationality with the ‘principle of revolution’ (Habermas op. cit.: 255).

The thought and concept of “nation” is not used before the 18th century. Spain Royal Academy, for the first time in 1884, used it in modern meaning in the dictionary they had prepared. In this dictionary, ‘Lengua Nacional’, is defined as “a formal and literary language of a country or a

language that is generally used apart from the other nations' languages and dialects" (Hobsbawm, 1993: 29).

Before this date, the word "nacion" had simply meant the people settling in a kingdom or a country or a province. In addition to other meanings, with this dictionary, the meanings of a "political unit" recognizing a higher / common ruling center and territories are making the state integral core and "people" living in these lands are attributed to the "nacion" (Ibid.: 30).

In this context, the first meaning of the "nation" is implied with the origin and lineage. The findings of the philological researches support this argument. Hobsbawm argues that in an old French dictionary the word 'nation' is related with the naissance (birth), extraction (lineage) and rang (status)" (Ibid. 30). In Low and High German the word "people" (Volk) evokes similar meanings with the words derived from "natio". In any case, there is a complicated interaction between 'volk' and 'natio'. The term "natie" in German jargon doesn't mean the Volk, but birth and lineage.

Diderot and d'Alemberte, the French Encyclopedists, define the nation as crowded people who are subjected to the same rule who settle in a particular territory and have a particular border. Sieyes argues that nation is the union of partners who live depending on the same law and be represented by the same legislative power (Sieyes, 1982: 17).

According to Kedourie, nation is a community from whose executive power the government is responsible (Kedourie, 1971: 6-7). German Encyclopedist Zedler claims that the nation with the peculiar and genuine meaning in 1740s implies a group of unified Burgers sharing common conventions, moral values and laws (Zedler, 1940: 901). Whereas, volk, as a more inclusive entity, covers people from different nations within the same provinces and states. It means that the people from different nations can live together in the same region even in the same state. Thus, it can be inferred, that there is no essential linkage between nation and territory.

It is inevitable to separate the usage of the word "nation" before and after the age of nationalism and modernization process in order to prevent confusion. The word nation means in middle Ages the Volk (non- politicized public), *ordo*(a strata in the social stratification), *Gesellschaft*(a community and people, bigger than family and smaller than tribe, who displays similarity inborn and bearing the identity of a particular ethnicity) in daily language. *Natio* in ordinary speech originally meant a group of men belonging together by similarity of birth, larger than a family,

but smaller than a clan or people. Thus one spoke of the *Populus Romanus* and not of the *natoromanorum* (Habermas, 1995:255).

The Medieval University is divided into nations as foreigner communities. “The University of Paris had four nations: *l’honorable nation de France, la fidèle nation de Picardie, la vénérable nation de Normandie, and la constante nation de Germanie*, ; these distinctions in use within the university, indicated places of provenance, but in no way corresponded either to modern geographical divisions, or indeed to what is now understood by ‘nations’ (Kedourie, 1971: 5).

Thus the ‘nation de France’, referred to speakers of Romance languages including Italians and Spaniards; the nation de Picardie referred to the Dutch, that of Normandie to those originating from North-Eastern Europe, and that of Germanie to Englishmen as well as to Germans proper. By extension, the word came to be used as a collective noun, sometimes in a pejorative sense.

Thus Machiavelli speaks of the Ghibelline nation, and Montesquieu refers to monks as the pietistic nation. This use of the word as a collective noun persists into the eighteenth century, and we find Hume stating in his essay “*Of National Characters*” that ‘a nation is nothing but a collection of individuals’ who, by constant intercourse, came to acquire some traits in common” (Ibid.: 13-14).

4.1.5. National Identity

National identity is very complicated and multi-dimensional matter. For this reason every researcher defines and explains this concept by emphasizing its different perspectives. For instance, Breuilly underlines the exclusive character of the national identity by regarding the relations between culture and nationalism distinguishing the nations from each other. On the other hand, Kymlicka refers to the civic nationalism by aiming to pinpoint its inclusive character by respecting the cultural differences. According to Gilroy national identity is a melting pot which has the assimilating character by depending on the notions of citizenship and patriotism.

Anderson asserts that national identity is imagined and constructed. Rutherford claims that national identity depends on the uniformity, cultural community and common culture. Calhoun seeks the way to link the national identity to the theory of democracy by means of post-national social formations. Güvenç finds the origins of national identity in the national culture which will be obtained by the socialization processes. Yurdusev establishes a correlation between the

national identity and state and he claims that national identity is the yield of nation-building and national ideology.

Connor and Smith emphasizes the primordial character of national identity and they use the word 'primordial' in the meaning of its back-ward looking character seeking the myth of national origin. As a contrary, Bradshaw says that the national identity has a forward-looking character and this identity emerges with the politicization of an ethnic group looking to the future destiny by sharing the same soil of the homeland.

Breuilly, in his book entitled *Nationalism and the State* elaborates upon the relationship between culture and nationalism. For him this relationship always bears the traces of historical, ethical, and political forces that constitute the often shifting and contradictory elements of national identity (Breuilly, 1993: 269).

Central to the construction of right wing nationalism is a project of defending national identity through an appeal to a common culture that displaces any notion of national identity based upon a pluralized notion of culture with its multiple literacies, identities, and histories and erases histories of oppression and struggle for the working class and minorities'. According to Breuilly, "to the degree that the culture of nationalism is rigidly exclusive and defines its membership in terms of narrowly based common culture, nationalism tends to be xenophobic, authoritarian, and expansionist" (Ibid.:270).

Kymlicka does not share the same idea with Breuilly and she claims that nationalism moves closer toward being liberal and democratic to the degree that national identity is inclusive and respectful of diversity and difference: "A civic nationalism that makes a claim to respecting cultural differences does not guarantee that the state will not engage in coercive assimilating policies" (Kymlicka 1995: 17).

How nationalism and the nation state embrace democracy must be determined, in part, through the access of diverse cultural groups have to share structures of power that organize commanding legal, economic, and cultural institutions on the local, state, and national level (Ibid.:18). Cultural differences and national identity stand in a complex relationship to each other and point to progressive as well as totalitarian elements of nationalism that provide testimony to its problematic character and effects.

In Gilroy's idea national identity is structured through a notion of citizenship and patriotism that subordinates ethnic, racial, and cultural differences to the assimilating logic of a common culture, or, more brutally, the 'melting pot' (Gilroy, 1993: 72). Behind the social imaginary that informs this notion of national identity is a narrowly defined notion of history that provides a defense of the narratives of imperial power and dominant culture.

Of course, national identity, like nationalism itself, is a social construction that is built upon a series of inclusions and exclusions regarding history, citizenship, and national belonging. As the social historian Benedict Anderson has pointed out, the nation is an 'imagined political community' that can only be understood within the intersecting dynamics of history, language, ideology, and power. In other words, nationalism and national identity are neither necessarily reactionary nor necessarily progressive politically (Anderson, 1991: 13). National identity is always a shifting, unsettled complex of historical struggles and experiences that are cross-fertilized, produced, and translated through a variety of cultures.

Rutherford claims that national identity based on a unified cultural community suggests a dangerous relationship between the ideas of race, intolerance, and the cultural membership of nationhood. Not only does such a position downplay the politics of culture at work in nationalism, but it erases an oppressive history forged in an appeal to a common culture and a reactionary notion of national identity (Rutherford, 1972: 42). Pitting national identity against cultural difference not only appeals to an oppressive politics of common culture, but reinforces a political moralist that polices 'the boundaries of identity, encouraging uniformity and ensuring intellectual inertia' (Ibid.:47).

Calhoun tries to combine the national identity and democracy by using the legal rights. In his words, "in the first instance, national identity must be addressed as part of a broader consideration linking nationalism and post national social formations to a theory of democracy" (Calhoun, 1972: 311). That is, the relationship between nationalism and democracy must address not only the crucial issue of whether legal rights are provided for all groups irrespective of their cultural identity, but also how structures of power work to ensure that diverse cultural communities have the economic, political, and social resources to exercise 'both the capacity for collective voice and the possibility of differentiated, directly interpersonal relations.

Güvenç defines national identity as a kind of socialization manner processing that takes part in the individual within any certain community, or, it is a feeling of the state of belonging to any group by means of acculturation (Güvenç, 1985: 27). It is the ‘we feeling’ which is shared by all individuals living within the certain geographical frontiers, in governing of the nation–state and with the creation of a national culture dependent on the historical and cultural perspective” (Ibid: 29).

National identity is perceived inevitable for every community within the process of nationalization as the guarantee and base of the national existence. Yurdusev argues that the process of nation building or the construction of a nation can be comprehended within two levels. First of all, the rise of nation-state and second one is the dominance of the national ideology (Yurdusev, 1997: 22).

The national ideology enhances the emergence of a general world-view within the framework of a common and widespread ‘we feeling’ awareness for society. On the other hand, nation-state performs a functioning tool of the self – realization of the national ideology.

Connor defines the term “nation” as a mass-based community of belonging and interest, whose members share a back–ward looking sense of common genealogical and geographic roots, as well as forward-looking sense of destiny. As a community of belonging, members typically view the nation as an extended family related by common ancestry, although this belief in a common ancestor is based more on myths and legends than on an appraisal of the nation’s history (Connor 1978: 377). Most nations are products of inter-ethnic integration. The myth of common ancestry is critically important and the myth reduces the likelihood that nations can be unmade. It makes nations appear as primordial communities that are both natural and eternal. The primordialist depiction of national identity is emphasized by nationalists in order to explain the back-ward looking character of the national identity.

As Smith argues the myths of national origin also typically stress the importance of the nation’s geographic roots in some ancestral homeland and often depict the nation as a product of both blood and soil. (Smith 1986; Anderson 1988) This myth of primordial connectedness with the homeland serves one of the main bases for nationalistic claims to territory today. The nation is more than a backward-looking community of belonging; it is also a forward-looking community of interest. That is, future orientation provided by the national identity transforms the nation from

a backward-looking ethno-cultural community concerned with preserving the past, into politicized interest group which intents on seizing control of its fate or destiny: National self – determination.

This forward – looking aspect of national identity also has a geographic dimension, since most nationalists assert that in order for the nation to gain control over its destiny, it must gain control over some geographic place. Territory becomes the means through which the nation will fulfill its destiny. Of course, the geographic place that nationalists assert control over is the ancestral homeland (Bradshaw, 1997: 10).

In this way, the backward and forward-looking dimensions of national identity are intimately connected through the soil of the homeland. In this understanding, the nation is not an ethnic group, nor is it a state, although it is used as a synonym for one or the other. However, the nation is intimately related to both ethnic groups and states. Nations may be seen as ethnic groups that have become forward-looking politicized and territorialized interest groups.

Bradshaw states that the nation is also often referred to as a cultural community whose member shares a set of tangible traits or objective characteristics, such as language, religion, customs and so forth (Ibid.:12). Although this is normally the case, the retention of these objective characteristics is not a necessary condition for the maintenance of national identity, and the existence of a community whose members share a common language, religion, etc is not a sufficient condition in and of itself for the emergence of a national identity. Indeed the loss of one's native language or religious affiliation has often led to not to the demise of one's national identity, but conversely to a rise in national self- consciousness as a reaction against the forcible nature of such assimilation processes.

Glancing over the identity formation mechanisms and the nation-building strategies, one would notice that these two processes are proclial in their sui generis character and they are supposed to be overcome by transnationalism because of the globalism, multiculturalism and neo-liberal ideologies. However, the circulation of the goods, capitals, workers, and money in global perspective led to question the ontological existence of national identity in many respects.

Surprisingly the globalism both urge people to seek their local, ethnic, religious and national identities and as a contrary to this searching process, it made people global citizens because of the necessity to have global networks in order to survive. As a result of this investigation and

reasoning, we may emancipate from our local, regional, ethnic and national identities and define ourselves with global identity in very near future.

4.2. Ethiopia in Comparative Perspective

Following World War II and the start of decolonization, newly independent countries in Africa struggled to create viable nation-states combining different ethnic groupings within the territorial boundaries inherited from colonialism.

For these countries, modernity entailed the transformation of disparate ethnic groups into a unitary nation-state with a common language and citizenship. France was the model nation-state par excellence. Such a nation-state came to be regarded as a badge of modernity, while “Ethnicism” was associated with backwardness and repudiated by modernizing elites.

Many African countries followed the nation-state model and attempted to create a unified nation out of disparate peoples. Since most African countries are multiethnic, the Ethiopian experiment with ethnic federalism is of special interest to students of African politics. Ever since decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, the belief that ethnic identity should be denied public expression in political institutions has been conventional wisdom in the continent. The 1960s witnessed the rise of state nationalism in Africa. State nationalists attempted to undermine ethnic nationalism, which they saw as an obstacle to modern state formation. Despite their arbitrariness, the territorial entities inherited from colonialism formed the basis for nation-state-building.

The chief challenge was to replace ethnic identity with national identity, rather than simply superimpose the latter. Suspicion of ethnic nationalism is discernible to this day. In Uganda, to take an extreme example, the state altogether disallows ethnic parties; it champions a de-ethnicized unitary state.

Yet, it is undeniable that the effects, largely deleterious, of ethnic identity on public life persist unabated. Despite its official banishment from political life, ethnic nationalism has proved a potent political force throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Recognition of the importance people attach to ethnic identities and interests informs the Ethiopian experiment that accommodates the institutional expression of ethnicity in public life.

Ethiopian ethnic federalism encourages political parties to organize along ethnic lines, and champions an ethnicized federal state. As an exception to the general pattern in Africa, it is

worthy of a close examination. A brief review of a few federal systems among African, communist, and western countries is useful to understand better the unique and radical aspects of the Ethiopian federal system.

Among African countries, Nigeria is notable in creating a federal system and committing itself to cultural and structural pluralism. At the time of its independence in 1960, its federal system consisted of three regions, each with a dominant ethnic group. In 1967, a total of twelve states were created. By 1996, it had expanded to thirty-six states, in part, so that ethnic group and state and would not correspond. Thus, in sharp contrast to Ethiopia's federal system, Nigerian federalism is certainly not ethnic-based in structure or objective.

Outside the developing world, Yugoslavia and the USSR had constitutional arrangements that recognized the right to self-determination and secession. Yugoslavia's 1946 communist constitution gave each republic a right to self-determination and secession. By 1974, Yugoslavia consisted of five "nations." But Marshal Tito organized the federal system in such a way that there was no precise correspondence between ethnic territories and the various republics. Once the federation collapsed in 1992, ethnic cleansing was unleashed to forcibly make ethnic units coincide with political territories. The Soviet regime had created conditions that were conducive to the transformation of ethnic nationalism into state nationalism. It institutionalized nationhood and nationality at the sub-state level and, thus, inadvertently paved the way for its own disintegration. Both Soviet and Yugoslav federal structures had collapsed by the last decade of the 20th century.

Finally, corporate pluralist western countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada formally recognize ethnic units, and allocate political (e.g., legislative and executive positions) and economic power on the basis of an ethnic formula. Ethnic groups are integrated only in their mutual allegiance to a larger national government and the need to participate in a national economic system. One of the ways Ethiopia's federalism differs from the other corporate pluralist states, however, is in its allowance for the right of secession. The constitutional marrying of political pluralism and the right of secession makes Ethiopia's ethnic federalism unique.

4.3. Ethnic Diversity in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has great ethnic diversity with 84 ethnic groups. Twelve of these ethnic groups have a population of half a million or more, out of a population of 53 million in 1994. The two major ethnic groups (the Oromo and the Amhara) constitute over 62 percent of the population. The third largest ethnic group, the Tigray, has been the politically dominant ethnic group since 1991, but comprises only 6 percent of the population.

The three ethnic groups constitute more than two-thirds of the population. In 1994, four other ethnic groups, namely, Somali, Gurage, Sidama, and Welaita, had a population of over one million. The seven largest ethnic groups comprise 84.5 percent of the country's population. Five ethnic groups (Afar, Hadiya, Gamo, Gedeo, and Keffa) had populations between 599,000 and 1,000,000. The twelve largest ethnic groups constitute almost 92 percent of the population. Fourteen ethnic groups had populations between 100,000 and 500,000, while twenty-eight ethnic groups had a population of between 10,000 and 100,000. Twenty-three ethnic groups had a population of less than 10,000 each in 1994. For the most part, each ethnic group has its own language.

The religious composition of the population is as follows: Christian (61.7 %), Muslim (32.8 %), Traditional (4.6 %), others (0.9 %), and Not Stated (0.1 %). Orthodox Christians constitute 50.6 %, Protestants constitute 10.2 %, and Catholics comprise 0.9 % of the total population. The “Traditional” category above refers to those Ethiopians who follow indigenous religions. Ethiopian Jews, known as Bete Israel or Falasha roughly one hundred thousand in the recent past but virtually all of them immigrated to Israel within the last two decades.

The history of state formation in Ethiopia is a source of profound, even bitter contention. At one extreme, pan-Ethiopian nationalists contend that the state is some 3,000 years old. According to this perspective, well represented by Gashaw, the Ethiopian state has existed for millennia, forging a distinct national identity. Ethiopian nationalism is a historically verifiable reality, not a myth. It has successfully countered ethnic and regional challenges. The assimilation of periphery cultures into Amhara or Amhara/Tigray core culture made the creation of the Ethiopian nation possible. From this perspective, Ethiopia is the melting pot par excellence. Its image is one of Ethiopia as a nation-state.

At the other extreme, ethnonationalist groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) claim that Abyssinia (central and northern Ethiopia, the historic core of Ethiopian polity) colonized roughly half the territories and peoples to form a colonial empire-state in the last quarter of the 19th century. From the ethnonationalist vantage point, Ethiopia is a colonial empire that needs to undergo decolonization where "ethnonational" colonies become independent states. Its image is one of Ethiopia as a colonial-state.

A more sensible image of Ethiopia would be as a historically evolved (non-colonial) empire-state. The ancient Ethiopian state, short-term contractions in size notwithstanding, expanded, over a long historical period, through the conquest and incorporation of adjoining kingdoms, principalities, sultanates, etc., as indeed most states in the world were formed. The declared objective of the framers of ethnic federalism was to transform the empire-state into a democratic state of ethnic pluralism in order to ensure that no ethnic community would find it necessary or desirable to secede.

Adopting the French model, modern Ethiopian governments attempted to forge cultural homogenization through state centralization and one-language policy during most of the 20th century. In the span of a century, three forms of ethnic social engineering have been attempted in Ethiopia. The first social engineering was designed by Emperor Menelik (1889-1913) but significantly elaborated by Emperor Haile Selassie (1930-36, 1941-74). It attempted to create a unitary state on the basis of cultural assimilation, using Amharic as the sole language of instruction and public discourse and Abyssinian Orthodox Christian culture as the core culture of Ethiopian national identity. This effort was in keeping with the pan-Ethiopian nationalist perspective. Cultural and structural inequalities typified imperial rule, with ethnic and regional discontent rising until the revolution of 1974 overthrew the monarchy. The policy of assimilation into mainstream Amhara culture provoked some subordinated ethnic groups into initiating ethnic movements in various regions of the empire-state.

The second ethnic social engineering (1974-91) was the military government's attempt to retain a unitary state and address the "national question" within the framework of Marxism-Leninism. To address the latter, it set up the Institute for the Study of Nationalities in 1983. Based on the Institute's recommendations, the military regime created twenty-four administrative regions and

five autonomous regions within the unitary form of state, but no devolution of authority was discernible.

In 1979, the regime initiated a mass National Literacy Campaign in 15 Ethiopian languages. At the same time as it was making these and related efforts (e.g., in legitimating ethnic folk music and dance) in the direction of cultural pluralism, the regime waged a military campaign against ethno-nationalist armed groups. In the last decade of its rule, ethnic-based opposition organizations had intensified their assault on the military government and ethnic nationalism became a major factor in the demise of the centralizing military regime.

The previous two social engineering attempts had failed by 1974 and 1991, respectively. The third ethnic social engineering (1991-present), under investigation here, is the EPRDF government's attempt to maintain the Ethiopian state on the basis of ethnic federalism as well as cultural, language and political autonomy at regional and sub-regional levels.

Ethnonationalist movements grew immensely during military rule. Apart from the Eritrean nationalist movements, the major ethnic organizations included the TPLF, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and Afar Liberation Front (ALF); minor organizations included Islamic Oromo Liberation Front (IOLF), Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF). Ethnonationalist organizations posed the gravest threat to military rule and to the unity and territorial integrity of the country. Indeed, it is the TPLF/EPRDF, and to a lesser extent, OLF, Afar and Somali movements that, in collaboration with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), brought down the military regime.

TPLF, OLF, and WSLF had sought secession prior to the collapse of the military junta. They were willing to come together to forge a new constitutional arrangement they could all live with probably because they had come to realize that secession was not a viable option. At the same time, however, a secession provision had to be made a part of the compact, if only to justify the sacrifices they had called upon their mobilized constituents to make during long years of struggle. It is likely that at least one or perhaps more ethnonationalist movement(s) would not have joined a federal arrangement if secession were not constitutionally recognized.

The ideological antecedents of EPRDF's ethnic federalism project can be traced to Marxist-Leninist ideology and its conception of "the national question." The project followed the example of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) at home and

abroad had introduced Marxism-Leninism to Ethiopia in the mid-1960s. "The national question" had soon after emerged as the burning question.

The ESM was initially divided on the "correct" resolution of the national question. In the end, the ESM attempted to legitimate ethno-nationalism within the ideological compass of Marxism-Leninism, marking a radical departure from the inherited pan-Ethiopianist ideology.

The ESM saw its resolution within the framework of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of "the right of nations to self-determination, up to and including secession." By 1971, the ESM world-wide adopted this doctrine. When the ESM gave birth to Marxist-Leninist political parties, notably MelaItyopia Socialist Niqinaqe (MEISON) in 1968 and Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) in 1975, it also bequeathed them this doctrine.

When the military junta adopted the Marxist-Leninist orientation of the ESM, it conspicuously rejected "the right of secession" doctrine. But other ethnonationalist organizations, including OLF and TPLF made "the right of nations to self-determination, up to and including secession," their organizing principle and *raison d'être*. When EPRDF assumed power in 1991 in alliance with OLF and others, this doctrine became the basis for constructing a new federal state structure. Thus, ideological orientation and political necessity recommended ethnic federalism as a framework for resolving issues of ethnic and regional autonomy and the right to self-determination while retaining the Ethiopian state.

4.4. The Evolution and Structure of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia

4.4.1. From Multi-ethnic Empire to Ethnic Federation

Ethiopia is one of the ancient countries of the world with a long history of independent statehood. The modern Ethiopian state emerged at the second half of the 19th century with the ascension of Tewodros (1855- 1868) in 1855 to the throne. This heralded the emergence of the country out of two centuries of decline and endless squabble between provisional rulers (Bahru 1991: 11; Teshale, 1995: 30). Tewodros initiated the erstwhile twin imperial policies of modernisation and centralisation (Teshale, 1995).

Almost all of his successors followed these policies, albeit with different levels of enthusiasm and vigour. After Tewodros's death in 1868, Kassa Mircha of Temben came to the throne following his coronation as Yohannes IV (1872-1889) in 1872. He pursued his predecessor's

policy of unification, although in a different fashion. In contrast to Tewodros, he was less centralist and satisfied insofar as the regional nobility were ready to recognise his authority and pay their tribute regularly (Bahru, 1991: 44).

Menelik (1889-1913) who managed to control the imperial throne after Yohannes's death at the battle of Metema in 1889 followed the twin imperial policies of modernisation and centralisation. He in particular undertook a series of military conquests expanding the frontiers of the country to the south, west and east (Bahru, 1991: 60). Indeed, his lasting legacy has been the emergence of Ethiopia with its present geographic shape, capital and ethnic makeup. The battle of Adwa (1896) in which Ethiopian forces defeated the Italians led to international recognition of the boundaries of the country (Ibid).

Emperor Haile Selassie who took the throne after the somewhat brief reign of Lijl Iyasu, the grandson of Menelik who ruled the country from 1911-1916 dominated much of the 20th century history of the country. Indeed, he ruled Ethiopia first as a regent for 14 years (1916- 1930) and later as emperor for 44 years (1930-1974). He followed the policies of centralisation and modernisation of his predecessors with a renewed vigour and tenacity. In 1931, he introduced the first written constitution of the country. The main purpose of this constitution was to consolidate his power. The constitution neither included provisions on civil liberties nor established a representative legislature (Bahru, 1991: 141; Clapham, 1969: 34).

The Italians occupied the country from 1936-1941. In 1941, after the defeat of the Italians, the Emperor recovered his throne and rekindled his twin policies of centralisation and modernisation. To this end, one of the first decrees he introduced right after the restoration of the country's independence, was Decree 1 of 1942. This decree brought unprecedented levels of centralisation in the history of the country (Clapham, 1992a: 103; Markakis, 1974: 290; Perham, 1948: 348).

Amid the intensification of the emperor's resolve for centralisation of power, Eritrea joined with Ethiopia in 1952 under a United Nations (UN) sanctioned federal arrangement. The Ethio-Eritrea federation (1952-1962) was more of an autonomous arrangement than a federation, as Eritrea that had a liberal constitution that recognised limited rights of freedom of association and speech became part of a highly centralised state under an absolutist monarch with guarantees of self-

rule. In the end, the constitutional asymmetry between the two contributed to the demise of the federation in 1962 (Markakis, 1974: 362).

Since the beginning of the 1960s, the imperial government began to face opposition from increasingly radicalised students who rallied behind 'land to the tiller', 'the nationalities question' and armed insurgency in Eritrea. The abrogation of the Ethio-Eritrea federation in 1962 led to a civil war between different Eritrean separatist movements such as the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and successive Ethiopian regimes. The 1970s saw many changes that would shape the history and politics of contemporary Ethiopia.

In 1974, revolutionary upheavals rocked the country. The imperial regime, whose structures failed to handle the increasing demands for change coming from the various corners of the country, was overthrown by a popular revolution in September 1974 (Clapham, 1988: 32). In the same period, several ML political movements mushroomed throughout the country. After its rise to state power, the military regime took several radical measures that destroyed the material and ideological basis of the imperial regime. The most important decision in this respect was the nationalisation of land in 1975 that automatically ended tenancy. In 1976, the Derg officially issued its programme of the National Democratic Revolution Programme (NDRP). The NDRP officially defined 'scientific-socialism' as the main guiding principle of the revolution. It also declared the equality of the country's ethnic groups and promised self-administration through regional autonomy. However, these pledges were not translated into practice.

Thus, the EPRDF that assumed power in May 1991 after its protracted 17 years of armed insurgency undertook the reconstruction of the Ethiopian state. The EPRDF-spearheaded multiethnic coalition convened a national conference in July 1991, and quickly established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) under a transitional charter. Twenty-seven political groups participated in the charter conference. According to the preamble of the transitional charter, "self-determination of all the peoples shall be [one of] the governing principles of political, economic and social life" henceforth. It underlined the need to end all hostilities, heal (ethnic) wounds, and create peace and stability.

The transitional charter affirmed the right of ethnic groups to self-determination, up to and including secession (Article 2) and provided for the establishment of local and regional

governments “on the basis of nationality” (Article 13). It also stipulated that "the Head of State, the Prime Minister, the Vice-Chairperson and Secretary of the Council of Representatives shall be from different nations / nationalities” (Article 9b).

The charter conference established an 87 -member Council of Representatives (COR), comprising "representatives of national liberation movements, other political organizations and prominent individuals" (Article 7). The COR acted as the national parliament for the two-and-half-year transitional period. EPRDF had the largest voting bloc with 32 seats, followed by the Oromo Liberation front (OLF) with 12 seats.

The radical departure from the unitary policies of the two previous regimes provoked immediate opposition from pan-Ethiopian nationalists. At the other extreme, the OLF bolted out of the transitional government in June 1992 and abandoned its participation in the upcoming district and regional elections, charging election fraud on the part of EPRDF and complaining that the provision for ethnic and regional autonomy enshrined in the Charter was not faithfully implemented.

In April 1993, EPRDF, which has ethnic constituents in (and rules) Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and Southern regional states, ousted five Southern political groups (the “Southern Coalition”) for expressing sympathy with opposition groups meeting in Paris. Thus, by the time the constitution was crafted in 1995, EPRDF’s ethnic federal design, as well as its political legitimacy, was already under challenge in some critical quarters.

The transitional COR established a Constitutional Commission to draft a constitution. It later adopted the draft and presented it for public discussion. Then, a Constituent Assembly ratified the federal constitution in December 1994, which came into force in August 1995. The constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia starts with the words: “We the nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia.” This phrase indicates that all the ethnic groups as collectivities, rather than individual citizens are, in principle, the authors of the constitution. Thus, Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism is federalism based on ethnic communities as the constituent units and foundations of the federal state.

Comprising a preamble and eleven chapters, the constitution covered separation of state and religion, transparency and accountability of government, human and democratic rights, structure of the federal and regional states, and division of powers. Although Ethiopia is a multiethnic

state, the preamble affirms that the Ethiopian peoples, "*in full and free exercise of [their] right to self-determination*"(italics mine) strongly commit themselves to build one political community and one economic community based on their common interests, common outlook, and common destiny. These clauses were inserted in the preamble, after a long debate, in order to underscore the need for political and economic unity among the constituent ethnic groups and regions.

In the remaining portion of this section, we will look at two important components of ethnic federalism: language pluralism, and regional autonomy. Language pluralism is important because it was one of the factors that created profound alienation for ethnic groups for whom the dominant culture-cum-language was not their own, and because it is one indicator of pluralism in multiethnic societies. The regional autonomy subsection indicates specific ethnic and regional rights included in accommodating perceived demands of major ethnic groups.

4.4.2. Language Pluralism

There are more or less as many languages as ethnic groups in the country. In other words, there are more than 80 languages in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, as indicated in the previous section, cultural assimilation with Amharic as the language of instruction was the policy during the imperial, and to a lesser extent, the military periods.

However, post-1991 Ethiopia's ethnic federalism is characterized by cultural pluralism, including language pluralism. Amharic is the working language of the federal government. In addition to Amharic, state television and radio media broadcast in Oromiffa and Tigrinya. But each regional state has the right to choose its own working language. In addition to Addis Ababa (the federal territory and capital) and Dire Dawa (federal territory), Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and the polyglot Southern regional states have chosen Amharic as their working language. Indeed, Amharic is the second language of about 10 percent of population.

By comparison, Oromiffa, the next major language in the country is the second language of only 3 percent of the population. In the Federal court system, the working language is Amharic; in the regional system, the working language is up to the region.

Each regional state can choose its own language of instruction in primary schools. Out of some 80 local languages spoken in the country, 19 are now used. Within each regional state, municipalities, zones and districts can choose their own language(s) of instruction.

In Oromia regional state, for example, Adama (now the regional state capital), Amharic can be the language of instruction as much as Oromiffa. Within the Southern regional state, Guragigna, Sidamigna, Welaitigna, Hadiyigna, Gamogna, Gedeogna, Keffigna, or Kembatigna, etc. can be the language of instruction as much as Amharic in respective zones and districts.

Due to lack of resources in the local language, including writing system, adequate teaching material, and teaching staff in the local language, many communities have chosen Amharic as their language of instruction. But, according to the federal Education Sector Development Program, more textbooks will be printed in local languages.

In the Afar, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern, and Oromia regional states, pilot nomadic schools and boarding schools have been established and/or planned in order to provide educational access, in most cases for the first time, to children in pastoral communities. Plans are also underway for Regional Education Media Units to design and transmit educational programs in local languages. Within the framework of the federal Education Sector Development Program, each regional state has produced its own educational development plan, and 87 percent of the program is to be implemented by the regional states themselves. They also have a considerable degree of financial autonomy subject to federal Ministry of Finance oversight.

4.4.3. Regional Autonomy

The constitution established a federal republic comprising nine regional states created on the basis of predominant ethnic group, except the Southern regional state formed by 46 ethnic groups, and except two federal territories, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. It affirmed the unrestricted corporate right of all ethnic groups: “Every nation, nationality and people shall have the unrestricted right to self- determination up to secession” (Article 39). The act of secession requires a two-thirds vote in the legislature of the seceding ethnic group to be followed three years later by a referendum in the seceding region. It does not require the approval of the federal legislature.

The House of Federation (upper house) is the guardian and interpreter of the constitution. It is the chamber in which “nations, nationalities, and peoples” (i.e., ethnic groups) are directly and proportionately represented. The House is composed of at least one representative from each of 67 ethnic groups in the country, and one additional representative for every one million

population of each ethnic group. As a result, most ethnic groups are represented in the 112-member House of Federation.

The Southern state (SNNP) with 46 ethnic groups has 54 representatives. The two largest ethnic groups, the Oromo and the Amhara have 19 and 17 representatives, respectively; the politically dominant ethnic group, the Tigray, has 3 representatives. It is noteworthy that the multiethnic federal territories of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa have no representation in the House of Federation.

The constitution provides considerable executive, legislative and judicial authority to regional states. “All powers not given expressly to the Federal Government alone, or concurrently to the Federal government and the States are reserved to the States” (Article 52). Each of the nine regional states has its own constitution, flag, executive government, legislature, judiciary, and police; it chooses its own working language; finally, it has the right to secession. The constitution also allows further decentralization from regional state to zonal and woreda (district) levels. Some constituent parts (e.g., ethnic zones) want their statuses upgraded to that of regional state, primarily because that is where executive power lies.

The constitution provides little guidance to management of federal-regional relations. Dealing with inter-state border disputes, Article 48 stipulates settlement by bilateral agreement among the disputant states. If the parties fail to reach an agreement, the House of Federation will decide on the basis of settlement patterns and the wishes of the people concerned. Article 50 only stipulates the general need for mutual, reciprocal respect between federal and regional governments.

There is immense economic interdependence (grain, coffee, etc.) among the regional states, and between regional states and the federal state. There are also the beginnings of exchange of experiences (in education, health, soil and water conservation, etc.) among the regional states themselves.

Generally, the federal government mediates relations among regional states. Relations between the federal government and regional governments and among regional governments have been relatively smooth thus far because one party, albeit a multiethnic coalition, dominates all levels of government either directly or indirectly through its allied ethnic parties. The ruling coalition, EPRDF, enjoys a monopoly of power at all levels of government, except in one (Hadiya) zone. EPRDF consists of three ethnic and one multiethnic organizations, namely, the TPLF, Amhara

National Democratic Movement (ANDM), Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), and Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Front (SEPDF).

The structure within EPRDF provides equal votes for the four components in its central as well as executive committees. It has hegemonic control over EPRDF-allied ruling parties in the remaining five regions of the country (Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, Harari, and Somali).

4.4.4. Ideology of Ethiopian Federalism: Ethnic Self- determination

Every federation has its corresponding ideological inspiration (King, 1982). The question is then what are the ideological bases of the Ethiopian federation? One way of examining this is by looking at two interrelated developments in the modern history of the country – southward expansion of the Ethiopian state and the emergence of a radical ML opposition since the 1960s.

The southward expansion of the Ethiopian state, completed at the end of the 19th century under Emperor Menelik, led to a dramatic increase in the geographic size and ethnic heterogeneity of the country. It also led to the emergence of distinct systems of administration in the historic north and the newly conquered south. Students of Ethiopian political history who critically examine the multifaceted impacts of these processes use the north and the south as organising concepts. They refer to the historic north that has been predominantly inhabited by the Christian Amhara-Tigrayan populations and from where the center of Ethiopian statehood over several centuries came to the geographic south as the ‘Abyssinian north’ and the territories that were incorporated at the end of the 19th century to the Ethiopian state as the ‘south’.

The north is termed ‘Abyssinia’ despite the fact that Ethiopian emperors and their subjects for centuries called their country Ethiopia and themselves Ethiopians well before Menelik’s expansion to the south (Bahru, 1991: 1). Although these categories have some limitations, they are useful to examine the emergence of distinct systems of rule and land tenure in the south after its incorporation (Clapham, 1975: 73; Perham, 1948: 293).

Ethnic inequality and economic exploitation characterised the multi- ethnic Ethiopian empire that emerged after the expansion (Alem, 2004: 100). This particularly refers to the imposition of the Amhara elite, Orthodox Christianity and the Amharic language as embodiments of the Ethiopian state (Merera, 2003: 62). The chief instrument the imperial government used to bring

some form of unity among the ethnically diverse peoples of the country was assimilation to the culture, language and religion of the dominant Amhara rulers (Clapham, 1988: 195).

This was successful to a certain extent as the Ethiopian state gave 'relatively little weight to issues of ethnic origin' and as a result, 'individuals from peripheral areas as well as from humble social backgrounds could reach' not only 'positions of power' but also 'authority and prestige' once they passed through the 'assimilation' process (Ibid). However, this did not bring the desired 'unity' because of a number of interrelated reasons. First, there will always be people who would oppose the requirement that they need to assimilate to the dominant culture in order to find accommodation in the structures of power. Second, like anywhere else in the world, failure to accommodate individuals who 'passed' through the assimilation process in the political and economic structures of a multi- ethnic state rekindles ethnic consciousness and perhaps lead to rebellion (Smith, 1982: 31).

On top of assimilation, political institutions that were used to administer the south were distinctly different from the Northern provinces. The pattern of administration that emerged in the south followed two broad trends – those southern rulers who peacefully submitted to Menelik such as the rulers of Jimma, Wollega, BelaShangul and Assosa, were allowed to rule their territories by paying a fixed amount of tribute (Perham, 1948: 295-6; Bahru, 1991: 87; Markakis, 1974: 104). In contrast, the administration of the majority of the southern territories fell to Menelik's military chiefs and the nobility (Markakis, 1974: 106).

Additionally, there came the introduction of a new system of land tenure that served as a key instrument of surplus extraction in the south. Accordingly, the imperial government used land grants to compensate three groups of clients that were instrumental in the imposition and perpetuation of its rule over the new territories. These included the northern soldiers (neftegna), priests of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC), and the balabat³ (Caulk 1978: 469; Markakis 1974: 109). The alienation of the southern peasantry from its land was such that during the 1970s, in some five southern provinces, absentee landlords held 28 to 45 per cent of all of the measured land (Balsvik, 2005: 149).

The southern peasants who became tenants of the new landholders were required to 'surrender a sizeable portion of [their] produce to the landholder- ranging from one-third to one-half' (Markakis, 1987: 39). In addition to economic exploitation, there were also linguistic and

cultural domination. The imperial government in this respect prohibited publication in the Oromo and Tigrayan languages (Markakis, 2003b; Mekuria, 1997a; Tubiana, 1983). In contrast, since 1941, the Amharic language was used as a medium of instruction in elementary schools in addition to its traditional function as the language of government (Markakis, 2003b: 12-13). Moreover, the Orthodox Church was declared as state religion, while Islam, which has a wide following in the country, was not recognised by the State.

The political marginalisation and economic exploitation of the conquered south and Haile Selassie's project of building a highly centralised state faced diverse challenges ranging from peasant rebellions in Tigray, Bale, Gojam, secessionist war in Eritrea to militant opposition from university students (Bahru 1991: 220).

The Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM), as the concerted and organised opposition of university students to imperial rule came to be known, passed through several stages before it reached climax at the end of the 1960s (Bahru, 1991: 222; Balsvik, 2005: 71-8; Kiflu, 1993: 35-40; Mulatu and Abate, 1988: 36).

At the initial stage of their activism, the concerns of students were parochial in character and largely focused on campus issues (Kiflu, 1993: 35). However, towards the end of the 1950s, they began to be assertive and raise political issues. For instance, they demonstrated supporting the aborted coup d'état against the Emperor in December 1960. Soon afterwards, they challenged the massively inequitable distribution of land. In this respect, since 1965 they began to demonstrate under the slogan of 'land to the tiller' and positioned the end of tenancy as one of their key objectives (Kiflu, 1993: 39).

The end of the 1960s signalled the radicalisation of the ESM and the emergence of leftist ideologies of Marxism-Leninism (ML) and Maoism among the students. Indeed, in this period, ML emerged as the uncontested ideology of the students and provided the ideological framework for any group that claimed to be progressive for the 'diagnosis of the malaise of Ethiopian society and the prescription for its remedy' (Bahru, 2003: 3).

The ideological militancy of the students in this period was such that when sworn into offices of their unions, they used to commit themselves to the goals of ML and Maoism (Balsvik 2005: 294). The radicalisation of the students took a new turn towards the beginning of the 1970s when they began to tackle the problem of ethnic relations in the country.

In November 1969, Wallelign Makonnen published in the student magazine, *The Struggle*, an article entitled 'On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia'. In this article, he challenged the very idea of Ethiopian unity by saying 'Ethiopia was not yet a nation but an Amhara-ruled collection of a dozen nationalities with their own language, ways of dressing, history, social organization and territorial entity' (cited Balsvik 2005: 276). Since the beginning of the 1970s, the national question emerged as a key slogan for the students.

4.4.5. Stalinist theory of nationality and reconstruction of the Ethiopian state

Marxism as developed by Marx and Engels was based on the analysis of class contradiction. Hence, it gave little attention to issues of ethnicity and nationalism. But Russian revolutionaries who were forced to confront the plight of subordinate national groups and minorities in Tsarist Russia developed what came to be known as a Stalinist theory on nationalities. Soviet nationalities policy grew incrementally and was on the main characterized by political expediency than ideological consistency. Initially, Russian revolutionary leaders like Lenin were dismissive of the role of nationalism in the Russian Empire (Hirsch, 2005: 23).

In 1905, Lenin even opposed the idea that was proposed by the social democrats to provide territorial and extra-territorial autonomy to the nationalities in a post-Tsarist Russia (Ibid.). But when the revolutionary upheavals began to gain momentum, he reversed his earlier position and came to embrace the concept of national self-determination.

This reversal of position was necessitated by the desire to gain the support of non-Russian ethnic groups in the struggle against the Tsarist regime and during the civil war that followed the 1917 revolution which brought the Bolsheviks to power. Principles of self-determination and federalism were also used to build the Soviet state (Duchacek, 1970: 137-138).

The Soviet nationalities policy which was on the main developed by Joseph Stalin incorporated Marxist Leninist ideas and sought to legitimize the vanguard role of the communist party. Hence, by borrowing ideas from Marx/Engels's theory on historical materialism – stages of the development in human society – the Soviets classified their ethnic groups into nations and peoples. On this basis, Joseph V. Stalin 'arranged the numerous Soviet nationalities according to hierarchy of recognition' (Allworth, 1990: 35). This hierarchy determined the location of the ethnic groups in the former Soviet Union's multilevel ethnic federation.

The process that led to the creation of the Soviet Union as a multitiered ethnic federation was not, however, based on 'ideals of equality or democracy, but upon an order of preferences dictated by factors such as location, size, stability and the dominance in its area by the nationality group' (Ibid.)

Besides, the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union was imbued with many other contradictions. First, the right of self-determination up to and including secession was incorporated in the Soviet constitution. This was, however, a mere lip service as the Soviets never allowed administrative autonomy let alone secession. Second, though the Soviet state was organized on the basis of an ethnic federation, power was monopolized by the unitary communist party.

In Ethiopia, the Stalinist theory of nationalities heavily influenced the position of the students and the political movements that emerged out of the ESM. Many of the concepts used to discuss problems of ethnic relations in Ethiopia were copied from Russian revolutionaries.

The students, therefore, not only considered Ethiopia akin to Tsarist Russia as a 'prison house of nationalities' but also sought to 'resolve' the problem through Stalinist principles of self-determination, which profess the right of a 'nation' to 'arrange its life in the way it wishes' either 'on the basis of autonomy', 'federal relations with other nations' or 'complete secession'. The theory, moreover, recognised the sovereignty and equality of 'nations' (Stalin, 1954: 321).

Hence, almost all of the leftist political movements that emerged after the 1974 revolution in Ethiopia accepted the ML ideology and Stalin's theory of nationalities. However, differences remained on a number of issues such as strategy of mobilisation and the extent to which the ethnic groups would exercise self-determination (Markakis, 1987: 254-7; Young, 1997: 154). Hence, multi-ethnic revolutionary movements like the EPRP and the MEISON gave primacy to 'class contradiction' in their political discourses and organised themselves crossing the ethnic divide.

In contrast, ethno-nationalist movements like the TPLF and the OLF put their emphasis on 'national contradiction' and sought to mobilise members of their presumed ethnic constituencies. These organisations had crucial differences on the question of secession. While the EPRP and MEISON were reluctant to endorse secession, the TPLF, OLF and other ethnic movements advocated ethnic self-determination up to and including secession (Markakis, 1987: 254-7).

As Marxism Leninism was so popular among the politically active sections of society, the soldiers who managed to control power in 1974 quickly adopted this ideology (Bahru, 2003: 4). In spite of the popularity of ML amongst almost all of the contending political forces, the country saw a protracted and violent power struggle during the 1970s and 80s. The Derg not only claimed to take guidance from ML ideology but also received valuable support from the Soviets. Consequently, it sought to implement Stalin's theory on nationalities.

In 1976, it adopted the NDRP that among other things declared equality among the ethnic groups of the country and promised self-administration (PMAC 1976). Later in 1983, the military regime established the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities (ISEN). ISEN had two key mandates – study and document the distribution, social and economic conditions of ethnic groups in the country; and recommend a new state structure that would provide regional autonomy for the various ethnic groups of the country based on experiences of the Eastern Bloc (Hailu, 2003).

The Derg introduced its version of regional autonomy after the adoption of the constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) in 1987. This constitution established an asymmetrical regime of regional autonomy in which some of the provinces affected by ethnic/regional insurgency were organised into five autonomous regions – Eritrea, Tigray, Dire Dawa, Ogaden and Assab. Eritrea was provided with more autonomy than the other autonomous regions. In contrast, the military government divided the rest of the country into 24 administrative regions. It is, however, important to note these measures were not intended to provide administrative and political autonomy as the military regime and its vanguard party, the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) continued to centralize power.

Additionally, these reforms did not include linguistic autonomy. Amharic remained the working language of the government at all levels. This experiment ended in 1991 after the defeat of the Derg.

Right after its assumption of state power in 1991, the EPRDF began its project of reconstituting the country into an ethnic federation. This process was highly influenced by Stalin's theory of nationality. Indeed, there are striking similarities between the theory and practice of Soviet and Ethiopian federalism.

First, Ethiopia adopted the Soviet practice of hierarchically categorising its ethnic groups into ‘nations, national groups and peoples.’⁵ More interestingly, the 1994 Ethiopian constitution adopted Joseph Stalin’s definition of the ‘nation.’⁶ In this respect, Ethiopia’s ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ were defined by art. 20/5 of the federal constitution as:

A group of people who have or share a large measure of common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.

Even with a single definition, the three terms – ‘nations, nationalities and people’ – implicitly indicate a hierarchy among the ethnic groups. This will be more explicit when one considers the territorial organisation of the federation. Indeed, the Soviet experience of ‘multi-tiered’ ethnic federalism seemed to have influenced the territorial organisation of Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism. In the Soviet practice as Slocum noted:

Territorial autonomy was implemented by a multi-tiered territorial- administrative structure, which divided the Soviet Union into a hierarchy of so-called “state” forms ranging from union republics (Soviet Socialist Republics or SSRs) down through autonomous republics (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics or ASSRs), autonomous oblasts (regions), and autonomous okrugs (districts).

Each national-territorial unit corresponded to one “titular” nationality group—the nationality after which the territory was named. Each category of statehood was associated with a specific degree of organizational, administrative and cultural privileges, which gave certain local advantages to a given territory’s titular nationality. The fortunes of a given nationality might rise or fall in terms of moving to a higher or lower form of statehood, but the power to determine the political status of a given nationality group rested with the Kremlin (1995: 6).

In a similar fashion, Ethiopia pursued a multi-tiered approach to territorial autonomy in which apparently the bigger ethnic groups (the ‘nations’) such as Tigray, Amhara, Oromo and Somali have been given their own regions in which they constitute the majority and the regions were named following their own ethnonyms. In contrast, several dozens of smaller ethnic groups (‘nationalities and peoples’) were put together to create ‘multi-ethnic’ regions such as the SNNPR, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz. Even in such multiethnic regions like the SNNPR

many ethnic groups were given their own sub-regional administrative structures such as zones, woreda or special-woreda.

Like the practice of the Soviet Union, the decision to give a certain level of administrative status to ethnic groups solely rests upon the ‘vanguard’ party, the EPRDF. As a result, there are some paradoxes, which are still difficult to explain. For instance, the Harari whose overall population does not extend beyond ten thousand and constitute about 7 per cent of the total population of the historic Harar city were allowed their own regional state, while the Sidama whose population is more than two and half million were given a zonal status within the Southern region.

Second, one of the core principles of Soviet federalism that in theory provided ethnic self-determination up to secession, but in practice never allowed autonomy beyond culture and language (Towster, 1951: 442, 445) were transplanted in federal Ethiopia. Put another way, even if Ethiopia’s federal constitution recognises ‘unlimited’ self-determination, it is clear from the experience of the last 17 years that the ethnic regions are not allowed to exercise administrative autonomy let alone secession.

Third, there is a strong similarity between the federalism of the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia in terms of the centralization of power by a vanguardist political party. Like the Communist Party of the ex-Soviet Union, the EPRDF provides political leadership to all of the ethnic regions either through its member organizations or affiliates. This may warrant characterising Ethiopian federalism as ‘national in form’ and ‘revolutionary democracy in content’ by borrowing one of the well-known adages of Soviet federalism – ‘national in form’ but ‘socialist in content’.

Fourth, Ethiopian federalism like the ex-Soviet Union brought new roles to the State regarding the codification and regulation of territorial and personal ethnicity (Brubaker 1994; Gleason 1990; Slezkine 1996). For instance, like the Soviet Union, where ‘there was not an inch of ... territory that did not have an ethnic landlord...’ (Slezkine 1996: 96), federalism in Ethiopia led to ethnicisation of territory in which there is a tendency for exclusive control of territory by the titular ethnic groups. This partly contributed to the transformation and generation of conflicts in post-federal Ethiopia.

Additionally, like the former Soviet Union, the Ethiopian state is now involved in the regulation and codification of ethnic identity. This is due to the use of ethnic otherness as a key instrument

of organising the Ethiopian federation. Hence, the federal constitution and other legislations provide several provisions on ethnic self-determination, the resolution of disputes over ethnic identity, boundaries of ethnically constituted regions and others. For instance, article 39/1 of the constitution provides that ‘every nation, nationality, and people in Ethiopia has unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession.’ The constitution also specified the procedures to follow when ethnic communities exercise this right (art. 39/4).

Likewise, article 46/2 outlines the criteria for forming regional states, which include ‘settlement patterns, language, identity, and the consent of the people concerned.’ The federal constitution even contains a provision, which allows ‘internal secession’ (art. 47/2). Thus, ethnic groups in multi-ethnic regions could form their own federating units through a plebiscite.

The constitution also provides principles and procedures about the resolution of intra-federal boundary conflicts between ethnically constituted regions (art. 48). The next section discusses how the ML inspired revolutionary democracy ideology of the ruling regime influences federal development.

4.4.6. EPRDF’s Revolutionary Democracy and Federalism

The stated ideology of the Ethiopian ruling party is revolutionary democracy. The ruling party has not so far made the essence of this ideology clear (Merera 2003: 120). Nonetheless, this ideology intertwines ML principles of party organisation and mobilisation with ethnic nationalism.

Of course, ML not only promotes the centralisation of power around the ‘vanguard’ party but also conspicuously antithetical to any division of political power. That is why many scholars named the ex- Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia as sham federations (McGarry and O’Leary, 1993; O’Leary, 2001; Stepan, 1999).

The forthcoming sub-sections briefly discuss the historical development of vanguardist political parties in the Ethiopian context, the essence the revolutionary democracy ideology of the EPRDF and EPRDF’s reinvention into a dominant party in the wake of its rise to state power in 1991.

4.5. Advantages and disadvantages of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia

This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia by analyzing the emerging trends in the regional states. It also aims to determine whether the

Ethiopian ethnic federal model is successful in promoting ethnic autonomy and ethnic equality as officially professed. Is it successful in nurturing ethnic cooperation or accelerating ethnic conflict; is it creating ethnic empowerment or widening ethnic dissatisfaction. Is it the empowerment of the ethnic communities or the ascendancy of the ethnic elites? Is the federal arrangement going in a direction of forging a workable polity? Is it a sustainable political arrangement for the people of Ethiopia? As a whole, the section attempts to determine the essence of the federal model that is evolving in Ethiopia.

4.5.1. Advantages of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia

Leaving the controversy aside, there is no doubt that ethnic federalism has brought some advantages to the people of Ethiopia. For example, ethnic federalism has helped Ethiopians to speak their own language in education and administration units.

In view of this, Habtu (2003) argued that ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has created conditions favorable to ethnic and regional autonomy in language and culture as evidenced by its application in administrative, fiscal, and judicial systems.

Habtu (2003) emphasized a major advantage of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is that when people take a case to the court they are able to follow the procedures in their own language whereas previously the courts used one national language. In previous regimes, the country tried to follow one official language in pursuit of the French model of governance, which was not accepted by some sections of the country. Thus, the language and cultural policies of ethnic federalism have helped various ethnic groups of Ethiopia to develop, promote, and preserve its language and culture. Thus, all languages in Ethiopia are given equal state recognition.

Ethnic federalism has changed the political system of Ethiopia. Desta (2015) mentioned that ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has enhanced citizens' participation in politics. Although democracy and free speech are not fully realized, the participation of various ethnic groups in the country's political system has shown substantial development. The overall benefit of wide political participation is not yet investigated in Ethiopia; however, citizen participation in the political system is generally seen as a positive thing.

Ethnic federalism has helped recognize and bring respect to the rights of minorities in Ethiopia. Habtu (2003) stated that previously neglected and oppressed minorities have gained confidence

in themselves and have built their own administrative units. Some ethnic groups who felt marginalized by the popular culture exercised during the previous regimes have shown a sense of pride and equality.

The pre-1991 regimes of Ethiopia tried to adopt the French model and attempted to apply cultural homogenization and the one-language policy. The centralization policy had been practiced during the 20th century and collapsed in 1991. Ethnic federalism has helped Ethiopia to provide sufficient comfort and confidence for minority groups in the country. Thus, minorities are entitled to exercise self-government including their own institutions within their territories, and representation in regional and federal governments to some extent.

4.5.2. Disadvantages of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia

Ethiopian ethnic federalism continues to be a focus for researchers. The fact that it is the only post-communist ethnic federalism that still exists, even though the Constitution allows ethnically organized states to secede and become independent nations any time they want, makes it a subject of interest to researchers. Some eastern European countries such as Yugoslavia and the USSR tried this arrangement but ended up disintegrated.

As a result, Ethiopia's ethnic federalism has been under scrutiny from scholars and the general public. Many of these researchers concluded that although Ethiopia realized improvements during the last two decades, such positive developments have been overshadowed by the negatives (Aalen, 2006; ICG, 2009; Lyons, 2009). The common reason given for such an assertion is the divisive ethnic hegemony created by ethnic federalism.

Ethiopia's ethnic federalism has been imposed by the TPLF, a militant group that toppled the previous regime after 17 years of continuous civil war. Due to their upper hand in the military, TPLF people did not allow much participation from other ethnic groups, especially from the Amharas. In fact, the purpose of implementing ethnic federalism was to weaken the Amharas, who in the past played a major role in building Ethiopia as a nation (Young, 1998). Thus, Ethiopian ethnic federalism is largely seen as divisive.

As discussed in the previous sections, the main reason for introducing ethnic-based federalism in ethnically divided countries such as Ethiopia is a strategy for conflict prevention and resolution. Apparently, the result of such a strategy in Ethiopia seemed not to work as several

new ethnic conflicts have been brewing for the past two decades. For example, Balcha (2007) studied how ethnic conflicts are hurting the people in the west and southern part of the country. Some of those ethnic conflicts are new since the introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. Many observers commented that if such conflict continues unresolved it jeopardizes the country's unity and future developments.

Ethnic politics was legally established in Ethiopia since 1991. Following such institutionalization, ethnically organized federal states formed and political parties were highly encouraged to organize themselves along ethnic lines. Many scholars argued that such developments severely damaged national unity and common values of the Ethiopian people (Habtu, 2003; Tiba, 2011).

It seems that the whole exercise of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia was grooming ethnic states for independent statehood (Tiba, 2011). In other words, the ethnic arrangement is increasing the risks of secession in Ethiopia as each ethnic group has its own latent state that may explode any time in the future. This is particularly true for those regional states that are large and resource rich.

Following the implementation of ethnic federalism, what one currently sees in Ethiopia is a kind of ethnic entrepreneurship where everyone is championing his or her own ethnic enclave. Instead of building one country that respects diversity for all, what we see in Ethiopia is ethnic identity reimaged, ethnic conflicts increased, and economic and political benefits aligned to ethnic lines. Such reconstruction of ethnic identities in Ethiopia has created intergroup polarization (Debelo, 2012).

Consensus among citizens has become hard to achieve and love for the common nation has greatly deteriorated. Ethnic groups are becoming increasingly attached to their own ethnic state where group ownership such as possession of constitutionally defined territory is developed. In view of this, some Ethiopians have experienced unfriendly treatment and even forceful eviction from ethnic states that they do not belong to.

If a member of one ethnic group happened to reside in a federal state belonging to another ethnic group, he or she were considered an alien and severely restricted in participating in the economic and political affairs of the state. Therefore, ethnic federalism as the new political order of the

country is driving most Ethiopians to glorify their own ethnicity, which is nurturing a toxic relationship among ethnic groups.

The establishment of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has produced complex problems. Some of the problems include: unstable and fragmented ethnic federations that are surrounded by tribal conflicts, a seceded country called Eritrea which is now better known by many as an economically collapsed country with a one man dictatorship, a border conflict with Eritrea that consumed the lives over 100,000 people, erratic liberation fronts fighting for secession, jihadist insurgency in neighboring Somalia that brought military intervention at the expense of thousands of Ethiopian lives, and creation of military zones along the entire border between Ethiopia and many of its neighboring countries (Mehiretu, 2012).

Moreover, Abbink (2006) argued that Ethiopian ethnic federalism that created nine ethnic states or territories pushed the country into unknown waters with alarming consequences for all Ethiopians. Thus, ethnic federalism has seriously undermined Ethiopia as a country, its people as citizens, and damaged the integrity of the country's age-old collective identity.

Another disadvantage of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is unequal economic development among the ethno-federal states. Since the federal arrangement was not genuine, equitable political power and revenue sharing among ethnic groups seem to be a challenge. Various studies have shown that because it restricted the movement of labor, capital, and knowledge; ethnic federalism is an obstacle to equitable growth and development in Ethiopia (Aalen, 2006; Mehiretu, 2012).

If a person from one ethnic state wants to move to another ethnic state to establish a business or for employment that person will not be welcomed or able to do what he or she has to do to make a living. Speaking one's national language alone will not be helpful. Such a situation made the country's ethnic federal exercise highly fragile.

Social capital among Ethiopians has been severely compromised ever since ethnic federalism has been introduced. The Pan-Ethiopian identity that has been built over a thousand years has slowly evaporated as the new political system chose ethnicity over national identity. The overall perception is that one ethnic minority, the TPLF of Tigray, control the national government making it very difficult for the central government and its institutions to stay neutral and treat all citizens equally (Aalen, 2006).

As the existing social capital among Ethiopian ethnic groups dismantled, many of the newly established ethnic states issued orders of evictions against other ethnic groups who had been residing together for many years. Ethnic cleansing is a product of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The regime that authored Ethiopian ethnic federalism promoted tribal or group rights but systematically marginalized national citizenship (Fiseha, 2006; ICG, 2009). Furthermore, Abbink (2006) stated that the new covenants tied to ethnic-based privilege paved the way for ethnic cleansing in Ethiopia. After the implementation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, ethnic Amharas who were living in various parts of the country have been deliberately marginalized and weakened (Mengistu, 2015).

The Amharas were not only marginalized but also became a victim of ethnic cleansing as thousands of them were killed, looted, and forced to leave from some states such as Oromia, Southern Nation and Nationalities, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella, although most of these people were born and raised in these regions (Shewakena, 2013).

Such situations showed that Ethiopian ethnic federalism failed to bring its citizens together and created decentralized dictatorship throughout the country. Thus, ethnically organized states could not be inclusive of their fellow citizens for the mere reason of the difference in ethnic background.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1. Conclusion

This concluding part is divided into three sections. The first section pinpoints the major empirical evidence that is directly related to answering the main research question of the dissertation, i.e. how effective is the ethnic federalism arrangement in fulfilling the demands of the various ethnic groups for self-administration and equal representation within the context of a viable Ethiopian state? It also aims to determine how successful ethnic federalism is in promoting self-rule and shared rule simultaneously?

In general, in this section the dissertation focuses in identifying the empirical flaws in the implementation of the ethnic federal arrangement. The second section identifies the conceptual shortcomings and immense challenges of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The third section will conclude by presenting the contribution or significance of the MPS dissertation, and a recommendation.

5.1.1. Empirical flaws behind Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia

As revealed in the empirical findings of the preceding chapter, the TPLF/EPRDF has not kept its promises in providing genuine self-administration for the various ethnic groups at the local level and equal representation at the federal level. Although many of the ethnic groups find satisfaction in the ideological commitment behind the promise to recognize their identity, language and political rights, in most cases, however, they are disappointed with the actual implementation, which is devoid of genuine self-administration. In addition, at the national level, the federal government has not been organized as a coalition government of the various ethnic groups that constitute the Ethiopian state. Disproportionate to its share and contribution, the TPLF, largely dominates the federal government in a style of imposing its pre-eminence at the federal as well as regional levels by using the EPRDF as a cover to hide its hegemonic position in the Ethiopian state.

More importantly, the ethnic federal arrangement has faced with a severe predicament that may not be easily resolved due to the inherent weakness of the sole protagonist of the ethnic federal arrangement. As argued in Chapter four, the TPLF has been the major force behind the

conceptualisation and implementation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The paradox, however, is that the TPLF could have been the main loser of a genuine implementation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The TPLF, which claims to represent the province of Tigray, would have been at a disadvantage in satisfying the twin criteria of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia: ethnic entitlement and federation.

Firstly, in terms of ethnic entitlement, the Tigrayan ethnic group accounts for 6 percent of the total population of Ethiopia, therefore its share in the federal government, in accordance with the ideology of the ethnic federal formula, should have been proportional to its population share as foreseen by the ethnic entitlement formula. In practice, with the current federal arrangement, the Tigrayan elite and the TPLF have a dominant and leading role in the federal government.

Secondly, the Tigray province has been a comparatively highly impoverished and environmentally degraded region without any significant natural resource in comparison to most of the other regions in Ethiopia.

Consequently, a genuine federation would mean that the social and economic development in Tigray would be greatly dependent on resource transfers from sources beyond the province of Tigray; this could be very difficult, in view of the fact that almost all of the regions suffer from endemic poverty and scarcity of resources as well. Without the hegemonic role of the TPLF, the disproportional benefit enjoyed by the Tigrayan elite and the Tigray province could not have been possible.

Consequently, the hegemonic role of the Tigrayan elite or the TPLF has been the main factor in derailing the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia. As discussed in the empirical chapter, the TPLF/EPRDF single-handedly carried out and dominated the constitutional drafting process and setting of procedures and arrangements for establishing an elected government that replaced the transition government. In such a situation it is not difficult to comprehend the motives and agenda of TPLF/EPRDF, although it claimed commitment to a genuine ethnic federal arrangement.

As its actual performance tells, the TPLF is more interested to protect its hegemonic position at the expense of a genuine ethnic federal restructuring. Here, the most important point to understand is that the TPLF/EPRDF has not been an honest force in implementing a genuine ethnic federalism.

Contrary to critics who argue that the TPLF has been excessively empowering ethnic groups, the real practice is that the TPLF is co-opting elites from the various ethnic groups who accept the dominance of the Tigrayan elite in the Ethiopian state.

Hence, the TPLF/EPRDF is not giving real power to ethnic groups, but to elites from various ethnic communities in order to stretch its influence and rule. Since the EPRDF has been orchestrated by the TPLF and the TPLF has remained the supreme core member of the EPRDF the implication is that the ethnic federal arrangement has been used by the TPLF in order to extend its authority beyond its own territory. It appears that the TPLF is using the ethnic federal arrangement to install itself in the dominant position of the Ethiopian political space through the support of surrogates and ethnic entrepreneurs who have been rewarded and benefited more than the ethnic community they claim to represent.

Although the TPLF claims that it has been, first and foremost, struggling for the rights of the Tigrayan people for self-determination, its legitimacy in Tigray has not been tested democratically. Nevertheless, it is evident that the TPLF has been able to secure immense moral and political support from the people of Tigray because of its commitment for the assertion and promotion of Tigrayan nationalism. Thus, the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia has been used by the TPLF to establish the hegemony of the Tigray nationalism over other nationalisms, including Ethiopian nationalism. Though it is difficult to know whether the Tigrean people as a whole support or benefit from the strategy of the TPLF, there is ample evidence that the Tigrayan elites are benefiting and have assumed a dominant position in the federal structures disproportionate to their share.

According to the principles of its own ideology of fair and equal representation of ethnic groups, the TPLF, which represents the Tigray province with 6 percent of the Ethiopian population, should have assumed a minority role, if its intention has not been an ethnic hegemony via ethnic federalism. But, because it has operated contrary to the rule of its own game, the TPLF and EPRDF are behaving like an instrument of coercion and domination rather than equality and freedom. As a result, the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia has been characterised by the suppression and oppression. In a nutshell, the ethnic federal project in Ethiopia has become a device for the implementation and protection of the hegemonic position of the Tigrayan elite that has its origin in a minority ethnic group. The TPLF uses a system of patron-client relationship by

co-opting elites from various ethnic communities and regions to serve the extension of its dominant power in order to have dominant control of the resources the Ethiopian state. By alienating the major section of Ethiopian society and setting the foundation for the unpopular and lonesome journey, the TPLF/EPRDF has been ruling Ethiopia by relying heavily on its military strength. Nevertheless, there has been a lot of resistance from different sources and directions. Since 1991, the TPLF/EPRDF has faced strong opposition from the two major ethnic groups- Oromo and Amhara- that account for nearly 60 percent of the total population of Ethiopia. As discussed in chapter 4, section 4.2, most intellectuals have been unhappy with the TPLF/EPRDF's ethnic agenda; many Amhara intellectuals are hostile to the ANDM, which was formed by the EPRDF to represent Amhara. Similarly, Oromo intellectuals and a significant portion of the Oromo population have showed stronger sympathy toward the OLF than the OPDO; it has been very difficult for the OPDO to attract faithful members. Since 1991, the Oromia regional state has been experiencing political turmoil, frequent manifestations of resistance from Oromo students in universities and high schools, defections of individuals from the top leadership of the regional government, massive arrests and harassment of civil society groups in the region. In the SNNP, the various ethnic groups in the region who have resisted the dominance of the TPLF/EPRDF in the region formed a coalition party. This political grouping has been a challenge to the ruling SEPDF that was orchestrated and installed to power by the TPLF. As confirmed by international election observers' teams in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010, the oppositions' coalition could have been successful in controlling the SNNP regional government, if the ruling party had truly been committed to free and fair elections. There are numerous credible reports that the ruling party has been constantly intimidating and imprisoning members of the opposition in the region.

The Oromia, Amhara and the SNNP regional states, which are the core regions of the federal Ethiopia and account for 75 percent of the total population of the country, are not genuine allies of the TPLF. The TPLF uses its coercion and cooption strategy to dominate the regions by operating in the name of the EPRDF, which is acting as 'a monopolistic holding company' for the advancement of its sectional interests.

In other regions, such as the Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz and Somali regional states, the trend and the resistance have been the same. However, the TPLF/EPRDF, which is determined to

protect its hegemony, continues to show its defiance of all resistances and utterly dominates the ethnic federal structure in a centralized manner.

As discussed in chapter four of this dissertation, the TPLF's co-option strategy has also promoted inexperienced, less educated, submissive and non-popular individuals in the regions. These were deliberately picked by the TPLF in order to facilitate its ambition of dominating the overall political space in the country. Prominent, better-educated and self-confident individuals are deliberately pushed aside by the TPLF/EPRDF cadres because it is realized that these people might not have been submissive and faithful followers of the TPLF's hegemonic project. Generally, the ethnic federal formula in Ethiopia is empirically flawed; it has been simply used as a device to 'legitimise' the domination of a tiny minority ethnic group over the majority and other ethnic groups. The next section likewise discusses the conceptual weaknesses of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.

5.1.2. Conceptual flaws behind Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia

It is conceptually wrong to introduce ethnic restructuring and ethnic entitlement in a county like Ethiopia. Firstly, it is evident that with more than 80 ethnolinguistic groups, it is a gigantic task in Ethiopia to satisfy the rights of all these groups for 'a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that [they inhabit] and to equitable representation in the State and Federal governments' (Article 39, the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution).

It is also a very challenging to select some and to omit others in providing a right for self-government at the local level and equal representation at the national level as this involves a difficulty of establishing a criterion that respects the rights of some groups while at the same time neglecting those of others. Especially, since, the ethnic entitlement and ethnic restructuring policy in Ethiopia has aroused expectations that could not be so easily and modestly satisfied. Although ethnic cleavages have existed in Ethiopia, with the exception of very few groups that had demanded political rights for their group, for the majority ethnic groups there had been no significant political demands along ethnic group lines.

Nevertheless, it is the introduction of ethnic federalism that has produced an increasing demand for political involvement and political organisation along ethnic lines. Thus, the projects of

ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has further exacerbated the growth of ethnic consciousness and ethnic classification around which a political life should be organised and also giving ethnicity a political significance- 'ethnicising politics and politicising ethnicity'. Although as argued by some, a highly heterogeneous society may need to have a powerful centre (Horowitz 1985: 620) or electorally and culturally dominant ethnic group or Staatsvolk (O'Leary 2001), in order to hold the nation together in a stable federal framework, in the case of Ethiopia wherein the center is dominated by a minority ethnic group, force and intimidation have become a norm in dissuading ethnic groups from demanding their constitutional rights for unconditional local autonomy and self-government that have promised them. However, the powerful center dominated by the tiny minority Tigrayan elite, which is more interested and determined to protect its hegemony in whatever way required, is not willing to respect such constitutional promises.

Secondly, since favouritism and prejudices are the hallmarks of ethnic entitlement, it is very difficult to sustain the ideology of ethnic entitlement in the context of Ethiopia which has experienced a long period of intermix and interaction between the various groups. The introduction of ethnic entitlement has resulted in gross violation of rights of the minority and other groups in many local areas. Many states' officials and local leaders are implicated in ethnic cleansing and massive human rights violations.

In October 2002, the Ethiopian Prime Minister admitted that his party and state official were responsible for the 'abuse of the constitutional rights in many places in Southern Ethiopia and he acknowledged that members of the ruling party are using the emblem of the EPRDF as a masquerade to violate constitutional rights. The SEPDF/EPRDF demoted and dismissed one-third of the ruling party central committee members and dismissed more than half of its politburo members by accusing them of various charges like 'engaging in pitting people against each other, squandering public money, creating cliquish working relationships, engaging in acts of parasitism and the advancement of self-interest, corruption and anti-democratic activities, and creating their own ethnic islands that helped them to abuse their authorities for their own personal gains'.

Though, the ethnic entitlement ideology in Ethiopia has presupposed that providing power for the ethnic groups would resolve conflicts in the country once-for all, it is evident that the creations of more power-exercising centers have been associated with the rise of more power

abusing centers as well. As a result, ethnic preferences have become an open policy of discrimination and abuses.

Thirdly, ethnic entitlement has created a situation in which the distribution of resources would be scrutinized in terms of a zero-sum politics. It was believed that many of the ethnic groups in the SNNP and Benishangul-Gumuz regions have traditionally shared various common traits in culture, historical experience, religion and psychological make-up. However when it came to the distribution of resources and benefits, every group revealed itself to be uncompromising and fierce in its sectarian demands. In situations where resources are scarce and destitution is chronic and widespread, the incentive for sharing and compromise can be very minimal.

By its very nature, ethnic entitlement is exclusivist and egocentric. As a consequence of the recent ethnic entitlement discourse, assertive and exclusionist ethnic consciousness is on the rise. However, the on-going arrangement is not strong enough to answer or deal with the demands arising from some of assertive and exclusivist ethnic interests. As it becomes difficult to create institutions for toleration and concession, this accelerates ferocious competition and hostile ethnic relations.

Thus, the institutional weakness to tackle the emerging factional and sectarian demands of ethnic groups has reproduced more resentment and strife that may only be calmed down through tougher government intervention and punitive power involving widespread intimidations, purges, incriminations and liquidations.

Such punitive and coercive measures have resulted in more resentment and resistance, which manifest itself in the form of ethnic clashes, revengeful killings of civilians, ethnic cleansing, resignations and other measures that in turn heighten further ethnic resentment. Consequently, ethnic entitlement in Ethiopia has resulted in vertical and horizontal conflicts. Vertically, the ruling group has been frequently using military force to quell demands from various groups for more rights.

Horizontally, the ethnic restructuring has generated more inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic hostilities and conflicts than voluntary and sustainable cooperation. Ethnic tensions and violence in Nazareth, Ambo, Assosa, Awssa, Teppi, Kembata-Alaba, Wolaita, Arbaminche, Gamo-Gofa, Gurage-Siltie, SidamaWolaita, Wolaita-Gamo, BenchiMajji, Gedeo-Gujji have been examples of horizontal ethnic violence.

Fourthly, ethnic entitlement or preference is more geared to satisfy the interests and privileges of the elites (Horowitz 1985: 677). The elites, which claim exclusive rights in representing an ethnic group, can easily be enticed to exaggerate differences and exclusionism for self-seeking benefits. Secessionism or demands for more autonomy in many areas have been initiated and spearheaded by the elites regardless of the opinion, interests and benefits of the respective ethnic communities. A separate and new administrative structure requires more bureaucratic budget expenditures and resources that can deprive resources allocation for social service programs and other development projects for the local communities.

Moreover, local elites can also benefit from more autonomy or secession because they can satisfy their interests better with the elimination of any accountability to the higher body. It can be difficult for the central elite to convince and shape local attitudes where local elites have a monopoly. The situation becomes worse, as the local elites identify themselves ethnically with the local community, which is the undesirable factor behind ethnic entitlement and ethnic criteria. In a different scenario, local elites can also become an instrument for centralization through co-option and patron-client relationships with the center by intertwining central and local despotism.

Fifthly, ethnic entitlement produces a weak leadership structure, as it uphold ascriptive requirement rather than criterion based on achievements and merits. Ethnic restructuring in Ethiopia has resulted in the appointment of incompetent individuals in leadership and administrative positions in the ethnic constituencies.

In the Benishangul-Gumuz region, in many areas of the SNNP and Oromia regional states, the elites in power severely lack adequate capacities and proper qualifications to run administrative and political offices; but the ethnic restructuring policy requires that regardless of their abilities the elites should assume leadership in administrative structures. In such an injudicious arrangement, neither the local community nor the regional people benefit. Steps to replace the elites with qualified and 'non-indigenous' experts have been met with stiff resistance and resentment. It is unacceptable for local elites to easily give up their benefits, which have constitutional and ideological legitimacy deriving from the policy of ethnic entitlement.

There are numerous disadvantaged and minority groups in Ethiopia, which never had access to modern education and did not have a chance to acquire appropriate skills in running state

structures and bureaucracies. However, with the advent of the ethnic entitlement policy, many ethnically-based administrative units have been created that are controlled and run by the local elites. Despite their lack of adequate skills and education in running the new alien (modern) state structures, the local elites have assumed leadership and managerial positions in the administrative and political organs.

In the Benishangul-Gumuz region, for instance, the five indigenous ethnic groups were marginal to the process of the state formation. In most cases, the existing social services and other infrastructures like health facilities, schools and roads are largely out of reach for the indigenous communities who live in scattered and inaccessible villages.

Under the given circumstances, ethnic federalism is not moving in the direction of closing the 'gap', rather it widens or exacerbates it by negatively affecting socioeconomic progress through the promotion of a self-defeating development policy based on untrained or unskilled manpower. As presented in chapter five, the bulk of the budget subsidies from the center allocated to the regional state has disappeared in corruption, inefficiency and under-utilisation. Sixthly, ethnic entitlement has become inimical to democratic governance. Particularly, in many of the urban areas, which are inhabited by multiethnic communities, ethnic restructuring has denied the majority of the residents the right to participate in local politics and administration, as ethnic identification has been the criteria for assigning political and administrative responsibilities. In addition, voting for other multiethnic parties in elections is considered by local political elites as a rejection or opposition to the rights of the ethnic communities for self-administration; in some cases this has resulted in massive killing, harassment and expulsion of the civilian population in many urban areas.

In numerous cases from the federal level to local areas, especially in most urban areas, the Ethiopian federal arrangement has become an oligarchic system wherein the few have a right to rule over the majority.

At the federal level, the ethnic coalition formation strategy has taken the shape of a patron-client arrangement, mainly based on personal reward and advancement. The pattern is similar at the lower levels of the federal structure in wereda and kebele levels. In fact, the federal arrangement established through the consent of few elites or groups would be ineffective in controlling or

castigating power abuse; this is because the allegiance of the elites or ethnic leaders is built in the survival and keeping the political system intact.

Thus, mismanagement and human rights abuse by regional as well as local leaders have been used as a bargaining mechanism for the ruling TPLF/EPRDF to secure the allegiance of the regional and local elites. The result has been the creation of an oligarchy in which the few rule over the majority in a tyrannical manner that neglects the rule of law. Generally speaking, the ethnic federal structures have been accompanied by frequent flare-ups of violence, human rights abuses, ethnic strife and conflicts, misuse of power, inefficiency and corruption. It has become antithetical to its own discourse and promise of respect for ethnic self-administration and ethnic empowerment.

As the empirical and conceptual flaws reveal, the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia has been faced by two major obstacles: first the agenda of the minority, the TPLF and the Tigrayan elite to install themselves in a dominant position through the ethnic federal arrangement; the second difficulty is associated with the challenge of providing a self-government rights for the 80 ethnolinguistic groups in Ethiopia.

5.2. Recommendations

The writing of this dissertation for Master of Political Science (MPS) has not only been an academic endeavour for the research writer. As a Native Ethiopian citizen, the process has also been a dutiful journey to search for a political solution for a polity that has been suffering from internal conflicts arising from secessionist and regional autonomy demands since 1950s. It is in this spirit that the writer offers the following remarks summarizing the results of his findings and some suggestions as to the way to indicate the difficult situation facing the Ethiopian society.

In this context, the research writer has arrived at the conclusion that a strategy of encouraging ethnic criteria and ethnic entitlement for political organization and political rights is not a viable policy. Thus, it is advisable to discourage ethnic criterion or ethnic entitlement for political organization and political rights as much as possible. Ethnic demands are very difficult to satisfy and also very difficult to suppress.

Ethnic entitlement often creates more demands than the original claims, as its demonstration effect is so strong as to incite more expectations which are difficult to fulfill. Particularly, in poor

societies where resources are severely scarce, ethnic restructuring can contribute to the breeding of mistrust and deadly conflicts around the question of resource appropriation. Constructing walls, erecting ethnic pillars are very destructive in the long run due to the narrow and egocentric nature of ethnic demands. Moreover, it is always difficult to dismantle ethnic entitlement once it has been introduced; it can grow into permanent cleavages as the elites harvest more benefits and privileges in the bifurcation. It is thus, preferable and advisable to emphasize incentives for political integration, rather than to encourage cleavage by crystallizing distinctiveness and differences. Seen in the light, however, force is neither the means to bring integration nor to suppress down ethnic demands.

Consequently, in multi-ethnic societies it is preferable to facilitate mobility and integration, simultaneously with recognition and respect of ethnic groups and their legitimate claims. Although ethnic rights and demands are difficult to satisfy, it is important to recognize these in a manner that do not exacerbate ethnic division and ethnic hostilities. More emphasis needs to be given to political arrangements that spur ethnic accommodation such as introduction of election procedure that can encourage inter-ethnic cooperation and ethnic coalition parties.

It can also be helpful to produce a more accurate and encompassing national history by treating issues that could trigger ethnic hostility and mistrust very sensitively. A national history must reflect the virtue and achievements of all groups in a respectful manner. It may be worthwhile to refrain from associating rulers and kings with the ordinary people because of ethnic classification. Furthermore, it is important to create a hybrid model that can respect ethnic groups, encourage inter-ethnic cooperation by suppressing hubris and upholding humility; by engineering a political interaction that promotes respect and trust while undermining and dissuading vengeance and arrogant behaviours and activities.

A political system that recognizes and respects identities, upholds achievements and merits instead of ascriptive requirements and nepotism; it can also lead to the creation of a desirable system based on trust and tolerance among ethnic groups.

Nonetheless, it is not easy to completely discard the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia, as shown by the constant and severe challenges of two major opposing and contending groups. The first group is composed by those who claim more ethnic autonomy and the second group is those who demand the precedence of individual rights over group rights. Although both groups seem

to have irreconcilable positions, it is advisable to consider both demands in order to map out a hybrid federal model that can tone down the major predicaments of the ethnic federal.

First, the federal model in Ethiopia needs to consider multiple criteria such as geography, socio-economic factors, settlement patterns, population mix and other essential factors in delimiting the regional states. For instance, most of the urban areas of the country are inhabited by synchronized multiethnic communities where ethnic identities are so diluted and less significant making ethnolinguistic criterion inappropriate and inapplicable.

Thus, the ethno-linguistic criterion should be discarded in establishing political and administrative structures in the urban areas. The rural areas are, in most cases, inhabited by a concentration of a specific ethnic community in a distinct territory, raising the need for some kind of structure that could recognize such a concentration.

More importantly, the federal arrangement in Ethiopia should facilitate the creation of a genuine multiethnic coalition freely by means of incentives and political frameworks in rewarding multiethnic parties. The federal project should reward ethnic fluidity and intermix by politically discouraging exclusive arrangements and fragmentations.

Second, the federal structures in Ethiopia should adopt a hybrid model that can institutionalise a genuine ethnic coalition through a bi-ethnic hegemonic and majoritarian system. The two major ethnic groups, the Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups represent about 60 percent of the population, the lion's share of the intellectual and trained manpower, and a significant territory with paramount contribution in the Ethiopian state.

The coalition of the Oromo and Amhara group can make a decisive majority as they are demographically and electorally dominant. Although not an effective dominant group as a single 'Staatsvolk', or a national/ ethnic people, they can become a bi-hegemonic core and majoritarian to lead the federal project and to nurture a stable and cohesive political community. In addition, the coalition of the other ethnic groups can serve as a check-and-balance arrangement to persuade and require the majority groups to behave in a moderate manner by valuing interethnic bargaining and concession.

In the current arrangement, the TPLF that represents the Tigray province, which accounts for about 6 percent of the total population of Ethiopia, holds a dominant position in the political

structure. This has to be changed and the TPLF should assume an influence that matches its share and capabilities. It is totally unfeasible and unsustainable for a small minority ethnic group to assume an hegemonic and leadership position in a context where the consciousness of the people as well as of the ethnic groups is sufficiently mature to distinguish between what is appropriate and what is not.

Military force and other deceptive strategies such as co-option of elites and divide and rule may work for some time, but such strategies cannot create a genuine framework that can nurture a workable political system in a sustainable way. It is evident that the willingness of the people to accept the rule of the TPLF/EPRDF has been weakening. In the May 2005 Ethiopia's election, the TPLF/EPRDF forcefully changed the outcome of the election's result (as reported by the European Union's Election observers mission and by virtually all the civil society groups in Ethiopia). The election is a clear message to the TPLF/EPRDF that the Ethiopian people are ready for a democratic change and progress.

Interdependency and mutualism are inevitable natural reality in human life. Culture is essentially dynamic but not static. Modernized way of life is making the people of the world more similar than ever before; this situation is inevitable global dynamics. The existence of this reality makes internationalism and Globalism inevitable universal phenomena. All people of the world, knowingly or unknowingly enjoy their lives in accordance with the global dynamics which eventually leads the entire humanity to global interdependency and mutualism by the virtue of positive and constructive psychological tendency.

Having this in mind, the writer of this dissertation recommends that Ethiopian political elites and all concerned bodies in Ethiopian politics should maintain unity among the countless Ethiopian peoples having diversified ethno-cultural background. Unity and integrity cannot be attained by a mere wish; a functional system which could equally and fairly accommodate all groups of people in the country should be installed. So, by reconfiguring the unjust institutions that have been perpetually source of injustice through equal and proportional representation that could lead to genuine unity. The next step should be that rather than focusing on the unique aspects of the ethno-cultures, it is very advisable to focus on the unifying factors in order to avoid internal disintegration, maintain integration of the state and go in accordance with the global dynamics towards global interdependency as well as Global mutualism.

Media sources

Anderson, Benedict (1983): *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso

AP (Associated Press) (28 February 2001): Human right group: 100 killed, 10900 displaced by the fighting in Western Ethiopia”

ARB (Africa Research Bulletin): Political, Social and Cultural Series (September 1999),

“Ethiopia: OLF Defeated? Vol. 36, No.8.

BBC (16 December 2003): “Violent Land Clashes in Ethiopia”

BBC (4 February 2004): “Western Ethiopia tense after clashes”

BBC (25 April 2007): Q & A: Ethiopia’s ONLF rebels

BBC (26 April 2007): “Ethiopia rescue attempt warning”

BBC (23 July 1999): “The Somali connection”

BBC (31 January 2001): “Ethiopia: Amhara Nationals Being evacuated form Western District”

BBC (5 July 2000): “Ogaden Opposition radio on air”

BBC (15 September 2006): Ethiopian officers join rebels’

BBC (5 July 2002): Oromo rebels deny Ethiopian ‘victory’”

BBC (19 August 1999): “Ethiopia says Oromo rebels crushed)

BBC (3 December 1997): “Ethiopia charges 31 over suspected rebel attacks”

<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/fiscal/brosio.pdf>

Huntington, Samuel (1993a): *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Country*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Ethiopia Zare (09 June 2008): “BewelegawGichtYemotutKe 250 yibeltalu” (“More than 250 killed in Wollega conflict”)

ICG (26 Jan. 2007): *Somalia: The Tough Part is Ahead*, in: *Africa Briefing*, No. 45, Nairobi/Brussels.

IRIN (1 November 2005): “Police attacked in troubled Western region”.

IRIN (13 December 2007):”Healing the Scars of conflict”

IRIN (22 December 2003): “56 Arrested after ethnic killings”

IRIN (6 February 2004): “Ethnic violence leaves 18 dead in the east.”

IRIN (14 June 2006):” Ethnic Conflict claims 100 lives in the South”

IRIN (12 March 2003): “Government blamed for ethnic conflict”

IRIN (19 June 2006): “Thousands displaced in clashes over land in the South”

IRIN (5 July 2002): “Ethnic Conflict Worsening Afar food crisis”

NegussayAyele (2006): “MelesZenawi and Etrhiitorpeia”

<http://ethiomeia.com/articles/meles_zenawi_and_eritrea.html>

NegussayAyele (30 June 2007): “On the Identity of PM MelesZenawi and His TPLF Regime in Ethiopia”

<http://www.ethiopians.com/Views/On_the_Identity_of_PM_Meles_Zenawi_by_Ne

References

- Aalen, Lovise (2002): *Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000*.
Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. Development Studies and Human Rights, Bergen.
- Aalen, Lovise (2006): "Ethnic Federalism and self Determination for Nationalities in s Semi-Authoritarian State: the Case of Ethiopia." *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 13 (2-3), pp. 243-261.
- Abate Nikodimos Alemayehu (Fall 2004): *Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Challenges and Opportunities*, Faculty of Law, University of Lund (Master thesis).
- Abbink, Jon (1997): "Ethnicity and Constitutionalism in Contemporary Ethiopia." *Journal of African Law*, 41: 159-174.
- Abbink, Jon (1993): "Ethnic Conflict in the 'Tribal Zone:' TheDizi and Suri in Southern Ethiopia," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, XXXI, 4 P. 675 A
- Abbink, J. (1997): "Ethnicity and constitutionalism in contemporary Ethiopia", *Journal of African Law*, 4th Quarter.
- Abbink, J. (2006): *Ethnicity and Conflict Generation in Ethiopia: Some Problems and Prospects of Ethno-Regional Federalism*. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 24 (3): 389-406.
- Adele-Jinadu, L., (1994): 'Federalism and the Structure of Nigerian Federation: Some Recurrent Issues', *The Nigerian Journal of Federalism*, Vol.1, No.2, December.
- Addis Digest (July 1995): "Focus of the Month: The Ethnic Problem in Ethiopia," No. 4, GRAPECA, Bonn.
- Addis Digest (September-October 1995): "Focus: Ethnic Federation: Reality, Rhetoric and 26 Risks", No.6/7, GRAPECA, Bonn.
- Addis Tribune (2 March 2001): "Over 100 killed in East Wollega" EHRCO says Ethnic Religious Conflict Reach Serious Stage."
- Agbu, Osita (2004): "Re-Inventing Federalism in Post- Transition Nigeria: Problems and prospects", *Africa Development*, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, pp. 26-52.
- Ake, Clude (1996): *Democracy and Development in Africa*, Washington DC: Brooking Institute.
- AlemHabtu (2003): *Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Background, Present Conditions and Future Prospects*. Paper Submitted to the Second EAF International Symposium on Contemporary Development Issues in Ethiopia, July 11-12, 2003, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Almendral, Violeta Ruiz (2002): "Fiscal Federalism in Spain: the Assignment of Taxation Powers to the Autonomous Communities," Presented at the Comparative Fiscal Federalism Conference

organized by the University of Birmingham, with the support of the Canadian High Commission (London), the Forum of Federations (Ottawa) and the Research in Brussels program of Brussels-City Region. January 18th 2002.

Andargachew Tsige (1997 EC): “Netsanet Yemayawk Netsa Awchi” (“Freedom Fighter without Freedom”)

Asmal, Kader (1990): Constitutional Issues for A Free South Africa: Decentralization of a Unitary State, Transformation 13, pp.81-95.

Assefa Fiseha (2007): Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia. A Comparative Study. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.

Awolowo-Dosunmu (1994): ‘*Observations on Nigerian Federalism*’, The Nigerian Journal of Federalism, Vol.1, No.1, June.

Bayart, J.-F. (1993): *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*, (Longman, New York).

Bednar, Jenna (7 September 2006): The Robust Federation. University of Michigan; Dept. of Political science

Berhanu Gutema Balcha (2008): “*Ethnicity and restructuring of the state in Ethiopia*,” DIIPER Research Series, Working Paper No. 6.

BerhanuNega 1998 EC: Yenetsanet GohSiked. Likelebes Yetemokerew Ye Ethiopia Democracy (in Amharic) (“The Dawn of Freedom”) Börzel, Tanja A. (n.d): University of Heidenberg. “Federalism is dead-Long live Federalism”.

Brancati, Dawn (2006): Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism,” International Organization, 60(3), 651-685.

Brietzke, Paul (1995): “Ethiopia’s Leap into the Dark”: Federalism and Self-determination in the New Constitution.” Journal of African Law, Vol. 40.

Brosio, Giorgio (October 2000): Decentralization in Africa.

Broschek, Jörg (2007): “Federalism and Political Change: Germany and Canada in

Historical-Institutionalist Perspective” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the

Canadian Political Science Association, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, May 30 – June 1, 2007.

Bunce, Valerie (1999): Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State. Cambridge University Press.

Buchheit, Lee (1978): Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Cameron, Maxwell A. And Tulia G. Falleti (2004): “Federalism and the Separation of Powers at The Subnational Level, “Prepared for Delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association, September 2 - September 5, 2004.

- Chabal, Patric and J.P. Daloz (1999): *Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Chandhoke, Neera (September 2006): 'A State of One's Own': Secessionism and Federalism in India, Working Paper no. 80, Crisis States Research Centre, Crisis State Programme, Working paper Series, No. 1.
- Coakley, John (2000): *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict*. London: Frank Cass
- Cohen, John M. and Stephan B. Peterson (1999): *Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing Countries*. West Hartford, CN: Kumarian press.
- Cohen, J.M. (1995): "Ethnic federalism" in Ethiopia. *Northeast African studies*, 2, pp.157- 188.
- "Constitution of the [Chinese] Soviet Republic" November 7, 1931, in Brandt,
- Conrad, Benjamin Schwartz, and John Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1952), p. 220.
- Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995: Compiled by World Heritage Encyclopeida™ licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0., 2018©
- Daily Monitor (19 July 2005): "Gabra, Guji Conflict Displaces over 43,000."
- De Silva, Kingsley M. (1986): *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, Lanham: University of America.
- Duchacek, Ivo (1977): 'Antagonistic Cooperation: Territorial and Ethnic Communities', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 7(4), Fall, 8-9.
- Egwu, Samuel (2003): 'Ethnicity and Citizenship Rights in the Nigerian Federal State', in Gana and Egwu (eds) *Federalism in Africa*, vol. 2, NJ: Africa World Press Inc.
- Elaigwu, J. I., (1994): 'Ethnicity and the Federal Option in Africa', *The Nigerian Journal of Federalism*, 1(1), June.
- Elazar, Daniel (1987a): "Foreword." In: *The Political Theory of the Compound Republic: Designing the American Experiment*, Vincent Ostrom, (Ed) 2nd ed. rev.
- Elazar DJ. (1987b): *Exploring Federalism*. Tuscaloosa: Univ. Alabama Press.
- Elazar DJ. (1993): *International and comparative federalism*. PS: *Polit. Sci. Polit.* 26(2): 190- 195.
- Elazar DJ, (Ed). (1994): *Federal Systems of the World*. Harlow, UK: Longman Group. xxi, 2nd Ed. 30
- Ellingsen, Tanja (2000): *Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and after the Cold War*. In: *Journal of Conflict Resolution*: *Journal of the Peace Science Society (International)*. Sage Publications Ltd., Vol. 44(2), pp. 228-249.

- Engedayehu, Walle (1993): "Ethiopia: Democracy and the Politics of Ethnicity." *Africa Today*, 2nd Quarter, pp. 29-30.
- Erk, Jan (Winter 2004): Austria: "A Federation without Federalism," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 34(1), 1-20.
- Ethiopia Zare (10 April 2008): Be Bale University Hayatemariwochtegedelu ("20 students killed in Bale university")
- Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1951): *Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fedosov, Pyotr (2002): "Theoretical Aspects of Federation in Russia," in: *Federation in Russia*, Rafael Khakimov (Ed.), Donald J. and Natalia Dolgova Jacobsen (Trans.).Kazan, pp. 12-19.
- Fillippov, Mikhail, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga Shvetsova (2004): *Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions*. Cambridge University Press.
- Fleiner, Lidija R. Basta (2000): 'Can Ethnic Federalism Work?'- Paper for the Conference on "Facing Ethnic Conflicts", Bonn, Germany 14-16, December 2000 - Centre for Development Research (ZEF Bonn).
- Ghai, Yash (2000): *Autonomy and Ethnicity Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States*. New York: Cambridge University press.
- Gebrehiwet Tesfai Barki (August, 2006): "Ethiopia: Is Multy – Ethnicity Federalism Feasible? Challenges and Prospects." Institute of Federalism, Friburg University.
- Gérard, Marcel (2001): "Fiscal Federalism in Belgium," Conference on Fiscal Imbalance, Québec City, September 13-14, 2001.
- Gurr, Ted Robert (1994): "Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," in: *International Studies Quarterly*. Blackwell Publishers, No. 38.
- Gurr, T. Robert and Barbara Harff (1994): *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, Oxford.
- Hagmann, Tobias and Mohamad H. Khalif (2006) *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali studies*, Vol.6, pp.25-49.
- Hameso Y. Seyoum (1997) *Ethnicity in Africa: Towards a Positive Approach*, London: TSC publications.
- Hassen, Mohamed (1999): "Ethiopia: Missed Opportunities for peaceful Democratic Process." In: *State-building and Democratization in Africa*. Kidane Mengistiab and Cyril Daddeh (Eds.). Westport, CN: Praeger. Hechter, Michael. 2000. *Containing Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hechter, Michael (2000): *Containing Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Helland-Hansen, Kristian (27 February 2007): "Peace be Upon You: The Relevance of Religion to violent Conflict". Dept. of Political Science, University of Oslo

- Henz, Paul B. (1998): "Is Ethiopia Democratic? A political Success story." *Journal of Democracy* 9: 40-54.
- Horowitz, Donald (1997): "Ethnic conflict Management for policy Makers." In: *Conflict and peacemaking in multi ethnic states*. Joseph V. Montville (Ed.). New York: Lexington Books.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1993b): "Political Development in Ethiopia: A Peasant-based Dominant-Party Democracy." Report to USAID/Ethiopia on consultation with the Constitutional Commission, March 28 to April 1, 1993, pp., 14-16.
- Jinadu, L. Adele (September 2002): "Ethnic Conflict of Federalism in Nigeria". ZEF- Discussion papers on Development Policy, Bonn, Nov. 49.
- Khakimov, Rafael (2002): "Forword" in: *Federation in Russia*, Rafael Khakimov (Ed.), Donald J. and Natalia Dolgova Jacobsen (Trans.). Kazan, pp. 7-9.
- Keller, Edmond J. (June 2002): "Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and Democracy in Ethiopia," *African Journal of political science (formerly African Journal of Political Economic)*, Vol. 7, No.1, pp. 21-50.
- Keller, Edmond (1998): "Transitional Ethnic Conflicts in Africa." In: *The International spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*.
- Kidane Mengisteab (1997): "New Approaches to State Building in Africa: The case of Ethiopia's ethnic based federalism." *African Studies Review* 40, pp.111-132.
- KidaneMengisteab (1999): "Ethiopia's Ethnic-based federalism: State-Building or Empire Reviving?" "Unpublished paper. 33
- Kimenyi, Mwangi (1998): "Harmonizing Ethnic Claims in Africa; A proposal for Ethnic-Based Federalism," *Cato Journal*, 18(1), 43-63.
- Kimenyi, M. S. (1997): *Ethnic Diversity, Liberty and the State: The African Dilemma*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- King P. (1982): *Federalism and Federation*. London: Croom Helm.
- Kreptul, Andrie (2003): "The Constitutional Right of Secession in political Theory and History," *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, 17(4), 39-100
- Kymlicka, Will (1998): "Is federalism a viable alternative to secession? In: *Theories of Secession*. Percy M. Lehning (Ed.). London: Routledge.
- Kymlicka, Will (2006): "Emerging Western Models of Multination Federalism: Are they Relevant for Africa? In: David Turton (Ed), *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*, Addis Ababa University Press and James Currey Publishers, 2006, pp. 32-64.
- Levine, Donald (1974): *The Evolution of the Multi-Ethnic Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Levine, Donald (2008): Public action and Democracy. *The Reporter*, Sat, Jan 19, 2008, p.11.
- Lijphart, Arend (1977): *Democracy in Plural Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend (1999): *Patterns of Democracy*. USA: Yale University Press
- Lijphart, Arend (2002): ‘The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy’, in: Andrew Reynolds (Ed.) *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lustick, Ian S., Dan Miodownik, and Roy J. Eidelson (2004): *Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It?* *American Political Science Review*, 98(2), (May). Mamdani, Mahmood (2005): ‘Political identity, citizenship and ethnicity in postcolonial Africa’. A keynote address in Arusha conference, “New frontiers of social policy” – December 12-15, 2005.
- Maiti, Prasenjit (2002): Major changes for India’s constitution? *Federations*, 2(4), June/July.
- Mattei, Ugo (1995): “The New Ethiopian Constitution: First thoughts on ethnical federalism and the reception of Western Institutions.” In: Grande, Elisabetta (Ed.). *Transplants Innovation and Legal Tradition in the Horn of Africa*. Torino: L’Harmattan Italia.
- Mazrui, Ali (April 1994): *The Bondage of Boundaries*. IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Pp. 61-63.
- Merera Gudina (2003): *Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for Democracy, 1960-2000*. Addis Ababa: Chamber Printing Press.
- Merera Gudina (2006): *Contradictory Interpretations of Ethiopian History: the Need for a New Consensus*. In: Turton, D. (ed.): *Ethnic Federalism. The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*, Oxford: James Currey, pp. 119-130.
- Mohammed Hassan (1999): “Ethiopia: missed opportunities for Peaceful Democratic process.” *State Building and Democratization in Africa: Kidane Mengisetab and Cyril Daddieh (Eds.)*. Westport: Praeger.
- Momoh, Abubakar (1999): ‘Problemitizing the Issues and Politics in Civil Society’s notion of Federalism in Nigeria’, AFRIGOV Conference on New Directions in Federalism in Africa, March 14-18, Abuja.
- Monahan, Patrick J., and Michael J. Bryant (June 1996): “Coming to Terms with Plan B: Ten Principles Governing Secession.” With Nancy C. Cote. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 83.
- Mueller, Dennis C. (n.d): “Federalism: A Constitutional Perspective.” Charles B. and Dennis C. Mueller (Eds.)
- National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDIA) and the African American Institute (AAI). (1992): *An Evaluation of the June 21, 1992 Elections in Ethiopia*. gussayAyele_June07.pdf>

- Nordlinger, Eric (1972): *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, Cambridge: Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University.
- Nyong'o, P. Anyang' (2002): "The Study of African Politics. A Critical Appreciation of a Heritage". Heinrich Böll Foundation. Regional Office for East and Horn of Africa. Nairobi. p. 101.
- O'Leary, Brendan (2002): 'Federations and the Management of nations: Agreement and arguments with Walker Connor and Ernest Gellner', in Daniele Conversi (ed.)
- 24 *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the study of nationalism*, London and New York: Routledge, pp 153-183.
- Osaghae, Eghosa E. (2006): 'Ethnicity and the State in Africa', Afro Asian centre for Peace and Development Studies. Ryukoku University.
- Osaghae, Eghosa E. (2004): "Federalism and the Management of Diversity in Africa." *Identity, Culture and Politics*, 5(1&2), 162-178.
- Ostrom, Vincent (1989): "Courts and Collectivities." Paper prepared for a Conference on Public Choice and the Judiciary, Utah State University,
- Ottaway, Marina (1995): "The Ethiopian Transition: Democratization or New Authoritarianism". *Northeast African Studies* 2: 64-84.

Appendix 1 : Interview questions

Interview Checklist

Gender_____ Age_____ Profession _____ Location _____

1. Checklist of the qualitative interview and list of Interviewees or informants These questions are used as a checklist for the qualitative interview. The interview process did not necessarily follow the sequence, and also not limited to these questions.

These questions served as guide in directing the interview process. Political participation of the people

- How do the people elect their representatives in regional, zonal, and other political offices?
- Do the opposition parties and groups have rights to participate in the elections? How?
- Do they support the policies of the ruling party or the oppositions? Why?
- What is their views regarding the relationships between the people and the local leaders?
- What do they expect and demand from each level of government?
- Do they feel that local administrations have adequate power? How?

Appendix 2 : Interview questions to observe Anticipation Ethnic Rights and Ethnic Relations

- What are the benefit or shortcomings of ethnic entitlement?
- What benefit (or difficulty) have you accrued because of ethnic entitlement?
- How is the relationship between various ethnic groups in local area?
- What are the rights of ‘non-natives’ and minority groups in their area?
- What are the implications (positive and negative) of redrawing of internal boundaries in linguistic and ethnic lines?
- What are the major causes of tensions in their area?

Appendix 3 : Interview questions to assess comments and suggestions on Resource Allocation

- What are the procedures of resource allocations at federal, regional and local levels?
- Do they feel it is transparent? How?
- Do they have confidence in the modalities of financial resource allocation, management and utilization? How?
- How does ethnic federalism affect economic relations?

Appendix 4 : Interview questions to assess Representation

- Do they feel that they are represented at the different level of governance structures- federal, regional and local levels? How?
- Do they feel that their respective ethnic groups are capable of representing the people? How?
- Do they consider that all ethnic groups are fairly represented in local, regional and federal structures? How?

Appendix 5: Interview questions to assess Anticipation

- What is their anticipation regarding the ethnic federal arrangement?
- What are their anticipation concerning the local, regional and federal administrations?
- What would they like to see changed? Why and How?

INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY

PROPOSAL FOR
DISSERTATION IN MASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (MPS)

**THE ROLE OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY IN ETHIOPIAN
STATES FORMATION**

BY

ABEL ANDARGE AGEGNEHU

Enrollment No: ID1405566 Telephone No : 251913082924

SUBMITTED TO : STUDY CENTER - CODE 8105

ADDIS ABABA

SEPTEMBER, 2017

19/10/15/902
01/02/18 ①

Student's Name : **ABEL ANDARGE AGEGNEHU** Course Code : **MPSE-010**
Program Code : **MPS** Regional center : **ADDIS ABABA /34/**
Enrollment Number : **ID1405566** Study Center Code : **8105**

ADDRESS

ABEL ANDARGE AGEGNEHU
TELEPHONE NUMBER : +251913082924
E-MAIL : abel_andarge@yahoo.com
P.O.BOX : 70304 Addis Ababa – Ethiopia

Approved
[Signature]
12/02/2018

TITLE OF THE DISSERTATION :

THE ROLE OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY IN ETHIOPIAN STATES FORMATION

This proposal has been prepared after due consultation with me of agree to supervise this dissertation project till its completion.

NAME, ADDRESS AND SIGNATURE OF THE SUPERVISOR

Name: Befekadu Dhabe
Address: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Signature and Date: [Signature] 30-12-2017

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Some people consider their state nationality (Citizenship) as their essential identity more than their Ethno-cultural background; while others consider their ethno-culture as if it is their fundamental identity more than the state nationality or Citizenship. It is usually observed that sentiment of nationalism, racism and tribalism among different individuals as well as different social groups throughout the world. Globalism on the other hand is seen by a number of people as a phenomenon which is against the everlasting sustainability of the uniqueness of ethno-cultural identity since it causes people from different communities interact with each other and exchange their values.

In contrast, there are so many persons everywhere who promote the perspective of humanism. It is an obviously observable reality that there is interdependency among human individuals and societies at large.

While admitting the inevitability of interdependency in human life, the argument of this thesis is basically in favor of the importance of interdependency, internationalism and Globalism on which the writer's personal conviction is based.

The essay attempts to discuss the role of Ethno- Cultural identity in the Process of State formations and expansions as well as the Ethiopian contemporary trends of political administrations in accordance with ethno-cultural issues. In relation to this, it tries to see the main factors affecting Ethno- Cultural identity to be significantly influential or not to be so.

Furthermore, analysis of various discourses related to this topic and the thesis writer's critical reflection on them is one of the focus areas of this paper. Ethno-cultural identity is one of the major critical parts of the overall framework of individual as well as collective identity.

Feelings of comfort and "rightness" for many philosophers are likely to come out of living within the environment which is to be shaped based on their own critical thinking rather than that of living within the existing system which is dominated by ethno-cultural values.

Ethno-cultural identities are manifested in very intentional ways. This manifestation is triggered most often by two conflicting social and cultural influences.

First, deep conscious immersion into cultural traditions and values through the highly influential religious, familial, neighborhood, and educational exposures and then developing a positive sense of ethnic identity and confidence on it (Linda Martin, 1997).

Second, people with minority status can have different ethnic make-ups. Those who are victims of negative stereotype, discrimination, political oppression, economic domination and administrative marginalization may cause sense of differentiating themselves from the main stream society which is not as such affected by those problems. In this case, individuals often develop sense of ethnic identity as a result of being victims of a negative treatment and media messages received from others because of their race and ethnicity (IBID).

Others, especially black Africans and red Indians, manifest ethnic and racial identity in mostly unconscious ways through their behaviors, values, beliefs, and assumptions. For them, an ethno-cultural identity is usually invisible and unconscious because societal norms have been constructed around their racial, ethnic, and cultural frameworks, values, and priorities and then referred to as “standard American culture” rather than as “an ethno-cultural identity.” This unconscious ethnic identity manifests itself in daily behaviors, attitudes, and ways of doing state formation and expansions (IBID).

Unlike many western cultures, there is a little conscious instilling of specific ethnic identity through white communities, nor is differential ethnic treatment often identified in the media of as white cultures did. The paper will try to discuss about the ethno-cultural identity benefits from the development of a conscious ethnic identity and benefits as well when multicultural frameworks are used in state formations and expansion (Bickford, Susan, 1997).

Contemporary Societies in contrast, are likely to experience and be resistant to ways of state formations doing that are outside the globalizations and trans Ethno- Cultural identity norms in which they have been raised. Thus, today’s world communities are likely to have multi Ethno-Cultural identity and self-reflective skills to be able to trans state formations; they are likely to insist on individual tasks and rewards and to discount knowledge bases that seem “alternative”.

On the other hand, postmodernism, cultural relativism, hermeneutics, and multiculturalism are used to show them how an attempt is made to refute arguments which are in favor of domination from one side, and re-establish the notion of diversity in Ethno- Cultural identity.

But, the discussion of the arguments of these two sides alone would not be sufficient for it leaves us in the middle of nowhere. So, coming up with some different alternative to the problems at hand is mandatory to the Philosophy of Ethno-cultural identity which is a new orientation in Political Theory, tries to overcome the limitations of both of these two sides while developing its own unique position of state formations and expansions.

So, rather than limiting oneself to one's dominant horizon alone, Ethno- Cultural identity philosophy depicts how pleasingly reformed the state should be.

The sentiment of Ethno- Cultural identity in several cases could have been a cause to formulate the contemporary independent societies. The paper to some extent attempts to assess the issue of those communities who have been struggling for liberation as a consequence of being victims of marginalization, discrimination and oppression.

However, some part of the arguments on this essay has a limitation as it doesn't broadly show to what extent the extra factors could positively affect the importance of Ethno- Cultural identity on state formations and expansions, and how much logically agreeable it is on clearly showing the liberation of disadvantaged parts of the society.

1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The question of identity is one of the major topics that have been raised among different groups of people throughout the world. The sentiments of Racism, Tribalism and Nationalism are also the major burning issues in the contemporary world. Sometimes, Political elites also manipulate the mentality of the society by constituting and exaggerating ethno-cultural issues. This situation sometimes causes conflicts, civil wars and international wars at large

For example, it is possible to observe the case of North Korea versus South Korea, China versus Taiwan, Israel versus Palestine, India versus Pakistan, Eritrea versus Ethiopia, Afar versus Isa - who live both in Djibouti and Ethiopia, Nuer versus Dinka - who live in South Sudan, etc. These people are known to have antagonism among each other and there is the sentiment of either racism or Nationalism behind their opposition.

Ethnic conflict does not necessarily have to be violent . In a multi-ethnic society where freedom of speech is protected, ethnic conflict can be everyday feature of plural democracies. For example, ethnic conflict might be a non-violent struggle for resources divided among ethnic groups. However, the subject of the confrontation must be either directly or symbolically linked with an ethnic group. In healthy multi-ethnic democracies, these conflicts are usually institutionalized and channeled through parliaments, assemblies and bureaucracies or through non-violent demonstrations and strikes.

While democratic countries cannot always prevent ethnic conflict flaring up into violence, institutionalized ethnic conflict does ensure that ethnic groups can articulate their demands in a peaceful manner, which reduces the likelihood of violence. On the other hand, in authoritarian systems, ethnic minorities are often unable to express their grievances. Grievances are instead allowed to fester which might lead to long phases of ethnic silence followed by a violent outburst. Therefore, ethnic peace is an absence of violence, not an absence of conflict. Another consequence is that violent ethnic rebellions often result in political rights for previously marginalized groups.

The source of ethnic conflict is more likely psychological than intrinsically factual. Mental frameworks of the people has a major impact on the causes of ethnic-conflict. Social stigma, social stereotype and prejudice, discrimination and marginalization.

In order to make our world more peaceful and stable, we human beings should develop sense of brotherhood among ourselves in a societal level, National level, Continental level and in a global level. So as to develop sense of brotherhood, everyone has to find out the rationale behind it because sense of brotherhood cannot be developed by a mere wish.

When we come to the case of Ethiopia, ethnic based complaints and movements have been taking place since long ago up to now. The contemporary Ethiopian political situation indicates that there are frequent occurrence of uprisings and conflicts between groups of people from different ethno-cultural background in Ethiopia.

For instance, in recent time, groups of people could quarrel in the name of identity who are from Ethio-Somali versus those who are from Oromo. There is no any guaranty for similar conflicts among other tribes not to happen because the issue of ethno-cultural identity has not been properly understood by the majority of the layman people especially in relation to state formation.

This research aims to contribute its own findings and recommendations to the efforts being undertaken by policy makers and all other concerned bodies in that regard.

1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- 1.3.1. Are Internationalism and Globalization inevitable natural processes or unnecessary incidents?
- 1.3.2. Does Ethno- cultural Identity have a significant role in the process of any state formation and expansion?
- 1.3.3. Does Ethno- cultural Identity have a significant role in the formation and expansion processes of African states?
- 1.3.4. Does Ethno- cultural Identity have a significant role in the formation and expansion processes Ethiopia as a state?
- 1.3.5. What should Ethiopia do to accommodate internationalism and globalization?

1.4. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Studying about the the relationship between Ethno-Culture and State formation is believed to have the following significances;

- It could be as insight for researchers who are concerned in to political Theory how Ethno-Culture relates with State formation in the context of Globalism and Internationalism,

- It could give clue to policy makers and other concerned bodies about Ethno-Cultural issues in the context of Globalism and Internationalism ;
- It could be used by researchers who are concerned in to Ethiopian Political System about the issue of identity and the relationship between Ethno-culture and state formation.

The researcher could choose this study because there were not other people before who conducted the same research on such an issue which specifically assess the relationship between Ethno-culture and state formation of Ethiopia in the context of Globalization.

1.5. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1.5.1. GENERAL OBJECTIVE

The present study has tried to investigate the relationship between Ethno-culture and State formation.

1.5.2. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

- To assess the relationship between Ethno-culture and state formation in Ethiopia
- To find a rational answer for the question as to what should Ethiopian Policy makers do regarding Ethno-Cultural Issues in accordance with Globalism?

CHAPTER TWO

2.1. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

2.1.1. ETHNO –CULTURE

Philosopher observations show that ethnic, cultural, and ethno- identities come into being and are awakened by awareness of and interaction with other ethnic and cultural groups. As Alain de Benoist wrote: “The group and the individual both need to be confronted by ‘significant others.’ Therefore, it is nonsense to believe that identity would be better preserved without this confrontation; actually, it is the opposite: con-frontation makes identity possible. Other subjects make a subject become subject.”(Ericson and David 2011) Thus, interaction with other types of human beings is an essential part of human existence, since they draw their very awareness of being who they are by this interaction.

Concerning the relations between different cultures, under normal circumstances each cultural entity is in contact with and sometimes connected with other cultural entities. It is true that cultures exist separately from each other, but it is an error to regard them as forming different universes, for in reality cultures engage in contact and dialogue with each other, which contributes to their development and improvement. For this reason many authors such as Pierre Krebs have rightly argued, from an identitarian perspective, that “the originality and the richness of the human heritages of this world are nourished by their differences and their deviations.” (Connolly and William, 2002).

In cultural dialogue, each exchange results in the appropriation or re-appropriation by one culture of the cultural creations or ideas of another culture in a new way based on its own unique particular spirit. It is also important to recognize that Europeans have also exchanged cultural creations with non-European peoples in a largescaled-cultural dialogue from which both sides benefitted. This has established “world-European contemporary philosophy,” although until late modern times Europeans have always maintained their uniqueness and particularity. (Appiah and Anthony, 1992)

2.1.2. THEORY OF RACIAL TYPOLOGY

Theory of racial typology philosophically named as the biological descent group, characterized by certain Meta-physical traits and certain dispositional tendencies which are inherited. It must be remembered, of course, that it is not enough to simply point out the reality of race; since opponents can argue that its reality is insignificant, it is necessary to assert its importance and function.

There is also the problem of disagreements on racial classification, which is why we must be prepared to defend our own view of racial typology. Concerning Europeans, Identitarians advocate the idea that European peoples as a whole, due to their close biological relatedness, form primarily a general “White” or European race, thus rejecting the notions of certain past racial scientists who asserted the primacy of sub-racial groups among Europeans.

The existence of this common racial type among all European ethnic groups forms a bond among them and allows them to better relate to each other (in ways that they cannot relate to non-White peoples). This fact certainly does not eliminate differences among European groups, but to deny the racial relatedness of European peoples is akin to and just as incorrect as denying the existence of a general European culture and type.

Race is linked with ethno-cultural identity in two essential ways: (1) race possesses a sociological and psychological dimension whereby ethnic belonging is associated with racial type and appearance; (2) race has a spir-itual dimension that is, a dimension permeating society and culture due to the fact that racial type is also defined by its style of expression.

The first point refers to the fact that membership in an ethnic or cultural group is socially and often instinctually associated with racial back-ground or at least with racial phenotype. It is for these reasons that “hostility to miscegenation may very well be inspired by cultural or reli-gious considerations . . . Moreover, it is well known that in societies where there are many interracial marriages, the social status of these married couples depends, to a large extent, on their closeness to the dominant racial phenotype all of which impacts on the marriage and on genetic selection.”(Hekman, Susan, 2004).

The second point refers to the fact that race impacts culture: race is a force “which has deposited itself in man’s bodily and psychic existence, and which confers an intrinsic norm upon all the expressions of a cul-ture, even the highest, most individual creations.” Thus, to quote Nico-las Lahovary, “the first explanation of political philosophy is generally found in the nature of a human being . . . , in all the cases where he acts as a collective being, from the nature of his people. The latter, in turn, depends on the race that imprints its seal upon it.”(hooks, bell, 1990)

Culture and ethnicity can thus never exist entirely independently of race, and, since any significant level of racial miscegenation transforms the basic structure of a racial type, it al-so transforms ethnic type; a concrete change in racial background causes a fundamental change in identity.

It is important to stress here that recognizing the reality and role of race in culture and ethnic identity does not imply culture and society can be reduced to race. It is true that the egalitarian assertion that “race is a social construct” is simply false, but it does not follow from this that “society is a racial construct.” In fact, both of these positions are equally false: the former denies the reality and function of race which we have previously discussed, while the latter is the expression of a biological reductionism. Identitarian and New Right philosophy rejects all forms of reductionism as fallacious, and therefore recognizes the complexity of factors influencing the nature of culture and society.

Race is only one factor that influences culture and society on state formations (which may themselves convey a reciprocal influence on race), but it is important to note that numerous cultural and social changes occur independently of race, because of multiple factors, and that identity cannot be reduced to simply racial identity, even if the latter has some importance(Mills, Charles, 1998).

Theories of Ethnicity

Over the last fifty years, ethnicity, nation and nationalism have become important areas of study within political science, anthropology, sociology and area studies (Gilbert, 2009). Ethnicity is

an abstract concept, which includes an imbedded reference to both collective and individual aspects of the phenomenon. Ethnicity is defined as “a self-and-other aggregate definitional dimension that deals with ‘us’ versus ‘them’”. Ethnic identity is defined in terms of both self-perceived as well as defined by outside groups. One of the most practical and prevalent features that help define ethnicity is language. The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution of Ethiopia, if not stated the term “ethnicity”, it stipulated the concepts of “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia”, and recognized over 80 different ethnic groups and accepted that each has a distinct culture, language and identities.

Yang (2000) argues that ethnicity is an ancestry. For others it is a physical attributes that is socially constructed beyond the will of the individuals. Ethnicity seems a daily phenomenon that appears in the form of questions in schools, jobs, grants etc. At the individual level, ethnicity is understood a social-psychological practice that enshrines an individual a sense of belonging and identity. Based on this understanding, one can define ethnic identity as a manner in which a person, by virtue of his/her ethnic origin, locate him/herself emotionally in relation to one or more social systems. The author above underlines that confusion as to the nature of ethnicity often emanates from lack of an adequate typology of ethnic groups and ethnic identities. This concept can be explained in terms of other similar concepts such as ethnic group, ethnic conflict and ethnic identity (Isajiw, 1993). Its objective feature includes those observable facts in social institutions including affinity and ancestry and the patterns of individuals in explicit behavior. Its subjective angle, on the other hand, reveals attitudes, values and preconceptions. The concept of ethnic group is the most basic. Ethnic identity on the other hand refers to ethnicity as an individually experienced phenomenon. Similarly, the ethnic groups can be defined as the community institutions or organizations that have descendants and ancestors as a means of cultural transmission and identity formation. Some of the basic and daily questions people ask include the following: what is your ethnicity? Which ethnicity you belong to? What is your affiliation? What is your ethnic group? Subjectively, the ethnic groups implies ethnic boundaries both within the ethnic group and without the ethnic group. In a multiethnic society, people could have multiple ethnic identities cognizant of that of ancestry. Single identity for instance refers to when both parents are supposedly coming from the same ethnicity; and the multiple identity differs in that parents come from different background.

Chandra (n.d, p.6) summarizes the most widely used definitions of ethnic identity as follows. For Max Weber, ethnic groups are those human groups with their common descent with

similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization or migration. Donald Horowitz (cited in *ibid*), ethnicity takes into account a myth of collective ancestry and traits believed to be innate. Fearon and Latin (*ibid*) also argued that an ethnic group is a group larger than a family for which membership is counted primarily by descent, and is conceptually autonomous. In this manner it is conventionally recognized as “natural history” as a group.

Fearon (*ibid*) defines a “prototypical” ethnic group as one that has several features such as membership based on descent. This takes into account the consciousness level of a group membership in which members have distinct and unique cultural features valued by the majority members. Similarly, this group has a homeland and a shared history. For Anthony Smith (*ibid*), an ethnic group is, “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of a common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity.” Above all, all of these definitions have profoundly common feature one of which is descent the role of which are specified in terms of a common ancestry, a myth of common ancestry and place of origin and a “descent rule” for membership. The features combined with descent include a common culture or language, a common history and conceptual autonomy. The differences are observed over how precise to specify the role of descent and how other features should be combined with it in defining ethnic groups.

Abbink (2006) who studied ‘ethnicity and conflict generation in Ethiopia’ does not hide ethnic-based conflicts in Ethiopia since 1991; but he seems to attribute the associated causes to the ethnic based federalism. He wrote that while it is difficult to identify the underlying causes of all conflicts, associated reasons include lack of control over resources, investment and settlement related disputes, language policy, inability of the governments to fix grievances and others. He argues that in order to reduce ‘ethnic clashes’ in Ethiopia, some of the possible options could include solving issues emanating from some of the regional state and boundary related disputes and the like.

Jemma (2001) narrates the meaning of ethnic conflict and said that it largely overlooked. Ethnic conflicts can be understood as cleavages between groups based on differentiations in ethnic identities. Secondly, there might be difficult to get universal meaning of ethnic conflict

mainly due to reasons that some may define it in the milieu of domestic politics, and others comprehend it in the international context of the inter-ethnic dispute. Moreover, ethnic conflict could vary in its nature and could range from peaceful expression of objections to absolute use of physical force. In the writing of Hizkias Assefa (n.d), most of the conflicts and wars carried out in the horn of Africa in the last 30 years have been due to the ethnic conflict, instigated both by the opponents themselves and by the outsiders.

For Jemma (2001), ethnic conflict is globally recognized as social problems that prompts careful response to the associated problems to draw joint solution. Different scholars have different views and predispositions; and this has caused misperceptions and controversies somewhat among the writers for them to handle this complex and politically sensitive matter by pinpointing the fueling causes of conflicts related to ethnicity and to suggest options. It is identified that academicians fail to agree on the sources of ethnic conflict. In fact, most of them attribute the root causes of ethnic conflict to the rigid or discriminatory government policies that exercise politics of exclusion. They believe that ethnic conflict occurs where the parties on power favors their ethnic group benefiting politically and economically at the expense of other ethnic groups. Others relate ethnic disputes to cultural domination that could result in fear of assimilation. Jemma (ibid) also studied that ethnic conflict can occur horizontally as in the case where clashes occur between or among neighboring ethnic communities usually associated to competition over resources while there are some researchers that link it with factors like weakening of central authority, economic shock or interference by outsiders and others.

According to Chai (1996), the issue of ethnic boundaries have been one of the debatable issues for the social scientists at since the work of Barth. Isajiw (1992) argues that the concept of ethnic group is the most central as others are derived from it. Ethnic group refers to ethnicity as the collective phenomenon and the ethnic identity implies ethnicity as an independently experienced phenomenon. He added that ethnicity itself is an abstract concept, which includes an inherent reference to both collective and individual aspects of the phenomenon. In addition, ethnicity is a process that is constructed in the process of feeding, clothing, schooling and conversing with children and others. On the other hand, Yang (2000) wrote that ethnicity could be a concept that is straightforward but is susceptible to interpretation. One may interpret it as ancestry and others as perceive it as a physical attributes. The fact that the definition of ethnicity could have emanated from the human mind and sentiments and implying emotional bond to a distinct group makes ethnicity subjective. On the other hand, ethnicity and its meaning could

also be objective as it takes into account some objective features and power relations. It is also free of individuals' desire. Overall, the two terms (ethnicity and ethnic group) can be used interchangeably. The ethnic group implies ancestry, national origin and culture where as ethnicity is affiliation and identifying oneself with the ethnic group.

Some theorists predict that ethnicity would decline and gradually cease through the processes of industrialization and modernization. Others argue that ethnicity will die through assimilation and unification processes. Nevertheless, others argued that ethnicity not only becomes potent in the contemporary world but also remains decisive tool in space and time. Globally ethnicity is not fading but it is rising. Ethnicity is vital in America; and played key role where the "Soviet" identity failed to supersede ethnic divisions in the former Soviet Union. Scholars pose questions related to the nature of ethnicity. These include whether ethnicity inherited or constructed, the basis of ethnicity and its determinants. Scholars have come up with a pool of three distinct theories of ethnicity with three different school of thoughts that determine the power of ethnicity. These are **primordialism**- (conceiving ethnicity as a primordial phenomenon and as fixed with distinct social boundaries), **constructionism** – (conceiving ethnicity as an epiphenomenon), and **instrumentalism** – (conceiving ethnicity.as a situational phenomenon and as a flexible, socially constructed, fluid and hence withering away). The Primordial perspective of ethnicity focuses on basic features and traits such as common blood, descent, ancestors, family, belonging, roots, and solidarity – essentialism (Isajiw, 1993 and Jemma, 2001).

The primordialist theory implies the perennialist theories of ethnicity with a belief that ethnicity is a long-standing feature of humanity that pre-dates the modern and post-1789 period. They characterize ethnic groups as having common origin, history, culture, language, territory, and the like. This perspective views human action as value oriented whereas Instrumentalists view this action as rationally oriented toward practical goals; and they underline the circumstantial manipulation of identities while primordialists point to the emotional power of primordial symbols (Kaufmann, n.d). In accordance with this theory, ethnicity is something given, ascribed or ascribed status at birth, originated in the kin-and-clan-structure of human society. Someone inherited from his/her own ancestor; and hence this is fixed, static and permanent. This bond of biological and cultural factors determine ethnicity. This school of thought gives a space for a common culture such as language, culture and language in determining the common ethnic group (Isajiw, 1993 and Yang, 2000). Ethnicity is a primordial affiliation in the sense

that it is connected to those things people cannot live without- example, tradition, the persistence of the past into the present, and collective self- consciousness (Jemma 2001 and Horowitz, 1998). What is vital here is that the fact that members are biologically interrelated to each other than to others, this blood ties help the members easily distinguish themselves from the rest of the members that are regarded as "outsiders" and that they are similarly considered by others as distinctive identities.

Those with the modern approach claim that ethnic identity is constructed in the modern era, either by instrumentalist elites or by political institutions whose bureaucratic constructions give birth to new identities (Kaufmann, n.d). This approach is best represented by Michael Hechter's theory of internal colonialism and cultural division of labor that divides the economic structure of society into the center and the periphery. The periphery is designated to get negligible jobs compared to the gains in the centre. It tends to conclude that such uneven economy, which is a product of economic exploitation, pronounces ethnicity (Isajiw, 1993). For this school of thought, premodern identities were strictly *indigenous* – for the peasant masses - or imperial religious - for military and religious elites. The aforementioned author affirms that there exist two major forms of ethnicity; and these are *primary ethnicity*, which refers to members of the group inhabiting their ancestral 'homeland' territory; and whereas the *secondary ethnicity* implies the case in which groups acknowledge that they are not native, and hence their homeland exists somewhere else.

Until 1970, the Constructionist school of thought was very common and dominating the outlook of many scholars; and then declined (Yang, 2000). This school of thought puts its argument by posing three arguments. It puts that ethnicity is socially constructed and is invented. Hence, by virtue of the product of the social constructs, ethnic boundaries are flexible, dynamic and are subject to change. Finally, it stresses that ethnic identification and affiliation is constructed by the society. It takes the form of social interactions.

The instrumentalist school of thought has different and opposing view from the previous two approaches. The instrumentalist approach dictates that ethnicity is a means and strategy of controlling resources. It attests that the extent to which a person remains ethnic is contingent on the extent that the person benefits from that particular ethnic group; and ethnicity exists and persists as long as it has a return. Finally, the integrative approach insists that instead of relying on a single school of thought, it would be relevant to take the combination of the three, as they remain equally determining in practice.

2.1.4. CULTURE AND IDENTITY

From this brief examination of how identity politics fits into the political landscape it is already clear that the use of the controversial term “identity” raises a host of philosophical questions. Logical uses aside, it is likely familiar to philosophers from the literature in metaphysics on personal identity one's sense of self and its persistence.

Indeed, underlying many of the more overtly pragmatic debates about the merits of identity politics are philosophical questions about the nature of subjectivity and the self (Taylor 1989). Charles Taylor argues that the modern identity is characterized by an emphasis on its inner voice and capacity for *authenticity* that is, the ability to find a way of being that is somehow true to oneself (Taylor 1994).

While doctrines of equality press the notion that each human being is capable of deploying his or her practical reason or moral sense to live an authentic live qua individual, the politics of difference has appropriated the language of authenticity to describe ways of living that are true to the identities of marginalized social groups.

As Sonia Kruks puts it: What makes identity politics a significant departure from earlier, pre-identarian forms of the politics of recognition is its demand for recognition on the basis of the very grounds on which recognition has previously been denied: it is *qua* women, *qua* blacks, *qua* lesbians that groups demand recognition. The demand is not for inclusion within the fold of “universal humankind” on the basis of shared human attributes; nor is it for respect “in spite of” one's differences. Rather, what is demanded is respect for oneself *as* different (2001: 85).

For many proponents of identity politics this demand for authenticity includes appeals to a time before oppression, or a culture or way of life damaged by colonialism, imperialism, or even genocide. Thus for example Taiaiake Alfred, in his defense of a return to traditional indigenous values, argues that:

Indigenous governance systems embody distinctive political values, radically different from those of the mainstream. Western notions of domination (human and natural) are noticeably absent; in their place we find harmony, autonomy, and respect. We have a responsibility to recover, understand, and preserve these values, not only because they represent a unique contribution to the history of ideas, but because renewal of respect for traditional values is the only lasting solution to the political, economic, and social problems that beset our people. (Alfred 1999: 5)

What is crucial about the “identity” of identity politics appears to be the experience of the subject, especially his or her experience of oppression and the possibility of a shared and more authentic or self-determined alternative. Thus identity politics rests on unifying claims about the meaning of politically laden experiences to diverse individuals.

Sometimes the meaning attributed to a particular experience will diverge from that of its subject: thus, for example, the woman who struggles desperately to be attractive may think that she is simply trying to be a better person, rather than understanding her experience as part of the disciplining of female bodies in a patriarchal culture.

Making sense of such disjunctions relies on notions such as false consciousness, the systematic mystification of the experience of the oppressed by the perspective of the dominant. Thus despite the disagreements of many defenders of identity political claims with Marxism and other radical political models, they share the view that individuals' perceptions of their own interests may be systematically distorted and must be somehow freed of their misperceptions by group-based transformation.

Concern about this aspect of identity politics has crystallized around the transparency of experience to the oppressed, and the univocality of its interpretation. Experience is never, critics argue, simply epistemically available prior to interpretation (Scott 1992); rather it requires a theoretical framework implicit or explicit to give it meaning. Moreover, if experience is the origin of politics, then some critics worry that what Kruks (2001) calls “an epistemology of provenance” will become the norm: on this view, political perspectives gain legitimacy by virtue of their articulation by subjects of particular experiences. This, critics charge, closes off the possibility of critique of these perspectives by those who don't share the experience, which in turn inhibits political dialogue and coalition building. Nonetheless, poststructuralist skepticism about the possibility of experience outside a hermeneutic frame has been countered with phenomenological attempts to articulate a ground for experience in the lived body (Alcoff 2000; see also Oksala 2004 and 2011; Stoller 2009).

From these understandings of subjectivity, it is easy to see how critics of identity politics, and even some cautious supporters, have feared that it is prone to essentialism. This expression is another philosophical term of abuse, intended to capture a multitude of sins. In its original contexts in metaphysics, the term implies the belief that an object has a certain quality by virtue

of which it is what it is; for Locke, famously, the essence of a triangle is that it is a three-sided shape. In the contemporary humanities the term is used more loosely to imply, most commonly, an illegitimate generalization about identity (Heyes 2000).

In the case of identity politics, two claims stand out as plausibly “essentialist”: the first is the understanding of the subject that characterizes a single axis of identity as discrete and taking priority in representing the self as if being Asian-American, for example, were entirely separable from being a woman. To the extent that identity politics urges mobilization around a single axis, it will put pressure on participants to identify that axis as their defining feature, when in fact they may well understand themselves as integrated selves who cannot be represented so selectively or even reductively (Spelman 1988).

The second form of essentialism is closely related to the first: generalizations made about particular social groups in the context of identity politics may come to have a disciplinary function within the group, not just describing but also dictating the self-understanding that its members should have. Thus, the supposedly liberatory new identity may inhibit autonomy, as Anthony Appiah puts it, replacing “one kind of tyranny with another” (Appiah 1994: 163).

Just as dominant groups in the culture at large insist that the marginalized integrate by assimilating to dominant norms, so within some practices of identity politics dominant subgroups may, in theory and practice, impose their vision of the group's identity onto all its members. For example, in his films *Black Is*, *Black Ain't* and *Tongues Untied* Marlon Riggs eloquently portrays the exclusion of Black women and gay Black men from heterosexist and masculinist understandings of African-American identity politics.

Or, theorizing the experience of hybridity for those whose identities are especially far from norms of univocality, Gloria Anzaldúa, for example, famously writes of her *mestiza* identity as a Chicana, American, raised poor, a lesbian and a feminist, living in the metaphoric and literal Borderlands of the American Southwest (Anzaldúa 1999). Some suggest the deployment of “strategic essentialism”: we should act as if an identity were uniform only to achieve interim political goals, without implying any deeper authenticity (Spivak 1990: 1-16).

Others argue that a relational social ontology, which makes clear the fluidity and interdependence of social groups, should be developed as an alternative to the reification of

other approaches to identity politics (Young 2000; Nelson 2001). These accounts of subjectivity, ontologies, and ways of understanding solidarity and relationships have enduring importance in philosophical scholarship in identity politics.

2.1.6. RACE, ETHNICITY, AND MULTICULTURALISM

Similar debates in philosophy of race highlight the contingent and historical nature of “race” as a category of identity. Despite a complex history of biological essentialism in the presentation of racial typologies, the notion of a genetic basis to racial difference has been largely discredited; the criteria different societies (at different times) use to organize and hierarchize “racial formations” are political and contingent (Omi and Winant 1986). While skin color, appearance of facial features, or hair type are in some trivial sense genetically determined, the grouping of different persons into *races* does not pick out any patterned biological difference (although see the debate “Is Race Real?” in the internet resources. What it does pick out is a set of social meanings with political ramifications (Alcoff 1997, 2006).

The most notorious example of an attempt to rationalize racial difference as biological is the U.S. “one-drop rule”, under which an individual was characterized as Black if they had “one drop” or more of “Black blood.” Adrian Piper points out that not only does this belief persist into contemporary readings of racial identity, it also implies that given the prolonged history of racial mixing in the US both coerced and voluntary very significant numbers of nominally “white” people in the U.S. today should be re-classified as “Black” (Piper 1996).

In those countries that have had official racial classifications, individuals’ struggles to be re-classified (almost always as a member of a more privileged racial group) are often invoked to highlight the contingency of race, especially at the borders of its categories. And a number of histories of racial groups that have apparently changed their racial identification Jews, Italians, or the Irish, for example also illustrate social constructionist theses (Ignatiev 1995).

The claim that race is “socially constructed”, however, does not in itself mark out a specific identity politics. Indeed, the very contingency of race and its lack of correlation with categories that have more meaning in everyday life (such as ethnicity or culture) may circumscribe its political usefulness: just as feminists have found the limits of appeals to “women's identity”, so Asian-Americans may find with ethnicities and cultures as diverse as Chinese, Indian, or

Vietnamese that their racial designation itself provides little common ground for global state formations which has communality. That a US citizen of both Norwegian and Ashkenazi Jewish heritage will check that they are “white” on a census form says relatively little (although nonetheless something) about their experience of their identity, or indeed of their very different relationship to anti-Semitism.

Tropes of separatism and the search for forms of authentic self-expression are related to race via ethno-cultural understandings of identity: for example, the U.S. Afrocentric movement appeals to the cultural significance of African heritage for Black Americans (Asante 2000). Racial categories are perhaps most politically significant in their contested relation to state formations. Racism attempts to reduce members of social groups to their racial features, drawing on a complex history of racial stereotypes to do so. Racism is arguably analogous to other forms of oppression in being both overt and institutionalized, manifested both as deliberate acts by individuals and as unplanned systemic outcomes. The specific direction of US discussion of the categories of race has been around color-blind versus color-conscious public policy (Appiah and Gutmann 1996). Colorblindness that is, the view that race *should* be ignored in public policy and everyday exchange has hegemony in popular discourse. Drawing attention to race whether in a personal description or in university admissions procedures is unfair and racist. Advocates of color-consciousness, on the other hand, argue that racism will not disappear without proactive efforts, which require the invocation of race.

Thus affirmative action, for example, requires statistics about the numbers of members of oppressed racial groups employed in certain contexts, which in turn requires racial identification and categorization. Thus those working against racism face a paradox familiar in identity politics: the very identity they aim to dispel must be invoked to make their case.

The literature on multiculturalism takes up questions of race, ethnicity, and cultural diversity in relation to the liberal state. Some multicultural states notably Canada allegedly aim to permit the various cultural identities of their residents to be preserved rather than assimilated, despite the concern that the over-arching liberal aims of such states may be at odds with the values of those they claim to protect. For example, Susan Moller Okin argues that multiculturalism is sometimes bad for women, especially when it works to preserve patriarchal values in minority cultures. If multiculturalism implies a form of cultural relativism that prevents judgment of or

interference with the “private” practices of minorities, female genital mutilation, forced marriage, compulsory veiling, or being deprived of education may be the consequence.

Okin's critics counter that she falsely portrays culture as static, internally homogeneous, and defined by men's values, allowing liberalism to represent a culturally unmarked medium for the defense of individual rights (Okin et al. 1999). For many commentators on multiculturalism this is the nub of the issue: is there an inconsistency between defending the rights of minority cultures, while prohibiting those (allegedly) cultural practices that the state judges illiberal. Can sustain the cultural and value-neutrality that some commentators still ascribe to it, or to what extent should it embrace its own cultural specificity (Taylor 1994). Defenders of the right to cultural expression of minorities in multicultural states thus practice forms of identity politics that are both made possible by liberalism and sometimes in tension with it.

2.1.5. LIBERALISM PHILOSOPHY AND IDENTITY POLITICS

A key condition of possibility for contemporary identity politics was institutionalized liberal democracy. The citizen mobilizations that made democracy real also shaped and unified groups previously marginal to the polity, while extensions of formal rights invited expectations of material and symbolic equality. The perceived paucity of rewards offered by liberal capitalism, however, spurred forms of radical critique that sought to explain the persistence of oppression. At the most basic philosophical level, critics of liberalism suggested that liberal social ontology—the model of the nature of and relationship between subjects and collectives—was misguided.

The social ontology of most liberal political theories consists of citizens conceptualized as essentially similar individuals, as for example in John Rawls' famous thought experiment using the “original position”, in which representatives of the citizenry are conceptually divested of all specific identities or affiliations in order to make rational decisions about the social contract (Rawls 1971).

To the extent that group interests are represented in liberal polities, they tend to be understood as associational, forms of interest group pluralism whereby those sharing particular interests voluntarily join together to create a political lobby. Citizens are free to register their individual preferences (through voting, for example), or to aggregate themselves for the opportunity to

lobby more systematically (e.g., by forming an association such as a neighborhood community league). These lobbies, however, are not defined by the identity of their members so much as by specific shared interests and goals, and when pressing their case the marginalized subjectivity of the group members is not itself called into question. Finally, political parties, the other primary organs of liberal democratic government, critics suggest, have few moments of inclusivity, being organized around party discipline, responsiveness to lobby groups, and broadbased electoral popularity globally known.

Ultimately conventional liberal democracy, diverse radical critics claim, cannot effectively address the ongoing structural marginalization that persists in late capitalist liberal states, and may even be complicit with it (Young 1990; P. Williams 1991; Brown 1995; M. Williams 1998).

On a philosophical level, these understandings of the political subject and its relationship to collectivity came to seem inadequate to ensuring representation for women, gays and lesbians, or racial-ethnic groups (Williams 1998). Critics charged that the neutral citizen of liberal theory was in fact the bearer of an identity coded white, male, bourgeois, ablebodied, and heterosexual (Pateman 1988; Young 1990; Di Stefano 1991; Mills 1997; Pateman and Mills 2007). This implicit ontology in part explained the persistent historical failure of liberal democracies to achieve anything more than token inclusion in power structures for members of marginalized groups. A richer understanding of political subjects as constituted through and by their social location was required.

In particular, the philosophical experience of oppression brought with it certain perspectives and needs that could not be assimilated through existing liberal structures. Individuals are oppressed by virtue of their membership in a particular social group that is, a collective whose members have relatively little mobility into or out of the collective, who usually experience their membership as involuntary, who are generally identified as members by others, and whose opportunities are deeply shaped by the relation of their group to corollary groups through privilege and oppression. Oppression, then, is the systematic limiting of opportunity or constraints on self-determination because of such membership: for example, Frantz Fanon eloquently describes the experience of being always constrained by the white gaze as a Black man: “ *I already knew that there were legends, stories, history, and above all historicity... I was responsible at the same time for my body, my race, for my ancestors* ”. (Fanon 1968: 112)

Conversely, members of dominant groups are systematically advantaged and privileged by the deprivations imposed on the oppressed members of the society. For example, in a widely cited article Peggy McIntosh identifies whiteness as a dominant identity, and lists four to seven ways in which she is advantaged by being white compared with her colleagues of color.

These range from being able to buy “flesh-colored” BandAids that will match her skin tone, to knowing that she can be rude without provoking negative judgments of her racial group, to being able to buy a house in a middle-class community without risking neighbors' disapproval (1993).

Critics have also charged that *assimilation* (or, less provocatively, integration) is a guiding principle of liberalism. If the liberal subject is coded in the way Young (1990) suggests, then attempts to apply liberal norms of equality will risk demanding that the marginalized conform to the identities of their oppressors. For example, many gays and lesbians have objected to campaigns to institute “gay marriage” on the grounds that these legal developments assimilate same-sex relationships to a heterosexual model, rather than challenging its historical, material, and symbolic terms (e.g., Card 2007).

If this is *equality*, they claim, then it looks suspiciously like the erasure of socially subordinate identities rather than their genuine incorporation into the polity. This suspicion helps to explain the affiliation of identity politics with *separatism*. This latter is a set of positions that share the view that attempts at integration of dominant and marginalized groups so consistently compromise the identity or potential of the less powerful that a distinct social and political space is the only structure that will adequately protect them.

In Canada, for example, Québec separatists claim that the French language and francophone culture are persistently erased within an overwhelmingly dominant Anglo-American continent, despite the efforts of the Canadian state to maintain its official bilingualism and to integrate Québec into the nation. Given their long history of conflict and marginalization, a separate and sovereign Québec, they argue, is the only plausible solution (e.g., Laforest in Beiner and Norman 2001). Analogous arguments have been made on behalf of Native American and other indigenous peoples and African Americans. Lesbian feminist separatists have claimed that the central mechanism for the oppression of women under patriarchy is heterosexuality.

Understanding heterosexuality as a forced contract or compulsory institution, they argue that women's relationships with men are persistently characterized by domination and subordination.

Only divorce (literal and figurative) and the creation of new geographic and political communities of woman-identified women will end patriarchal exploitation, and forge a liberatory female identity (Rich 1980; Frye 1983; Radicalesbians 1988 ;Wittig 1992). One of the central charges against identity politics by liberals, among others, has been its alleged reliance on notions of sameness to justify political mobilization. Looking for people who are *like* you rather than who share your political values as allies runs the risk of sidelining critical political analysis of complex social locations and ghettoizing members of social groups as the only persons capable of making or understanding claims to justice.

After an initial wave of relatively uncompromising identity politics, proponents have taken these criticisms to heart and moved to more philosophically nuanced accounts that appeal to *coalitions* as better organizing structures. On this view, separatism around a single identity formation must be muted by recognition of the internally heterogeneous and overlapping nature of social group memberships. The idea of a dominant identity from which the oppressed may need to dissociate themselves remains, but the alternative becomes a more fluid and diverse grouping, less intent on guarantees of internal homogeneity and more concerned with identifying “family resemblances” than literal identity (Heyes 2000).

This trajectory from formal inclusion in liberal politics, to assertions of difference and new demands under the rubric of identity politics, to internal and external critique of identity political movements has taken different forms in relation to different identities. Increasingly it is difficult to see what divides contemporary positions, and some commentators have suggested possible rapprochements between liberalism and identity politics (e.g., Laden 2001).

A problem in sorting through such claims is the vagueness of philosophical discussions of identity politics, which are often content to list their rubric under the mantra of “gender, race, class, etc.” although these three are not obviously analogous, nor is it clear which identities are gestured toward by the predictable “etc.” (or why they do not merit naming). Class in particular has a distinctively different political history, and contemporary critics of identity politics, as I will discuss below, often take themselves to be defending class analysis against identity politics' depoliticizing effects. Of those many forms of identity politics to which large academic

literatures attach, however, I'll briefly highlight key issues concerning gender, sexuality, and a complex cluster of race, ethnicity and multiculturalism.

2.2. CONCEPTUALIZATION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The five theories of state origin are evolutionary theory, force theory, divine right theory, Rational-legal authority theory and social contract theory. The vast majority of the states in the world today originate from social contract. This is essentially a constitution in which the members of the state give a mandate to the elected few to rule the country.

In such states, it is important for both the leaders and the rest of the population to follow the stipulations in the constitution, which is drawn up by both parties.

The evolutionary theory claims that the origin of the state as evolved from family. The force theory is also applicable in many states today. It relies on the use of aggression to come to power. This is one of the most common forms of state origin in countries that were colonized and which subsequently became independent after armed struggle.

The theory of divine right states that the leaders of a state come about as a result of ordination from God. This is not such a common method of state origin these days, though it was one of the most popular in the past. The Crusades and conquests of various parts of the world by Islamic leaders are prime examples of this. The Ethiopian case is more likely a combination of both force theory and the divine right theory in the ancient time and has been transformed in to social contract after 1991.

Writers of Ethiopian history have different perspectives in terms of their perception about the socio-political background of the country. Generally, there are four different perspectives and approaches by which Ethiopian socio-political history has been presented. (1) Africanist Perspective, (2) Ethiopianist perspective, (3) Ethio-nationalist perspective and (4) Post-modern view of Ethiopian socio-political experiences.

The Pan-Africanist perspective simply looks at Ethiopian history as part and parcel of African history. Ethiopia is just a part of Africa and the whole elements of Ethiopian socio-political experience are to be viewed as some part of the historical background of Africa. According to this perspective the age of Ethiopia is to be traced back as far as the age of Africa. Fossilized

findings are widely used by Pan-Africanists in order to describe Ethiopian age in history. (Lex Lubin, 2010).

Ethiopianist perspective on the other hand, views Ethiopia as a unique state established by a divine will in a different way from the rest of the countries of Africa. Ethiopianists measure the age of Ethiopia since from about 3,500 years ago and even some times they claim about the time to be measured since 5,000 years ago. They argue that Ethiopia is a culturally unique state “blessed” with the religious culture of Orthodox Christianity. The people of Ethiopia are heroes who have been sacrificing their lives for the respect of the country's sovereignty, territory as well as identity. In this case, the northern Ethiopian culture is considered as an agent for the whole culture of the country. The Solomonic dynasty lovers can be mentioned as an example for this perspective. During the cold war era, the former Ethiopian president Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam and his political party also by and large used to tend to be Ethiopianists even though they rejected the idea of divine power as they were Marxists and Leninists. (Kelley L. Ross 2014).

The third one is the Ethio-national perspective. Ethio-nationalism is a type of nationalism which defines the nation in terms of a shared ethnicity. This perspective is further divided by two different viewpoints such that “Colonial thesis” and “National operation thesis”. (Gene Callahan, 2016).

The colonial thesis activists argue that the ethnic group of the political elites in the ruling class have been colonizing all ethnicities and peoples who could not get the chance to hold on to the political power. That means, there are more than 85 ethnic groups within the Ethiopian political system and out of these all 85 ethnic groups, only one or two ethnic groups could get the chance to hold on to the political power and colonize all the rest ethnic groups. One of the widely known political parties which can be mentioned as the activist of the colonial thesis is the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). OLF is an organization established in 1973 by Oromo nationalists to promote self-determination for the Oromo people against “Abyssinian colonial rule”. Another example of the colonial thesis is the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). ONLF is a separatist rebel group fighting for the right to self-determination for Somali ethnic groups who live in the Ethio-Somali Region of Ethiopia. ONLF was established in 1984 claiming for the autonomy of this region and has claimed responsibility for several attacks since the beginning of 1994 aimed at Ethiopian forces in the area, which the government considers a region under

the new federal system. The Sidama Liberation Front (SLF) is also another example for the Colonial thesis advocates. (IBID).

In contrast, the National operation thesis argues that there has never been any colonialism in the Ethiopian Historical background. Any Ethnic group has never been colonized by another ethnic group. However, all ethnic groups did not enjoy equal opportunity in the political economy of Ethiopia since long ago. So, according to the National operation thesis perspective, the former Ethiopian political leaders favored one Ethno-culture over the other ethno cultures and one religion over the other religions. Even, all people from the ethno-culture to which the former Abyssinian political leaders belong did not enjoy proper justice; rather, only some members of that ethnicity who were in the network of the ruling class which means the political elites enjoyed luxurious life. In short, this perspective rejects the idea of colonialism in Ethiopia but admits the presence of inequality among ethnicities within the politics of Ethiopia. (IBID).

Post Modern view of the Ethiopian political experience argues that there are always unexpressed undermined stories under the obviously told exaggerated stories in Ethiopian History. Ethiopian History is full of discourses. Historians are usually so biased that they don't genuinely search out and expose the true stories; instead, they focus on the issues which support their personal concern. So, they study and write based on their own ideological interest. This is one of the discourses which make one not to rely on the historical teachings about Ethiopian politics.

Another discourse is that, culture and territory are artificially constructed manifestations of identity with in a society. A community may claim :- "this territory (land) is mine" and another community may also claim the same issue to the same territory (land). But, what is the factual evidence which enables them to convince that land area really belongs to either of the communities? There is not any objective judgment to allocate resource and cultural identity to the people. Rather influential elites and their propagandists preach the people and convince them to have the belief of specific ethno-cultural identity and ownership of specific natural resources. The issue of identity and ownership is full of discourse.

So no one can genuinely and rationally assert that Ethiopian ethno-cultural issues are to be addressed correctly. Every social construction is essentially unfair phenomenon because it is made up at the expense of human life in which so many innocent people have been lost for the sake of that. This is also another discourse. For this research purpose, the researcher's position

is in favor of the National operation thesis which is one of the two branches of the Ethio-National Perspective.

Conceptualizing the Meaning, Types and Causes of Conflict

The term ‘conflict’ comes from a word *confligere*, to mean ‘shocking together’ ‘which are goals held by the parties when the realization of one excludes the realization of the other. Conflict may destroy the very foundations of development such as natural resources, economic gains, and the social and civic ties that would permit and sustain development. This prompts to understand the nature, causes and consequences of conflict, which is indispensable to conflict prevention and management. Different factors could trigger conflicts such as a breakdown of governmental structures, increased burden over natural resources and ethnic & religious differences and others. Conflict leads, among other things, to breakdown of law and order, disruption of economic activities, humanitarian crises (e.g. displacement of people, including vulnerable groups such as women and children); and a state of uncertainty that deter long run investment efforts and stability (Galtung, 2007). To further imply the cause and effect relationships among conflict, violence and peace, Galtung explains that if conflict is the same as violence, then ‘conflict’ is bracketed between outbreak of violence and ceasefire.

According to Miller (2005), the term ‘conflict’ comes from the Latin word and has a meaning of ‘to clash or engage in a fight’. It shows a battle between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends. Conflict may be either manifest, recognizable through actions or latent as incompatibilities are unarticulated; or it is built into systems. Conflict is as old as humanity and appears as a prominent feature of the human society. It is natural in a society. Conflict is inbuilt in the human nature where there is polarized system in a society in the form of the ‘haves’ and the ‘haves-not’, the ‘strong’ and the ‘weak’, the ‘dominant’ and the ‘vulnerable’; these situations are often accompanied by perpetual struggle between the divides (Folarin and Adebo, 2005). From politics point of view, conflict exists when two or more groups are incompatible over values; and thus claim to status, power and resources with the aims that the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate the rivals. Inherently, conflict arises for different reasons and there are different types of conflict in human society. Conflict implies an enmity between two or more people; and is an opposition to

existing view, stand, or position that is expressed in the form of disagreement, anger, quarrel, hatred, destruction, killing, war and others (Folarin, 2005). Apparently, conflict begins from birth during which babies begin the journey of conflict by crying. Gradually as they grow up, babies bite with their teeth or scratches with their nails when they are angry; the indication that men will endure fighting as long as they have reactions and emotions causing love or hate; to feel happy or sad and the like.

Conflict is inevitable in the daily lives of people who interact in the state of agreement or disagreement; based on different motives and interests. Conflict may be used interchangeably with terms such as contrast, disharmony, discord, struggle, contest, strife, antagonism, controversy, clash, rivalry, contest, contention, brawl, fisticuff, fight, battle, feud, combat and war. In all of these cases, the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their adversaries (ibid).

The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Marcus and Coleman, 2006) holds the position of Darwin who defined a conflict as a competitive struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. He contends that ‘all nature is at war’, one organism with another, or with an external nature. According to Ho-Won Jeong (2008), conflict dates back to the beginning of human history and will likely never end. The denial of identity, security, and recognition is a critical and fundamental concern for most intractable conflicts.

Theories of Conflict

Different scholars argue that conflict is a social phenomenon that occurs daily although it varies in occurrences, duration and accessibility to different opportunities that help fuel the conflict, and others. Therefore, the history of conflict is as old as human history and usually seem to be associated with the control of resources and for dominance that have ultimately exacerbated social, political, economic, and religious disputes. While it is distressing, it is also true that conflict is not preventable and is rather recurrent. Given the diversified sources of conflicts, its prevention and resolution mechanisms are contingent on factors that caused the conflict itself (Gizaw and Abera, 2001).

Scholars propose wide range of causes including racial, ethnic and religious superiority, and repressive rules that dream for economic and political power (Abreham, 2001). Some scholars categorically look at the causes of a conflict from two approaches; namely, the objective and the subjective. The objective approach associates the cause of a conflict to the socio-political and the structure of a society. The subjective approach on the other hand implies the perceived

discordancy of goals and differences that prompt position of differences for the conflict to occur (*Bereketiab, 2013*). Implicitly conflicts could also occur in seeking demand for justice, which includes civil, political, cultural and religious rights; and getting avenue to social and physical infrastructures. Abreham (2010) contends that the search for secession and independence leads to a conflict.

The Horn is an area that is heavily prone to and affected by wars and conflicts. In the post-colonial era, from the late 1950s to the present, the region has experienced several devastating conflicts. In addition, ethnic and region-based wars in the horn of Africa are essentially reflections of the challenges of state and nation building exercise (Mengisteab, 2013 p.26).

A famous political scientist Gudina (2010) argued that the cause of conflicts in Ethiopia dates back to centuries of wars of conquest and atrocity occurred during the ‘imperial March’ to the South; and it has resulted in the multi-ethnic polity of the country. According to Gudina, this has left wounds behind to the extent that the present is seen in the lens of the past and to shape the future of Ethiopia. He said that the hegemony owned and exercised by the limited super-power has led to the formation of the Ethiopian empire towards the end of the 19th century that triggered the national domination of the limited ethnic group (s) over many others. *Zeyohannis* (2001) found out that while recognizing the criticality of diversity and conflict in social life as a precondition, apparently, the Ethiopian law has paved fertile ground for sprouting and intensification of conflicts. Other scholars wrote that the live of the Oromo people in Ethiopia was threatened and many of them lost their life due to conflicts and massacres led by the successive Ethiopian regimes for which many writers say ‘Ethiopia’s history is a history of conquest’. The country’s national leaders came from the authority of the Amharic-speaking Christian highlanders ruled for more than a century; and marginalizing other ethnic groups geographically and culturally to the extremes from the centre. Martial De Salviac is a French Catholic priest and ‘anthropologist’ who lived in Oromo land and who also observed the Oromo social life before and during the colonial war. He witnessed the magnitude and cruelty of the Emperor Menelik who had conducted an act of barbaric (De Salviac, 1901 and Kanno, 2013 and *African Dynamics in a Multipolar World*, CEAS 2013, p.1123).

Overall, some scholars theorize the manifestation of conflicts from various perspectives. Some see it from inter-state and others from the intra-state angles. Others associate it in terms of modernization and the extent to which this could override the already embedded traditional norms. Adem (2012) theorizes this in two angles. One is related to the process of economic modernization, which gradually leads to a division of labour and potentially takes over the

organically integrated society and ethnicity to replace with mechanically integrated society. The other outlook stresses the point that modernization instead has a greater influence to increase ethnic group interaction, and does not result in a new form of integration. They argue that the former approach can easily aggravate conflicts as it threatens the established norms based on the ethnicity. They are opted for the inherent reason if they are forced to lose their political importance and unintegrated citizens that could easily grip to an increasingly anachronistic ethnic identity.

Richard Shultz highlighted the *four major* characteristics of groups that are involved in ethnic conflicts (ibid). One group is the one that is severely divided society, The second is a group that sees its differences from other ethnic groups as irreconcilable; the third is a group that believes that ethnicity is a principal form of identification; and is therefore subject to the manipulation of the elite. In such a dynamics and volatile environment, what the scholars call the normative structure of the international system comes into play to influence the outcomes of the confrontations and conflicts between communal movements and the state. To overcome these challenges and win the legitimacy, the governing elite reacts in a variety of ways that Gabriel Almond calls 'three possible modes of reaction' - (adaptive, rejective and substitutive). Theories of conflicts are an instrumental to explain causes of conflicts that are numerous and complex in nature. This creates difficulty to analyze specific conflict situations. Advanced conflict theories would help simplify the causes, as they are understood in categories. Conflicts are a salient feature of the human society. While different theories exhibit different causes of conflicts, for the purpose of this study, we will briefly look at structural theory of conflict, Marxist theory, international capitalist theory, realist theory, and psychological theory of conflict that are stipulated by Sheriff (n.d).

The Structural theory of conflict approaches the cause of a conflict from the viewpoint of tension that arises as groups competing for scarce resources. According to the structuralists, conflicts emanate from the exploitative and unjust nature of human societies or because of domination of one class by another. This theory is criticized for it fails to see the advantages of racial or ethnic diversity and the strength that a society may gain from pluralism.

The Marxist Theory of conflict has a lot to do with the Marxian understanding of a society that is believed to have been divided into unequal classes; one strong, rich and noble with a power to control the instrumentality of state; the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the other, which is a

proletariat, is disadvantaged, socially emptied and financially not affording. While the financially capable exercises his muscles and controls both the state and the poor, this creates antagonism between the two. For Marx, the state itself is a product of the bi-polarity and tensions of class struggles and the state is shaped to be in a lasting state of conflict. Centrally, Marx argues that capitalism is at the center of the state that polarizes the society. One of the critics of this theory is that it looks at every issue of conflict from the economic perspective, which cannot exhaust the conflict causation.

International Capitalism Theory of Conflict has association with ancient colonialism and imperialism. For instance in search of raw materials and viable markets, the colonial powers were forced to invest surplus capital outside their origin. The western powers, in addition to exploiting resources, also changed the cultural landscape and civilizations that triggered conflicts. This theory interested in the explanation of the systematic collaboration of western financial institutions and capital to apply their profound influence on the global economy.

The Economic Theory of Conflict illuminates the considerable interdependence between the elements of politics, which are power, resources and scarcity. People strive to assume power for the reason that it is a means to an end; the gain of which is the economic power. Communities at local level dispute over daily routine issues such as farmlands, grazing fields, water resource and others, whereas groups demand or contest against the government over allocation of resources. Here, scarcity, wants, needs, or perceived scarcity is a driving force for political power, contention for resource control, and so on (ibid).

Realist Theory of Conflict teaches that conflict is an inherent characteristic of man. Man is a 'political animal' that have different interests and this holds true for a society which triggers conflict especially in a situation where there are scarce resources; and also where most people are deprived of comfort or control of resources, inevitably conflict occurs. For the Realist Theory conflict is a product of the 'innate' and 'selfish' nature of man who strives to satisfy his own best interests and others are none of his business. This 'innate' nature of man leads to "competitive processes" between actors who seek to have all or most of the available scarce resources. This tendency leads to erratic behavior and hegemonic propensities that could subsequently fuel up the international politics (ibid).

Frustration-Anger-Aggression Theory is a psychological hypothesis of conflict that posits that it is natural for man to react to unfriendly situations. According to this theory, aggression is the result of blocking, or frustrating, a person's energies and journeys to attain a goal. It explains that aggression is caused by frustration that when someone is prevented from attaining the target, he/she is frustrated and finally becomes anxious and aggressive when something triggers him/her. Scholars argue that ethnic conflict is one of the internationally recognized major social conflicts in the contemporary world. Should conflicts critically be understood and be resolved, one should, therefore, understand the concepts and theories associated with these conflicts and the issues associated with conflicts (ibid).

Many of the theories of ethnicities discussed above fail to discuss and lack recommendations for conflict resolution mechanisms aside from problem statement. Only two opposing theories, that are Pluralist Society Theory and Consociation List Perspective, focus on ethnic conflict resolution. The former theory suggests no solution to ethnic conflict. It rather stresses that because ethnic groups are characterized by the discordancy of interests among themselves. In this situation, a multi-ethnic state disintegrates and the only option to rescue such a problem is the intervention of an external forces. On other hand, Consociation List Theory has a position that ethnic conflict can be resolved and the inter-ethnic cohesion can be advanced under a democratic system. The rule of law that involves negotiation helps to accommodate the competing interests of others (Jemma, 2001). Abebe (2001) and Tesega (2001) acknowledge an indigenous means of conflict resolution as proved and effective. They regard the Oromo indigenous approach of conflict prevention and resolution as it has been effective for centuries. The Oromo are the largest population group in the horn of Africa and perhaps the second or third- largest nationality in the entire continent of Africa although reliable source is scant in Ethiopia solely due to political reason. Perham (1969) and Keller (1988) wrote that over the last eighty years, the Oromo constituted about 40% of the Ethiopian population (Bulcha, 2016). One of the instances include that in 2010, the number of the Oromo people was 40% of the 80 million population of Ethiopia followed by Amhara (25%) in accordance with the US Bureau of African Affairs (2010) . The Ethiopian Constitution is cognizant of the ethnic groups as nations, nationalities, and peoples. Article 39 of the Constitution deliberately takes note of this fact and understands nation, nationality, or people as “a group of people who have or share a large measure of common culture, customs, common language, belief and identities. This looks like as if the Primordial approach is enshrined in it. The constitution has divided the country

into a federation of “autonomous” states and affirmed that Ethiopia is a multinational state.

Bulcha (2016) argues that the territorial formation of five of these regional states – Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, and Tigray – is ethno-linguistic in nature whereas the remaining states, namely; the SNNP, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Harar are multiethnic. For so long, the fact that the Oromo have been under siege is due to fear that the advancement of Oromo identity would end the power of their adversaries including their present cultural and linguistic identity. The Ethiopian regimes are bored of the Oromo identities amid rise of the Oromo nationalism in many aspects; geography and demography. Oromo is perceived as a peril to Ethiopian identity as a ‘nation’ and a state; and politically and cultural as explored by Baxter, Hultin and Triulzi (Bulcha, 2016). Kuspert-Rakotondrainy (2013) quotes Fishman to define ethnicity as “a self-and-other aggregative definitional dimension that is concerned with ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ and with ‘them’ vs. ‘them’”. Fishman underlines that the most distinct feature of an ethnic group is their language. For instance, ethnicity is already a parameter for political division in Ethiopia, as a matter of past history and the way ethnic groups in Ethiopia have struggled for self-determination. In the Ethiopian context, clearly one can see two distinct types of group affiliations. One is the identity explained in terms of the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’, and the other one is the affiliation of the Pan-Ethiopian identity under what is called ‘Habesha’; to mean Ethio-Semitic groups of Christian highlanders. Seemingly, Abbink (2006, p. 178) is also concerned with the narratives here and wrote that the existing government of Ethiopia did not complete its agenda in this regard.

Political scientists and Sociologists usually debate on the issue of the causes of ethnic conflict. It is important to assess some of the major theories of causes of ethnic conflict in order to make a theoretical foundation for this research. Generally, there are three main schools of thought in that regard. They are :- (1) primordialist, (2) constructivist and (3) instrumentalist.

Proponents of primordialist perspective argue that ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location. Primordialist perspective rely on strong ties of kinship among members of ethnic groups. This kinship makes it possible for ethnic groups to think in terms of family resemblances (Jack Hayward,2003).

They also argue that each person has a natural connection to perceived kinsmen. In time and through repeated conflict, essential ties to one's ethnicity will coalesce and will interfere with ties to civil society (*Abrams, Holly, 2010*).

Ethnic groups will consequently always threaten the survival of civil governments but not the existence of nations formed by one ethnic group. Thus, when considered through a primordial lens, ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic society is inevitable. In this case, the most influential element for the cause of ethnic conflict is the perceived destructive intention or activity by specific group of people against ones cultural values, languages, religion, flag or any symbol of identity.

The constructivist perspective on the other hand argues advocates the importance of the socially constructed nature of ethnic groups (Jack Hayward,2003). Proponents of this perspective usually mention the case of Rwanda as an example because the the distinction between Tutsi versus Hutu was codified by the Belgian colonial power in the 1930s on the basis of cattle ownership, physical measurements and church records. Identity cards were issued on this basis, and these documents played a key role in the genocide of 1994. So, the constructivist perspective mainly focuses on the social orders which are to be formed both officially and tacitly. In this case, the most influential element for the cause of ethnic conflict is naming of social groups by political or religious institutions. That means, institutions which issue regionalism, border demarcation, ethnic group recognition and the like are the very basic agents of ethnic conflict. (Jack Hayward,2003).

When we come to the third theory, we find the instrumentalist argument. According to the instrumentalist perspective, whether ethnicity is a fixed perception or not is not crucial. Thus, this theory views explained persistence as the result of the actions of community leaders, who use their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, because they can find them more effective than social classes. (*Abrams, Holly, 2010*). In this account of ethnic identification, ethnicity and race are viewed as instrumental means to achieve particular ends. Moreover, the scholars of this school generally do not oppose the view that ethnic difference plays a part in many conflicts. They simply claim that ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain conflicts. (*IBID*).

Mass mobilization of ethnic groups can only be successful if there are latent ethnic differences to be exploited, otherwise politicians would not even attempt to make political appeals based on

ethnicity and would focus instead on economic or ideological appeals. Hence, it is difficult to completely discount the role of inherent ethnic differences. Additionally, ethnic entrepreneurs, or elites, could be tempted to mobilize ethnic groups in order to gain their political support in democratizing states. Instrumentalist theorists especially emphasize this interpretation in ethnic states in which one ethnic group is promoted at the expense of other ethnicities.

Hence, in this case of instrumentalist theory, resource is very important. Political elites or the ruling class play a vital role in the creation of ethnic conflict because they prioritize their own accumulation of wealth. When they prioritize their own economic security, that condition may cause lack of good governance or maladministration. So, whenever there are economic crises, there can also be lack of basic needs among the people and then, people start to rush for resource. The ruling class or political elites then try to divert this economic problem into ethnic dilemma in order to avoid the guilt from itself.

A number of political scientists argue that the root causes of ethnic conflict do not involve ethnicity in the pure sense, but rather institutional, political, and economic factors. These scholars argue that the concept of ethnic war is misleading because it leads to an essentialist conclusion that certain groups are doomed to fight each other when in fact the wars between them that occur are often the result of political decisions. There have always been economic claims behind every ethnic argument and conflict in Ethiopia so far. Therefore, as a theoretical framework, the Instrumentalist perspective is more compatible with the experience of Ethiopia. So, the researcher has tentatively planned to conduct the study within the conceptual framework of the instrumentalist theory. However, the upcoming main research has equal rooms of accommodation for any of all possible results to be found at the end of the investigation to be carried out.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODS AND METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

3.1. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research type is going to be a Qualitative Research. It is a kind of Case Study which specifically focuses on the case of Ethiopian state formation and its relationship with the case of Ethno-cultural identity in Ethiopian communities.

In terms of data collection, both primary and secondary sources are to be used. Naturalistic observation and Interviews are to be used as primary sources and critical review of relevant literatures is to be used as secondary sources.

Critical instance case study. This is to observe the research site for the purpose of calling into question in order to either challenge or assert the existing generalized thought about the cause and effect relationship between Ethno-cultural identity, its positive as well as negative impacts on Ethiopian state formation, and then to assess the implication of the answer to be found in the context of the contemporary globalization era.

- Independent variable is Ethno-cultural identity and dependent variable is state formation.
- Investigating variables are participant groups of academicians from different academic centers of higher education as well as prominent members of different political parties. Their ideas are to be assessed by responding to interview questions.

3.2. METHODS

3.2.1. TOOLS FOR DATA COLLECTION

The researcher will use the following techniques to collect data:

- Analyzing texts and documents, Interviews and
- Recording and transcribing
- discussions, etc

The main focus will be targeted on the structured questioner and key informant interview through check list, logically coherent questions in response to the research objective drafted and

the researcher will pose questions based on the checklists to find as much information as possible through probing technique until the relevant information is acquired.

The other tools; and document review will be targeted on obtaining more information about the Ethno-cultural issues in Ethiopia.

3.2.2. SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW

Key informant interviewers are going to be divided in to three categories in terms of their occupational status.

1. Academicians from different disciplines
2. Different Political Party members
3. Workers from different civil society institutions

The researcher will conduct interviews with 10 senior academicians who work at different higher educational institutions. These academicians are to be senior lecturers who have been teaching Social Science disciplines such as History, Geography, Political Science, Philosophy, Anthropology, Sociology, International Relations, Global Studies, African Studies and Civics. In addition to those Social science lecturers, the research will conduct interview with ten political professionals (Political party members) who work in different political parties in Ethiopia. Thirdly, ten other individuals who work in different civil society institutions will be questioned in that regard.

3.2.3. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWERS

In addition to those Social science lecturers, the research will conduct interview with ten political professionals (Political party members) who work in different political parties in Ethiopia.

3.3. SAMPLING METHODS

- **SAMPLING IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH**

Sampling is required in both qualitative and quantitative studies, simply because the “researches cannot observe or record everything that occurs” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:77).

we often speak of probability and non probability samples in social science research probability sampling is considered as the most rigorous approach to sampling since every element in the study of population is chosen at random and have a known probability of selection (Ritchie and Lewis,2003 :78)

Therefore the qualitative methods employed will be focused on group discussion and key informant interview through check list, logically coherent questions in response to the research objective drafted; and the researcher will pose questions based on the checklists to find as much information as possible through probing technique until the relevant information acquired.

The other tools are relevant literatures and documents to be reviewed in order to learn more about the relationship between Ethno-cultural identity and state formation in Ethiopia.

3.4. METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS

The researcher will attempt to produce patterns and concepts from the data by analysing interview, discussions and documents into different thematic arrays and structured coding will be used in stead of open coding. Qualitative research helps to ensure that all the key consistencies of relevance to the subject matter are covered and some diversity is included. Even though the research type is mainly a qualitative research, since it should be as objective as possible, the researcher will attempt to include a scientific data analysis technique.

Therefore, The SPSS will be used to examine descriptive statistics and the correlation between the variables to be selected. Accordingly, The data, which will be gathered through the interview and questionnaire, will be analyzed using the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) version 16. To obtain the demographic information of the participants, the researcher will employ descriptive statistics, such as frequency and percentages will be engaged to check the major types, common causes and management techniques in the process of group decision making. Finally, After categorizing similar responses of the open-ended questions, the researcher will analyze them in terms of the research questions.

American Psychological Association conventions (APA) will be used for reporting significant results, i.e., $p < 0.05$ as statistically significant (*) and $p < 0.01$ as statistically more significant (**). In the data analysis, Bivariate analysis will be used for testing the degree of associations

among the two variables to be denoted as (X,Y). this is to determine the empirical relationship between them.

3.5. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Even though Ethno-cultural identity and state formation is a worldwide issue, the scope of this literature is restricted to Ethiopian context; and in terms of conceptual framework, it attempts to deal with ethno-cultural identity in its aspect which exclusively relates only to globalism.

3.6. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

Even though there are a number of universities in Ethiopia, due to financial and time constrains, the researcher's operation is limited in the universities which are located only in Addis Ababa city. The other limitation is that, it is very difficult to find out people who have the courage to express their genuine political believes due to some security issues. Besides, while communicating with the main participants of the study, it is difficult to find out persons who are free from personal bias even among academicians.

3.7. CHAPTERS PLAN

* The study project will have five chapters and they have been tentatively planned as follows:

CHAPTER ONE :- This chapter has presents the “Introduction”. The introduction contains two parts; the background as well as the conceptualization and theoretical framework.

The background and the conceptualization deals with various theories and perspectives about the relationship between state formation and ethno-culture in Ethiopian Political system. In addition, the chapter will present about the issue of identity and globalization in Ethiopian context.

CHAPTER TWO :- Literature review about Ethnicity, Culture, identity and Globalization.

CHAPTER THREE :- will present about the Research Methodology

CHAPTER FOUR :- Chapter four has two further divisions : Part one and Part Two. Part one will present the main theme and part two will present the Research Interpretation and analysis.

CHAPTER FIVE :- will present Conclusion and Recommendation

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abu El-Haj, Nadia, 2007, “The Genetic Reinscription of Race”, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 36: 283–300.
- Alcoff, Linda Martin, 1997, “Philosophy and Racial Identity”, *Philosophy Today*, 41 (1/4): 67–76.
- —, 2000, “Phenomenology, Post-Structuralism, and Feminist Theory on the Concept of Experience”, in *Feminist Phenomenology*, Linda Fisher and Lester Embree (eds), Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- —, 2006, “Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self”, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Alfred, Taiaiake, 1999, *Peace, Power, and Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Allen, Amy, 2008, *The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Anderson, Bridget, 2000, *Doing the Dirty Work? The Global Politics of Domestic Labour*, London: Zed Books.
- Anzaldúa, Gloria, 1999 *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*, San Francisco: Aunt Lute.
- Appian, Anthony, 1994, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction”, in Guttman (ed.) 1994, 149–164.
- Appiah, Anthony and Amy Gutmann, 1996, *Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Asante, Molefi K., 1998, *The Afrocentric Idea*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- —, 2000, *The Painful Demise of Eurocentrism: An Afrocentric Response to Critics*, Lawrenceville, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Bennett, Jane, 2009, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*, Durham: Duke University Press.
- Bhabra, Gurminder K. and Victoria Margree, 2010, “Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 45(15): 59–66.
- Bickford, Susan, 1997, “Anti-Anti-Identity Politics: Feminism, Democracy, and the Complexities of Citizenship”, *Hypatia*, 12(4): 111–31.

- Blasius, Mark (ed.), 2001, *Sexual Identities, Queer Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brown, Wendy, 1995, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- —, 2011, “Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street”, *Transversal*, October. [Butler 2011 available on-line].
- Cixous, Hélène, 1976, “The Laugh of the Medusa”, Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen (trans.), *Signs*, 1: 875–93.
- Connolly, William, 2002, *Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- —, 2011, *A World of Becoming*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost (ed.) 2010. *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*, Durham: Duke University Press.
- Cornell, Drucilla, 2000, *Just Cause: Freedom, Identity, and Rights*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Coulthard, Glen, 2011, *A World of Becoming*, Durham: Duke University Press.
- —, 2014, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Cudd, Ann E., 2006, *Analyzing Oppression*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Davis, Lennard J. (ed.), 2006 [1997], *The Disability Studies Reader*, New York: Routledge.
- Dean, Jodi, 1996, *Solidarity of Strangers: Feminism after Identity Politics*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Deveaux, Monique, 2000, *Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

CURRICULUM VITAE

I. PERSONAL DATA

Name : Befekadu Dhaba Banti

Date of Birth: January 15, 1960

Place of Birth: Borana, Yabello

Sex: Male

Marital status : Married

Language : Amharic, Afan Oromo (Oromo language) and English

ADDRESS : Tel. 251-911-61-28-54 or 251-942-52-74-61

E-mail: dbefeaau@yahoo.com

II. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

- ❖ **Sept.2002- Jan.2005**, M.A. degree in International Relation, Addis Ababa University.
- ❖ **Sept.1996- Dec.1999**, B.A. Degree in Political Science and International Relation (Management Minor), Addis Ababa University.

III. SUMMARY OF WORK EXPERIENCES

I. Academic

1. Teaching assignments:

- 1.1. **Full-time course at New Generation University College-** have been teaching Major Political Science & International Relation Courses since 2004.
- 1.2. **Part -time courses both at public & private universities**
 - Have been teachings, advising & examining M.A. student theses at various universities: **St. Mary University, Civil Service University, Haregisa New Generation University.**

Consultant Team member and conducted research on “The Effect of Conflict on Women & the Family in former Borana Zone”.

- **March 10, 2002- Nov.22, 2002** served as an Expert of Promotion and Salary Increment, Addis Ababa City Administration (Region 14) Civil Service Bureau.
- **Feb. 2000-December 31, 2001**, Child Development Project Manager at Belojganfoy District (Food For the Hungry International/ Ethiopia), Kamashi Zone, Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State.
- **January 1, 1993-March 30, 1996**. Food For Work (FFW) Supervisor, Yabello Mekane Yesus Relief and Rehabilitations Office, Borana.

V. TRAINING & WORKSHOPS

- ❖ **January 11-14, 2001** attended workshop on Logical Framework Analysis.
- ❖ **November 20-25, 2001** attended workshop on Child Abuse and Neglect: Approach and Management.
- ❖ **August 28-30, 2001** participated in workshop titled ‘Emergence Response, Capacity Building program Workshop, theme 3; designing an Emergency Program’.
- ❖ **Feb.21-25, 2001**, attended workshop titled ‘Enhancing Federalism Scholarship in Ethiopia’.

VI. SKILLS & ATTRIBUTES

- Basic Computer knowledge: word, excel, data base and internet operations;
- Second grade driving License;
- Peace & Conflict Analyst ;
- Proactive in dealing with issues at hand;
- Ability to lead & facilitate meetings/conferences, & solid presentation skill;
- Ability to listen to others opinion, persuade & convince the conflicting parties to negotiate resolve their differences on amicable basis;

- **August 2014- present**, tutoring & advising 3 post-graduate students to write-up their theses, St. Mary University.
- **Oct.2, 2013- Oct, 3014**, trained Post-graduate students on Ethiopian Foreign Policy, National Security Priorities & Foreign Policy Analysis at School of International Relations & Diplomacy, Civil Service University.
- **Sept.2008- present**, I have been teaching Civics & Ethical Education (3 credit hrs) at Sidist Kilo University, Kotobe College of Teacher Education, Lincoln University, and City University College.
- **Oct.1, 2004 –Dec.31 2012**, Department Head at NGUC.
- **Oct.25, -Nov.10, 2012**, Guest lecturer at Hargeisa New Generation University College, Somaliland.
- **Nov. 2011-Sept.2012**, worked on part-time basis as Borana Zone Emergency Intervention Project Co-coordinator. Panos Ethiopia (while holding my teaching assignment).
- **July 25-Sept.25, 2010**, Evaluated Panos-Ethiopia phased out Borana Intervention Project.
- **Dec.2-4, 2009**, prepared teaching materials on ' Child Care & Development', and offered 3 days training for the staff of Hope For Children (HFC).
- **March 2006- Feb.13, 2009** Academic Dean.
- **In March 2004**, in collaboration with my colleague, prepared Training Manual on 'Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolutions' for CARE Borana Office, and offered 5 days training for Midlevel Professionals drawn from Government offices & Community leaders.
- **December 2003**, worked as a member Consultant Team & conducted research for Action For Development (AFD), a local NGO, on "The Role of Traditional pastoral Institutions in Governance".
- **April-June 2003**, worked for International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a

- Have been teaching Civic & Ethical Education both at private & public universities.

2. Administration- served as Academic Dean & Department Head at NGUC that allowed me to be a member of Academic Senate, participate in curriculum design, lead departmental commission, and have been serving as a Master of Graduation Ceremony since 2007.

II. **Non- Academic-** worked in different parts of the country both in government & NGOs in various capacities. In NGOs setting, served as Child Development Project Manager, Emergency Project Coordinator, Supervisor, Evaluated phased out Project, served as liaison Officer, an advocate for the marginalized groups.

In Governmental & party assignments- worked as an Expert of Promotion & Salary Increment, Cooperative Organizer, and Responsible Person for Youth Affairs & First Party Secretary along frontlines- Ethio-Somalia & Ethio-Kenya borders.

IV. DETAILED WORK EXPERIENCES

- **Oct. 1, 2004-present**, Senior instructor at New Generation University College, have been instructing courses such as State & society (3 credit hrs), Peace & Conflict Studies (4 credit hrs), Foreign policy & diplomacy (4 credit hrs), Politics in the Horn & the Middle East (3 credit hrs), Civil Society & Community Empowerment (3 credit hrs), International Law & International Organizations (3 credit hrs), Federalism (3 credit hrs), Comparative Politics (3 credit hrs), Political Economy of the World (3 credit hrs), & International Relations (3 credit hrs).
- **Since March 2004-present**, I have been instructing post graduate students at various facilities in Civil Service University.: Institute of leadership & Good Governance, School of Diplomacy & International Relations, Institute of Federalism & Legal Studies respectively

- Ability & willingness to perform multiple tasks at the same time;
- liaise with governmental officials, NGOs, Civil Society & other stakeholders;
- Amiable character that allowed me to work with team members drawn from multi-disciplinary multi-cultural background (both Ethiopians & foreigners);
- Interested to share knowledge & experience with others, & ready to Learn from anybody with reasonable behavior.

VII. References

Mr. Mustefa Tafiro, Global Studies & International Relations Department Head at New Generation University College, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Cell phone 251-9-10-46-25-86.

Mr. Solomon Hailemariam, former Panos Ethiopia Country Director, Addis Ababa. Cell phone 251-9-11-40-96-80 E-mail address: he 7solomon@gamil.com

Asnake Kefiale (Dr.), Graduate School of Governance Studies, Sidist Kilo University.
Cell phone # 251-912-11-27-28.

Dr. Teshome Tafesse, Ethiopian Civil Service University Research & Publication Director. Cell phone # 25191384956